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performance’ 
 
The UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry is recognised as having made significant 
safety performance improvement progress following the Piper Alpha disaster 
(6th July 1988), subsequent Public Inquiry, and 106 recommendations made 
by the Cullen Report. However, accidents continue to occur on offshore assets 
due to leadership and organisational failures, poor behaviours, lack of 
operating discipline, asset integrity challenges, and an absence of aligned 
safety strategy. Research was conducted through a strategic lens, looking 
across a typical Operator company’s value chain, and going beyond the 
predominant technical and engineering safety focus. Utilising safety climate 
as a leading indicator of safety performance, research explored the ways in 
which organisational typology, strategy, leadership, and psychological forces 
contribute to safety performance on offshore assets. Research of this nature 
had not previously been conducted in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry; 
triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data was utilised. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted onshore with Managers and 
Supervisors to determine organisational typology make-up of the value chain, 
associated safety strategy, with consideration for leadership and the 
psychological forces dynamic of Human Factors. An Offshore Workforce 
Safety Study was deployed at seven offshore assets. Under Academic Licence, 
the study utilised proven and validated data collection tools: Authentic 
Leadership Questionnaire (ALQ); Psychological Capital Questionnaire (PCQ); 
and the Safety Climate Tool (SCT). 
 
The research identified organisational typology patterns across the value 
chain. Operator and Contractor organisations were determined to typically 




Reactors. Considering safety performance at the offshore assets as measured 
by safety climate perception, it was concluded that organisational typology 
had no influence. There was no statistically significant difference between the 
safety performance indicator of safety climate perceptions across the 
typologies associated with the Operator, Contractor, and Sub-contractor 
value chain groups. Strict compliance with the Operator control of work 
arrangements plus the consistent Operator safety message was concluded to 
be the mediating factor. Authentic leadership and psychological capital 
constructs were both demonstrated to be positively correlated with safety 
climate scores. Each of the seven assets studied returned ‘Good’ safety 
climate scores on a validated scoring system. However, there was no 
significant difference determined across Operator, Contractor, and Sub-
contractor groups for safety climate scores by authentic leadership and 
psychological capital. Strict compliance with the Operator control of work 
arrangements plus the consistent Operator safety message was again 
concluded to be the mediating factor. Persisting with current compliance-
based practices was determined to possess a limiting effect over the ability 
to evolve from ‘Good’ to ‘Excellent’ safety climate scores in future offshore 
asset operations. Derived from the research findings and conclusion, 
contributions to practice, knowledge and method were identified. Four specific 
recommendations were made for practice, plus four for future safety science 
research. 
 
Keywords: Organisational Typology, Authentic Leadership, Psychological 
Capital, and Safety Climate. 
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This chapter serves to provide the reader with a comprehensive background 
to the thesis, introduce the research aim, questions, and objectives, present 
a synopsis of the research design and methodology, plus highlight the 
significance of the study. It also provides a chapter outline for the remainder 
of the thesis. 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH AIM 
 
Accidents and incidents in the workplace, for example Major Accident Hazard 
(MAH) events such as explosion and fire or occupational safety events such 
as slips, trips and falls, are acknowledged to severely deteriorate human 
capital, essential to organisational competitiveness, innovativeness, and 
economic success (Marimuthu et al., 2009; Unger et al., 2011; Diaz-
Fernandez et al., 2014; Kottaridi et al., 2019) and at the same time 
negatively affecting productivity (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2009). Considering 
organisations to be designed through strategic choices, something that was 
argued early by Child (1972), safety strategy considerations may be 
considered as an important strategic element for inclusion in overall business 
strategy. With that in mind, the research was conducted through a strategic 
lens, going beyond the predominant technical and engineering focus of 
organisations where frequently safety is considered proven by the absence of 
accidents and incidents.  
 
Safety management in organisations is considered heavily dependent on 
management and workforce beliefs and assumptions concerning 
organisational behaviour and safety, thus safety can be viewed as a dynamic 
and emergent property of an organisation, including engineering, social and 
technological aspects (Reiman et al., 2015). Further, the concept of safety 
and its management was considered adaptive and evolving in nature by 
Obolensky (2016). In formulating a proposal for the current research and 
through literature review, there appeared to be little evidence of safety 
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science research on the topic of safety strategy. However, in the absence of 
a strategy for safety with alignment to overall business strategy, it is unclear 
how positive safety performance can be consistently delivered to the benefit 
of organisational competitive advantage (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2009). A 
clear rationale for the research study subsequently emerged with a 
determined focus to provide an original contribution to assist with closure of 
the perceived safety-strategy gap in safety science research literature. 
 
Aligned with the perceived safety-strategy gap and from a from a human 
capital perspective, the UK’s Health and Safety regulator acknowledges that 
everyone can make errors no matter how well trained and motivated they 
are. However, the consequences of such human failure in the workplace can 
be extreme. Analysis of accidents and incidents provides evidence that human 
failure contributes to almost all accidents and exposures to substances 
hazardous to health. Many major Oil & Gas Industry accidents were initiated 
by human failure (Reason, 1997; Hopkins, 2012; Decker, 2014; Flin et al., 
2015). To avoid accidents and ill-health, organisations need to strategically 
manage human failure as robustly as the technical and engineering measures 
they use for that purpose (Decker, 2011). This served to direct the research 
into considering safety as a social construct within the context of 
organisational typology and organisational strategy. 
 
In the UK, the explosion and fire that destroyed the Piper Alpha oil platform 
on 6th July 1988, resulting in the deaths of 167 offshore workers, provided 
the worst offshore oil and gas industry disaster in terms fatalities. The Cullen 
Report (1990) resulting from the Public Inquiry has significantly influenced 
the management of health and safety for offshore workers during the past 25 
years. The enquiry made 106 recommendations in five key areas: regulatory 
systems for the UK offshore industry; management systems and control of 
work, hydrocarbon control, management of emergencies, evacuation, and 
rescue; and workforce engagement. Improvements generated following the 
Cullen Report have generally been credited with raising safety standards 
within the UK industry. The UK Oil & Gas Piper 25 Conference held during 
June 2013 had an agenda to reflect, review, reinforce and re-energise 
management of offshore safety. A Review of the Cullen Recommendations 
questioning their current relevance. The conclusion was that in the UK 
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industry accidents and incidents still occur for ‘old’ reasons. To meet these 
challenges, it was stressed as essential for organisations working in the 
industry to develop and implement appropriate business strategies, 
supported by effective leadership. Judith Hackitt CBE, Chair of the Health and 
Safety Executive stated that “there are no new accidents.  Rather there are 
old accidents repeated by new people” (Hackitt, 2013). 
 
The conclusion resonated that the industry remained predominantly focused 
on the engineering and technical aspects of safety; still viewing safety as 
proven through lagging indicators, the absence of accidents and incidents. 
The UK Regulator called for appropriate business strategies, highlighting the 
need for safety to be included formally as an element of overall organisational 
strategy. This was confirmed by Broadribb (2015) when considering what has 
really been learnt twenty-five years on from Piper Alpha was that in the UKCS 
accidents still occurred on offshore assets due to a blend of leadership and 
organisational failures, poor behaviours, and operating discipline, deficient 
asset integrity, and an absence of coherent safety management (strategy). 
By viewing safety strategy as a dynamic and emergent property of an 
organisation, opportunities may subsequently present to stimulate safety 
performance improvement with a commensurate positive affect on 
organisational productivity and competitiveness. Given the complex and 
varied make-up of the UK Offshore Oil & Gas industry value chain, the 
Researcher considered it unlikely that a one-size fits all safety strategy would 
be possible. Having already established that safety may be viewed as a 
dynamic and emerging property of an organisation, any developed strategy 
will most likely possess a uniqueness reflecting each organisations’ emergent 
engineering, social and technological aspects. Across the value chain there 
are many examples where different organisations provide the same products 
and services to the industry customers; here there may be similarities of 
process, structure, and strategy. Therefore organisational [strategic] 
typology emerged as a research topic of interest. Piper 25 highlighted the 
need for effective leadership in support of appropriately selected business 
strategies. This element of conclusion framed a key research area; for highly 
complex organisations working in hazardous environments is there a 
predominant style of leadership that promotes positive safety behaviour, 
through the effective implementation of safety strategy as an aligned element 
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of business strategy? At an individual level, what characteristics require to be 
present to ensure that safety policies and procedures are consistently 
followed, all with an acute level of hazard awareness to detect changes and 
emerging threats in the working environment? With these considerations, an 
overall research aim was established to: 
 
‘Explore the ways in which organisational typology, strategy, leadership, and 
psychological forces contribute to safety performance’. 
 
When the research was significantly underway, a Safety 30 industry 
conference was held during June 2018; a two-day event to mark the 30th 
anniversary of the Piper Alpha disaster. Lord Cullen presented an address 
containing a stern reminder of the dangers of complacency, particularly the 
dangers associated with not recognising or effectively acting upon warning 
signals. The examples highlighted included: Texas City Oil Refinery, 2005; 
Buncefield Oil Storage Depot, 2005; and Deepwater Horizon, 2010. These 
disasters were multi-faceted rather than purely engineering and technical in 
root cause, each giving rise to incident investigations, reports and academic 
studies illustrating [amongst other considerations] Human Factors (HF), 
organisational plus social contributing factors. The consideration of Safety 30 
indicated that the conclusions of Hackitt (2013) from the Piper 25 Conference 
plus Broadribb (2015) had not been fully acted upon; there remained 
propensity for further UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry disasters. In all regards, 
Safety 30 reinforced the originality and continued relevance of the established 
research aim.  
 
1.2 HAZARDS IN THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY  
 
The global and industrialised Oil & Gas Industry may be considered relatively 
modern, dating from the 19th century and the exploitation of the Baku 
(Azerbaijan) oilfields in 1846.  By the year 2000, hydrocarbons (oil and gas) 
were the most important derivation of power in the world economy 
(Stoneham, 2000), especially in modernised western societies. Out of 
commercial necessity, offshore oil and gas production platforms are usually 
designed in as compact a layout as possible, with a high density of processing 
equipment and living space (Khan, Sadiq, and Husain, 2002). Hazards are 
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present in any process involving hydrocarbons especially on offshore 
installations. Any accident resulting in fire and explosion may lead to the total 
loss of an offshore installation, as well as human life, e.g. Alexander Kielland 
- 1980, Piper Alpha – 1988, Mumbai High – 2005 and Deepwater Horizon - 
2010. The direct effect of fire and explosion to human life may be catastrophic 
and so may be the impact on the physical installation itself. Furthermore, oil 
and gas organisations are complex systems that are continually changing. 
Changes are typically in response to the external environment, e.g. market 
conditions, competition, government legislation, and shareholder 
expectations. Change may also by initiated from the internal environment, 
e.g. from within the social organisation. For offshore installations specifically, 
change may involve the production processes, technology, and personnel; all 
such change can invalidate, to a degree, prior hazard identification and risk 
assessment outcomes. If hazards are identified and associated risks assessed 
on a continual basis then such changes should be picked up explicitly to avoid 
accident and incident situations from evolving to catastrophic levels. 
However, the continuation of major oil and gas industry accidents 
occurrences worldwide (e.g. Alexander Kielland, Piper Alpha, Mumbai High, 
and Deepwater Horizon) serve to highlight the need for improved safety 
performance within hydrocarbon producing organisations.  
 
1.3 UK OFFSHORE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY SAFETY PERFORMANCE 
TRENDS 
 
Specifically considering the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry, and as stated 
previously, improvements generated following the Cullen Report are 
generally credited with raising safety standards within the UK Offshore Oil & 
Gas Industry. Oil & Gas UK’s annually published Health & Safety Report 
documents this overall improvement, as evidenced by the key performance 
data and trends. Figure 1.1. illustrates that since 2006-07 there have been 
seven work-related fatalities. This is significantly lower than the nineteen 
fatalities occurring across the previous decade.  Similarly, in Figure 1.2, the 
specified injury rate decreased to just under 73 per 100,000 workers during 
2016, its lowest recorded level. Furthermore, the over-seven-day injury rate 
reached a historic low during 2015, increasing slightly again during 2016 and 
2017.  
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Figure 1.1 Fatal Injuries Offshore - Source OGUK (2018a) 
 
Figure 1.3 illustrates that the number of major and significant releases have 
also been reducing since the recorded peak in 1997, with the twenty-three 
events recorded in 2016 being the lowest year on record. The key 
performance data and trends demonstrate improvement in safety 
performance over time, but also that further scope for improvement persists 
given the continued presence of hydrocarbon hazards plus a challenging work 
environment. There remains, however, no room for industry complacency 
with new challenges that did not necessarily present at the time of the Piper 
Alpha disaster. The UK industry has an increasingly ageing infrastructure and 
a mature basin that requires the execution of new and potentially untried 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Over-Seven-Day and Specified Injury Rate per 100,000 Workers - Source: OGUK 
(2018a) 
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technologies for hydrocarbon extraction. Decommissioning activity in the UK 
sector is predicted to increase over the next ten-plus years, presenting 
further challenges within the industry to: prevent major accident hazard 
occurrence by effectively managing asset integrity; and maintaining a 
positive focus on safety through completion of the decommissioning process 
(OGUK, Decommissioning Insight 2018b). 
 
Figure 1.3 Number of Process Hydrocarbon Releases Offshore - Source: OGUK (2018a) 
 
Consequently, there are now different business risk issues to be considered 
by both Operating, Contracting and Sub-contracting companies. The UK 
Regulator considers that Human Factors (HF) is clearly an issue for the 
industry (Hackitt, 2013). They may influence outcomes in each of the five 
key areas of recommendation made by Lord Cullen, most specifically 
management systems and control of work. Lest the industry forget Lord 
Cullen’s most recent reminder [at Safety 30] concerning complacency and 
the dangers associated with not recognising or effectively acting upon 
warning and weak signals. 
 
1.4 HUMAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE UK OFFSHORE OIL & GAS 
INDUSTRY  
 
Human contribution is substantial to the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry, with 
49,079 people travelling offshore during 2018 (OGUK, 2019a), with almost 
80 per cent working for Contractor or Sub-contractor companies. an offshore 
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population of 29,700 full time equivalent (FTE) workers (HSE, 2018), 
accounting for 4.8 million working days offshore. This population is spread 
across 143 manned operational assets, who in addition, provide support to 
118 normally unmanned installations, typically through helicopter flying 
campaigns. In addition, there are a further 41 non-operating assets that 
require periodic in-field intervention and inspection. This workforce faces 
daily challenges of a hostile environment in addition to complex and highly 
physical process demands related to the extraction, containment, and 
transportation of hydrocarbons.  In addition, approximately fifty percent of 
fixed platforms have now aged to beyond their original design life. The HSEb 
(2014: 13) noted that ageing is not limited to hardware but extends to 
“procedures, software, control equipment, and perhaps most importantly to 
the skills and experience of people working in the offshore industry, and the 
need to bring new people into the industry to be trained to manage future 
challenges.” It can be plausibly deduced, therefore, that ageing assets have 
the potential to exacerbate some elements of operational and process safety 
thus presenting potential serious consequences for personal and commercial 
risk, particularly if not appropriately managed. Additionally, the potential for: 
loss of hydrocarbon containment; asset failure; collision; well plug and 
abandonment failure; loss through incident in well intervention processes; or 
loss of well control; must be considered as dynamic, complex, and costly.  In 
addition to life extension projects there are an excess of 150 
decommissioning projects across the UK industry. Decommissioning is an 
activity that is expected to have a duration beyond at least 2025 (Oil & Gas 
UK, 2018). As the level of technology continues to expand, driving complexity 
of processes and systems, any subsequent major accidents could be 
catastrophic and may even result in commercial extinction for organisations 
involved in industry value chains.  
 
In recent years, several engineering approaches have been developed and 
implemented to generate safety improvements. For example, ‘inherent 
safety’ principles have been applied to the conceptual and detailed design of 
offshore platforms (Dalzell, 1998; and Kletz, 1998). This approach has the 
advantage that it addresses the source of potentially hazardous situations. 
However, human and organizational factors remain equally important issues 
to manage for improved safety performance (Reason, 1990; O’Dea and Flin, 
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2001; Mikkelsen, Ringstad and Steineke, 2004; Nivolianitou, Leopoulus and 
Konstantinidou, 2004; Hughes and Kornowa-Weichel, 2004; Adie et al., 
2005; plus Attwood, Khan and Veitch, 2006). This latter point is notable since 
in UK industry a significant majority of major accidents and incidents include 
HF as a critical feature. The UK Regulator consider that human failures, not 
mechanical failure, or environmental intervention, are responsible for up to 
80% of all types of accident and feature in almost every major accident. In 
this environment, HF become increasingly critical. Where safety is concerned 
“mastery of human factors is necessary when implementing safety 
management in complex systems” (Teperi and Leppanen, 2011). This 
perspective is supportive of Dekker’s (2011) consideration that to avoid 
accidents and ill-health, organisations need to strategically manage human 
failure as robustly as the technical and engineering measures they use for 
the same purpose.  
 
1.5 HUMAN FACTORS AND SAFETY 
 
Within the UK offshore Oil & Gas industry Human Factors are typically referred 
to as being: 
 
“environmental, organisational and job factors, and human and individual 
characteristics, which influence behaviour at work in a way which can affect 
health and safety”. (HSE, 1999). 
 
However, within broader academic research, a consistent definition of the HF 
term continues to prove elusive.  Korolija and Lundberg (2010) record that 
HF is a term frequently misused in media reporting of accidents. The 
unfortunately resultant and misplaced interpretation is one singularly related 
to human failure. Korolija and Lundberg (ibid) also confirmed through their 
studies that the lack of consensus over the HF definition between professional 
accident investigators further highlights the inconsistencies of HF conception. 
For research purposes, and to gain traction within organisational strategy, 
qualified support is provided for the definition propounded by Woods and 
Decker (2000) who defined HF as the: 
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 “intersection between people, technology and work, with the major aim to 
find areas where design and working conditions produce human error.”  
This definition narrowly focuses on human error. The alternative definition of 
HF, offered by the International Ergonomics Association (IEA, 2000) focuses 
on ‘optimising performance’ rather than ‘error’ and considers the 
‘interactions’ between people was preferred for research purposes: 
 
“the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of the interactions 
among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that 
applies theoretical principles, data and methods to design in order to optimise 
well-being and overall performance.” 
 
Dul and Neumann (2009) consider from this definition that HF has both a 
social (well-being) and an economic (performance) goal. Dul et al. (2012) 
conclude further that: HF pursues a systems approach; is design driven; and 
focuses on performance and well-being. Hollnagel (2014) considers that, as 
outcomes, the social and economic goals of HF will generally be realised on 
two quite different timescales. Achievement of the economic goal through 
performance improvement may be realised through well-known mechanisms, 
with insignificant delay and limited uncertainty. However, the relationship 
between HF and well-being (a psychological and physiological state) is 
indirect and may involve considerable unknown delays. Dul and Nuemann 
(ibid) suggest that by connecting HF to organisational strategy, a positive 
motivation for the application of HF may be created. Such a perspective may 
promulgate improvements in overall business system performance as well as 
in safety performance.  
 
1.6 STRATEGY AND SAFETY 
 
Given the perspective from the UK Regulator, consideration was given 
through research to exactly what constitutes and represents appropriate 
business strategies to ensure effective safety management. For several 
decades, the formulation of strategy and strategic management has been an 
important element within the private sector industries (Grandy and Mills, 
2004). Strategy is seen as the key to successful business operations through 
increased competitiveness (Finlay 2000; and Grant, 2003; and Johnson et 
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al., 2011). Strategy may be visualized at three distinct hierarchical levels: 
corporate; business; and functional (Lampel et al., 2014). Theories of 
strategic management recognise the importance of internal activities, 
resources, or capabilities as potentially important sources of creating value 
(KPMG, 2010; and Buller and McEvoy, 2012). The basis of strategic 
management theory has been shaped by several key authors, for example 
Chandler (1962) and Rumelt (1974). Chandler (ibid) chronicled the evolution 
of major American corporations from single product-market entities into 
vertically integrated ones with multi-business scopes. Rumelt (ibid) further 
developed Chandler’s propositions by developing a more refined classification 
of diversification strategies. Ultimately, strategic management concerns 
choosing a unique position for a company, i.e. doing things differently or 
better than competitors, and in a way that typically lowers costs or better 
serves customer needs (Porter, 1979). The intention is to create a discernible 
competitive advantage (e.g. Penrose, 1959; Mintzberg, 1978; Grant, 1991). 
Central to strategic management is the strategy itself. According to Mintzberg 
(1978: 935) “strategy in general, and realized strategy in particular, will be 
defined as a pattern in a stream of decisions”. In his study he argues that 
“the field of strategic management cannot afford to rely on a single definition 
of strategy”. One definition would be that corporate strategy explains the 
meaning and vision of a company to internal and external stakeholders while 
defining the boundaries of corporate policies, and thus contributes to a better 
understanding of corporate identity and culture (Mintzberg, 1987). Mintzberg 
et al. (1998) described ten different schools of thought that focus on the 
strategy formation process and emerge in management practice. Johnson et 
al. (2011) stated that corporate strategy is the combination of strategic 
analysis, choice, and implementation. Hill et al. (2015) described the analysis 
of internal and external company environments and the selection of corporate 
strategies as strategy formulation, whereas strategy implementation means 
putting the selected strategies into action.  
 
Moreover, considering an organisations total environment (internal and 
external) the concept of value chain became relevant. The value chain 
represents “the full range of activities which are required to bring a product 
or service from conception, through the intermediary phases of production…., 
delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use” (Kaplinsky, 2000: 
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121). To achieve a value proposition, it is essential that an organisation 
effectively manages the internal primary activities of their value chain plus 
the external contracted secondary activities; particularly those that relate 
directly to profitability and future competitiveness. In concurrence with 
Porter's (1985) seminal emphasis on the need to effectively link the 
integrated internal value chain activities, i.e. finance, accounting, marketing, 
production, research, development, and HSE management, to generate 
success through overall organisational strategy: a key feature of the 
conducted research.  
 
Further, and from a safety perspective, the value of strategic performance 
management is reflected in effective hazard identification, management and 
the absence of accidents and incidents (both major hazard and occupational). 
As such, successful strategic performance management is recognized as an 
essential activity in modern and dynamic business environments (Misankova 
and Kocisova, 2014). Aaltonen and Ikavalko (2002) concluded that the key 
(and challenge) to effective strategy implementation lies in the cultural and 
communication aspects of organisations. This highlights the need for strategic 
leadership to provide for effective communication and the development of an 
appropriate organisational culture, inclusive of safety culture. After all, at 
Piper 25, the UK Regulator called for appropriate business strategies 
supported by effective leadership and to stop having ‘old’ accidents with new 
people (Hackitt 2013). Boal (2004: 1504) defined strategic leadership as 
making “sense of and gives meaning to environmental turbulence and 
ambiguity and provides a vision and road map that allows an organisation to 
evolve and innovate.” Again, from a safety perspective, such leadership may 
be successful in facilitating effective management of hazards; both current 
and emerging. It may therefore be reasoned that effective strategic safety 
management and decision making, when combined with line of sight (LOS) 
considerations (Boswell, 2006), would be effective in connecting functional 
level HF activity with business and corporate level goals and objectives. A 
consistent HF definition aligned with a strategic ‘safety message’ and taken 
in combination with effective leadership may lead to increased safety 




Page 13 of 255 
 
1.7 PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCES ASPECT OF HUMAN FACTORS 
 
Storseth et al. (2014) in re-analysing the Hopkins (2012) study of the 
Deepwater Horizon accident concluded that psychological forces may have 
contributed to risk transfer across established safety barriers (technical, 
procedural, and organisational). The specific psychological mechanisms that 
contributed to the Deepwater Horizon barrier failures were: inadequate 
hazard identification; consensus-mode decision making; confirmation bias; 
warnings normalization; and groupthink. Storseth et al. (ibid: 54) defined 
these mechanisms as the “dynamics of social interaction” and considered the 
triangulation of “persuasion, pressure and power” as capable of creating 
conflict with the planned arrangements for safety defences and helping to 
defeat the in-place barriers. This highlighted psychology as a causal element 
of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy along with both organisational and 
technical contributions. These psychological forces are consistent with the 
notion that majorities can influence individuals even in the most inappropriate 
or dangerous of circumstances due to human social cognition being “primarily 
and involuntarily cooperative at the implicit level” (Stein, 2013:788). People 
appear to be involuntarily directed by the internal states and belief of others 
(Kovacs, Teglas and Endress, 2010) where, despite the existence of conscious 
conflict, the pull of the group provides a tendency towards conformity. 
 
The “dynamics of social interaction” as well as having the potential to produce 
safety barrier defeating forces are also integral to organisational [safety] 
learning. Here learning occurs through on-the-job experience, working 
alongside colleagues, hearing their stories, and getting feedback (Duguid, 
2005). This perspective on safety learning and the development of expertise 
is supported by Malsen (2014: 88) who observed that the “social science 
literature on expertise development strongly suggests that it is more than a 
matter of formal learning opportunities”. Further, Nesheim and Gressgard 
(2014) concluded that knowledge sharing has a positive effect on individuals’ 
actions in terms of safety. HF is a very broad concept, however, the 
importance of the learning through social interaction highlights psychological 
forces (positive and negative) as a specific aspect HF worthy of research, 
particularly their inclusion in safety strategy as an integrated element of 
overall business strategy.  
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1.8 SAFETY CULTURE AND STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 
 
As previously stated, Aaltonen and Ikavalko (2002) concluded that the key 
(and challenge) to effective strategy implementation lies in the cultural and 
communication aspects of organisations. This highlighted the need for 
strategic leadership to provide for effective communication and the 
development of an appropriate organisational culture, of which safety culture 
is an important aspect. Martin (1985) considered culture to be emergent 
within organisations and not something managed into being. Hofstede et al. 
(2010) considered organisational culture to be a blend of symbolic and 
material artefacts. Schein (2017: 10) considered that the concept of culture 
implies “structural stability, depth, breadth, and patterning or integration that 
results from the fact that culture is for the group a learned phenomenon just 
as personality and character for individual learned phenomena”. Schien (ibid) 
has evolved his thinking such that culture has a dynamic definition and is 
constantly evolving. This dynamism is a theme reflected in the Miles and 
Snow (1978) study of organisational strategy where one objective was to 
develop an understanding of the process by which organizations continually 
adjust to their environments, the researchers identified deduced an ‘adaptive 
cycle’ within business organisations. In addition to identifying four seminal 
typologies, they observed a perpetual cycling through three sets of decision 
making: the entrepreneurial problem; the engineering problem; and the 
administrative problem.  
 
Given the reflections of adaption and dynamism for organisational [and 
safety] culture the researcher recognised a key alignment with the social 
constructionist approach, particularly considering its extensive emphasis on 
everyday interactions between people and how they use language to 
construct their reality. It is concerned with how knowledge is constructed, 
communicated, and understood as a pivotal component of culture as well as 
strategy development and deployment. Thus, the social constructionist 
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1.9 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
During previous research (Spence, 2013) it became evident that there was a 
paucity of research literature considering HF as an aligned and integral 
element of business and/or safety strategy. Taken together with current 
concerns regarding ageing assets and continued safety issues within the 
industry, there was genuine potential for both topicality and originality of 
purpose in a research undertaking. Considering firstly HF as an inclusion 
within safety strategy along with effectiveness of implementation, and 
secondly through the relevant literature, it may be possible to produce an 
innovative and potentially important advance in safety science: assessing the 
impact of HF on safety strategy with corresponding increases in business 
effectiveness and safety performance improvement. The output from such 
research may ultimately benefit the industry through an increased 
understanding of HF within organisational safety strategy, leading to a 
reduction in the misconception that HF only equates to simple human failure 
and blame; perhaps ultimately leading to the demise of the ‘scapegoat’ 
phenomenon in accident and incident investigations. For the research sample 
population specifically, any identified threats to the future safety performance 
will lead to robust recommendations for short, medium, and longer-term 
improvement actions. 
 
Attempting to improve understanding of how the dynamics of social 
interaction can be capable of creating conflict with the planned safety defence 
arrangements thereby helping to defeat the in-place barriers, the research 
draws focus to [the Miles and Snow] organisational typology as a determinant 
of safety strategy through to its execution at the asset workforce level. Within 
the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry value chain, the Operator, Contractor and 
Cub-contractor typologies were deduced to likely specify a priori of safety 
strategy constructs to be expected. Here, strategy implementation was 
considered an antecedent of safety performance. Therefore, the inclusion or 
non-inclusion of elements to positively influence the dynamics of social 
interaction within safety strategy represent drivers, or inhibitors, for continual 
improvement in safety performance. 
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As stated in section 2.0, the research aim was to ‘Explore the ways in which 
organisational typology, strategy, leadership, and psychological forces 
contribute to safety performance’. 
 
Consequently, the research process commenced with the generation of six 
general focus research questions that flowed from the research idea 
(Saunders et al., 2009) and aim. These were subsequently utilised to direct 
the literature review (Bryman, 2012) and provide the basis for research 
objective development thereby leading to greater specificity in the research 
to be undertaken. The research questions established were: 
 
1. What are the organisational typologies displayed by value chain 
organisations ’Operator’, ‘Contractor’, and Sub-contractor’?  
 
2. To what extent is safety strategy, with HF content, included as an 
aligned element of organisational business strategy for the differing 
organisational typologies? 
 
3. What is the relationship between workforce psychological capital and 
organisational typology within value chain organisations? 
 
4. What is the relationship between organisational typology and safety 
leadership style within value chain organisations? 
 
5. What is the relationship between organisational typology and perceived 
workforce safety climate at offshore assets involved in Exploration, 
Operations, Asset Life Extension and Decommissioning? 
 
6. What effect does the Operator company safety message(s) have in 
creating alignment between all involved parties, irrespective of typology, 
to deliver acceptable safety performance? 
 
1.10 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
Saunders et al. (2009) consider that to deliver the necessary level of precision 
with research, the development of research objectives is required to stimulate 
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a greater degree of rigorous thinking, derived through use of more formal 
language. Therefore, the six established research questions were 
operationalised into five research objectives with specific reference to the UK 
Offshore Oil & Gas Industry Exploration, Operating, Asset Life Extension and 
Decommissioning lifecycle phases:  
 
1. To determine the extent of the influence exerted by organisational 
typology on the construction of safety strategy as an aligned element of 
overall organisational strategy. (From research question 1). 
 
2. To establish whether the psychological forces component of Human 
Factors is embraced within constructed safety strategies, considering 
psychological capital as an antecedent of safety focused behaviour.  
(From research questions 2 and 3). 
 
3. To describe the organisational typology associations with specific styles 
of safety leadership at the operational level on offshore assets during the 
lifecycle phases. (From research question 4). 
 
4. Determine how the preceding three aspects of safety strategy 
implementation combine to produce individual asset safety climate 
profiles. (From research question 5) 
 
5. Determine whether safety performance as reflected through safety 
climate perception is driven by individual organisational typologies or by 
the Operator company overarching safety message. (From research 
question 6). 
 
On acceptance of the research proposal, a Starter-Research Model, Figure 
1.4, was conceived. This was an initial guide to be used alongside the 
research questions to frame the research scope for literature review and 
eventual necessary synthesis. The developed model incorporated the 
principle of continuous improvement, central to effective functioning of three 
highly relevant management system standards associated with effective 
safety performance: ISO 45001:2018 (Occupational health and safety 
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management systems – Requirements), ISO 14001:2015 (Environmental 
management) and ISO 9001:2015 (Quality management). 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Starter-Research Subject Model - Source: Author 
 
Following establishment of the starting model, subsequent completion of 
literature review, and finally the literature synthesis the research title evolved 
to be: 
 
‘The influence of organisational typology, strategy, leadership, and 
psychological forces on UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry safety performance’. 
 
As the research progressed, the initial model (Figure 1.4) became superseded 
by the final Literature Synthesis depicted in Figure 2.8 of chapter 2. 
 
1.11 ANTICIPATED RESEARCH OUTCOMES 
 
This DBA research was constructed to contribute significantly at both 
academic and UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry levels through an advancement 
of the theory and understanding of safety strategy (its construct and 
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implementation) linked to organisational typology, with a specific focus on 
the psychological dynamics of HF plus safety leadership. The overarching 
intent was to add to the body of safety science knowledge that currently 
exists plus be of interest to a wide range of stakeholders, including Safety 
Practitioners and Oil & Gas Business Strategists. By satisfying the five 
established research objectives, several value-adding outcomes were 
anticipated for safety science research along with practical work-place 
applications; all intended to facilitate improved safety performance outcomes 
on offshore assets in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry: 
 
1. Identification of new areas and topics for future safety science research. 
 
2. Recommendations for:  
 
a. Enhancement of Supplier and Sub-contractor evaluation and selection 
processes to maximise alignment across the value chain, leading 
improved safety performance at offshore assets  
 
b. Safety leadership development to deliver improved leader-follower 
relationships resulting in improved safety performance at offshore 
assets.  
 
c. Developing the psychological strength of the offshore workforce, with 
a resultant improved ability to resist the adverse dynamics of social 
interaction (position, pressure, and power) thereby sustaining safety 
barriers and defences in depth.  
 
d. Safety strategy approaches to deliver improved alignment with 
overall business strategy, thereby enhancing organisational 
competitiveness through improved safety performance. 
 
1.12 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
 
The thesis has been presented across six chapters as outlined in Figure 1.5: 
an introduction (Chapter 1), a critical literature review (Chapter 2), the 
research methodology (Chapter 3), quantitative and qualitative research 
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findings (Chapter 4), discussion and sense-making (chapter 5) and finally 
conclusions, original contribution, and recommendations for practice plus 




Chapter 3Chapter 2Chapter 1
Background and 



















Figure 1.5 Structure of the Thesis - Source: Author 
 
The first chapter provides an introduction and background to the research 
study along with context, significance, and potential safety science 
contribution. Chapter Two presents a comprehensive review of the relevant 
literature informing the research study. It begins with an overview of the 
terms Human Factors, Leadership, Strategy and Value Chain in the context 
of this study – that of the UK offshore Oil & Gas industry.  The chapter 
subsequently provides a summary of the contributory nature of Human 
Factors in implementing and maintaining a proficient and effective safety 
climate and culture in the UK offshore Oil & Gas industry through inclusion as 
an aligned component of overall organizational strategy. Additionally, the 
chapter provides a summary of the contribution from organisational safety 
strategy formulation, alignment, and effective leadership to the management 
of occupational as well as major accident hazards, plus the subsequent 
reduction of risk. 
 
Chapter Three outlines the research design and methodology for the study. 
The theoretical and methodological assumptions are discussed illustrating 
how the between-methods triangulation approach was appropriate for this 
study. A description of the method employed to obtain and analyse the data 
is provided along with the steps taken to ensure ethical issues were upheld 
and rigour and validity were maintained throughout this study.  The research 
subjects are introduced in this chapter as well as a discussion of how they 
were selected.   
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Chapter Four contains the outcomes of the research study components and 
methodological triangulation. Within the chapter, themes relating to HF 
psychological forces, strategy conclusion and safety performance outcomes 
are developed 
 
Chapter Five presents a discussion of the findings and the implications in 
respect of the aim, and research objectives. 
 
Chapter Six finally details the research conclusions, considering the research 
aims, and objectives. Additionally the chapter outlines recommendations for 
organisations working in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry striving to 
develop and implement appropriate business strategies supported by 
effective leadership to ensure that accidents and incidents no longer occur for 
‘old’ [Piper Alpha-era] reasons. The chapter also details the unique 
contribution made to safety science research and proffer some suggested 
areas for future research.  
 
1.13 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The first chapter provided the reader with an introduction, background, and 
context to the accepted research study along with the identified potential 
contribution to the safety science body of knowledge. The chapter 
commenced with recognition that accidents and incidents in the UK Offshore 
Oil & Gas Industry workplace are acknowledged to deteriorate, human capital 
and negatively affect productivity and competitiveness. Considering safety to 
be an important element for inclusion in overall business strategy, and in 
observing both the 25th and 30th anniversaries of the 1988 Piper Alpha 
disaster, the UK’s Health and Safety Executive recognised the UK Offshore Oil 
& Gas Industry to still had accidents for old reasons. The UK Regulator 
stressed that it was essential for the Industry to develop and implement 
appropriate business strategies, supported by effective leadership. Following 
the Cullen Report into the Piper Alpha disaster it has become clear that safety 
performance in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry has improved through 
reduced: fatal injuries; over seven-day-injuries; and process hydrocarbon 
releases. However, the UK Regulator maintains a concern of Industry 
complacency and urges organisations not to ignore the dangers associated 
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with failing to recognise or effectively act upon weak signals. Acknowledging 
the human contribution to the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry remains 
significant, there is recognition from the UK Regulator that human failure 
accounts for up to 80% of accidents and routinely feature as a contributing 
factor to major accidents; mastery of Human Factors becomes essential if the 
Industry is to stop having accidents for old reasons. 
 
The chapter also considered the evolution of strategy formulation and 
strategic management and gave recognition to the consideration that the key 
(and challenge) to effective strategy implementation lies in the cultural and 
communication aspects of organisations that are both social and dynamic 
through evolution and implementation. Dynamism was reflected through the 
seminal Miles and Snow (1978) study of organisational strategy and how 
organisations continually adapt to their environments. From a social 
perspective, Storseth et al. (2014) demonstrated through a re-analysis the 
2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster that the dynamics of social interaction (plus 
the associated psychological forces) possessed an ability to transfer risk 
across, and defeat, in-place safety barriers. 
 
From the provided background and context, the research aim, six research 
questions and five research objectives were established. The following 
chapter will provide the reader with a thorough description of the critical 
literature review conducted to satisfy the research aim, questions, and 
objectives. 
 
*** *** *** 
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CHAPTER 2 




This second chapter encompasses the literature review undertaken to address 
topics considered significant to the research conducted and in support of the 
established research aim and objectives. Its purpose is to provide the reader 
with a clear understanding of the critical appraisal and synthesis of the 
current body of knowledge related to the research topic leading to the 
achievement of the research aim through satisfying the research questions 
and objectives. The chapter also serves to facilitate the identification of gaps 
leading to incremental contributions to the existing safety science knowledge 
base. 
 
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW CONTEXT 
 
Interest in organisational strategy as a concept relative to structure and 
management processes, how these aspects drive competitiveness and 
business success, has grown significantly during the past five decades (e.g. 
Finlay, 2000; Grant, 2005; and Johnson et al., 2011). A considerable amount 
of research and writing has also been undertaken considering the 
organisational dimension of accidents and incidents in the workplace (e.g. 
Flin et al., 2015; and Reason, 2016). There is, however, a paucity of research 
within the fields of strategy and safety to develop an understanding of how 
strategy contributes to the capability of high-risk socio-technical 
organisations to function competitively and effectively within safe operating 
parameters. The current research is solely focused on the relationship 
between organisational strategic typology and achievement of positive safety 
performance outcomes within the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry, given that 
accidents within this sector can lead to devasting consequences for 
individuals, the environment and for business survivability itself. 
Furthermore, the research specifically considers the psychological forces 
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The scope of literature review included both empirical and theoretical works 
accessed through published journals and textbooks along with grey literature 
contained in regulatory and industry body publications. Following the 
provision of research context, the literature review became structured in a 
manner that elicited emergent, interdependent, and pivotal concepts 
reflecting distinct themes of the literature review conducted. The concepts 
and emergent themes are illustrated in Figure 2.8. Literature Synthesis. The 
literature review methodology took an almost ‘snowball sampling’ approach 
to information extraction, providing an opportunity for the Researcher identify 
and extract as wide a range as possible of [potentially] relevant publications 
from their own discipline (Occupational Health & Safety Management) and 
from other research relevant disciplines (e.g. Human Resource Management, 
Strategy and Strategic Management Practice). In line with best practice 
(Short, 2009) a select number of academic databases were searched for 
research-relevant articles, including: Emerald Insight, Science Direct, Taylor 
& Francis Online; Wiley Online Library; and Google Scholar. Key search 
phrases were utilised throughout, for example: human and social capital; 
Human Factors; accident causation; safety culture; safety climate; safety 
strategy; strategic management practice; safety leadership; psychological 
forces; and Psychological Capital. Also included in the methodology was 
backward and forward reference searching from retrieved articles to identify 
additional research-linked literature. Articles selected were reviewed for 
relevance of content and to frame the constituent elements of the research 
data collection process. Overall, the critical literature review built upon and 
extended previous research activity conducted by the researcher (Spence, 
2013).  
 
The critical literature review came to reflect an adaptive and evolving process. 
In some respects, aligning with the Foster et al. (2019) research where it was 
concluded that adaption in complex organisations is related to safety 
performance; in this case, research performance. Not unsurprisingly, the 
researchers’ thoughts evolved organically from the initial study concept with 
subsequent realisation that the following nine items of empirical and 
theoretical research provided critical context to the overall research exercise. 
They served to illustrate that in order to improve safety performance in the 
UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry, to avoid having accidents for ‘old’ reasons, 
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consideration of factors beyond the still-predominant engineering and 
technical focus are required. 
 
▪ Human capital was considered by Shultz (1993) as the key to unlocking 
economic growth given that it invents new forms of physical capital.  
 
▪ Thomas and Ramaswamy (1996) in a study focused on matching Managers 
to Strategy through tests of the Miles and Snow [1978] typology, 
demonstrated organisations achieving an alignment between managerial 
characteristics and strategic direction perform better than firms where 
such an alignment is absent. 
 
▪ Rochlin (1999) concluded that safety is more than simply the management 
of risk; the pursuit of safety is more than just the hunt for error and its 
elimination. A broad range of social constructionist approaches is required 
to advance understanding of how technically complex organisations 
achieve positive safety outcomes in the face of workplace and associated 
environmental challenges.  
 
▪ Zohar (2008) acknowledges safety climate as a predictor of safety 
performance and highlights that the values-based explanation of culture 
(as proffered by Schein, 1992) embraces the core values and beliefs of 
senior managers where safety must originate as a priority. These core 
values and beliefs are therefore the antecedents of workplace policies, 
practices, and procedures that through implementation give rise to 
workers’ [safety] climate perceptions. 
 
▪ Kapp (2012) demonstrated that managers and supervisors (leaders) who 
are perceived to place a high value on safety achieve greater levels of 
safety compliance from their workforce than those leaders who are 
perceived to place a lower value on safety. 
 
▪ Blazsin and Guldenmund (2015) consider that social constructionism 
appears particularly adequate to analyse culture in any of its 
manifestations. In the case of the current research, safety culture and its 
subsequent performance outcomes. 
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▪ According to Stowers et al. (2017) safety can be described by performance 
(i.e. safe and successful completion of tasks) and efficiency (i.e. timeliness 
and budget) in the working environment.  
 
▪ Vukadinovic et al. (2018) concluded that having a proactive approach to 
managing human resource is a critically important element of business 
strategy. 
 
▪ The development of Psychological Capital (PsyCap) has been recognised 
by Stratman and Youssef-Morgan (2019) as having the propensity to 
reduce unsafe behaviours in a workforce leading to an increase in safety 
performance. 
 
Driven by the six general focus research questions generated from the 
research aim, the following eight sections document the primary areas of 
literature review relevant to the research. Ultimately, the goal of the research 
was to contribute to a reduction of accidents in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas 
Industry by, to avoid having accidents for ‘old’ reasons. Therefore, the first 
subject matter considered through critical literature review was accident 
causation. The chapter concludes with a synthesis of the literature reviewed 
plus a chapter summary.  
 
2.2 ACCIDENT CAUSATION 
 
Within the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry, safety barriers [synonymous with 
the term defence in depth] are part of safety management doctrine. Safety 
barriers can be described as a safety function accomplished through 
operational, organisational, and technical constituent elements (Reason, 
1997). Operational and technical barrier elements are readily definable 
however organisational influences, e.g. social interaction and related barrier 
elements may be more ambiguous (Storseth et al., 2014). This is somewhat 
ironic given the fact that many significant connections have been made in 
academic literature between safety performance and organisational factors 
(e.g. Reason, 1997; Dekker, 2012; and Hopkins, 2012). Looking at safety 
management beyond the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry, theories on accident 
causation plus the modelling of accident mechanisms proliferate in safety 
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science literature. The early theories e.g. Heinrich (1931) illustrate accident 
causation to be a one-dimensional sequence of [cause and effect] events. 
With accident and accident causation persisting as important themes within 
safety science; advancing safety through a reduction in accidents and 
incidents endures as a significant challenge to safety scientists (Salmon et 
al., 2012; Dekker and Pitzer, 2016). Commensurately, accidents and accident 
causation prevail as key themes within global Human Factors (HF) research 
endeavours (Salmon et al., ibid).  
 
Traditional cause-effect accident models imply that complex system accidents 
are the direct result of key events such as catastrophic equipment failure or 
unsafe human action. This can result in equipment or people being incorrectly 
blamed for an accident. Regrettably, this approach most likely leads to missed 
opportunities to learn valuable lessons about safety system failures and 
reduces the likelihood of future accident prevention (Underwood and 
Waterson, 2013). Such an approach can never fully decode the complexity of 
an accident or the system it occurred in (Dekker, 2011). There is now broad 
acceptance that accidents are a feature of complex sociotechnical systems 
where causal factors exist and interact at all levels. With over half a century-
plus of progress in safety science, sociotechnical systems theory and human 
factors methodologies accident causation models and analysis methods 
underpinned by systems thinking have emerged as the most prominent 
(Grant et al., 2018).  
 
2.2.1 Seminal Early Research 
 
Heinrich’s 1931 publication Industrial accident prevention: A scientific 
approach is considered seminal research, still frequently referenced, and 
taught today. One of the most recognisable outputs from his body of work is 
the “accident pyramid” best known as the ‘safety triangle’ and depicted in 
Figure 2.1. The accident pyramid was developed from the analysis of accident 
data collected by a large insurance company [Heinrich’s employer] over a 
period spanning more than thirty years. It focused on identifying causal 
factors of workplace accidents including “unsafe acts of people” and “unsafe 
mechanical or physical conditions”. The work highlighted the associated costs 
of accidents and encouraged employers to consider investing in occupational 
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accident prevention, i.e. prevent or interrupt the sequence of accidents. The 
research posited the ratio between fatal accidents, accidents, injuries, and 
minor incidents to be 1-10-30-600. The ratio has become known as 
‘Heinrich’s Law’. The second most recognisable output from his body of 
research is the domino model of accident causation (Heinrich, 1941), also 
known as the domino theory. This model implies a linear one-by-one 
progression of events resulting in an accident. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The “accident pyramid” (Heinrich, 1931) 
 
Heinrich’s research was pursued further by Bird during the 1970’s, also an 
insurance company worker, who analysed more than 1.7 million accidents 
reported by 297 cooperating companies. These companies represented 21 
different industrial groups, employing 1.7 million employees who worked over 
3 billion hours during the study period. This subsequent research concluded 
that Heinrich’s Law is relatively constant over time and across companies. 
Bird (1974) also proposed an update to Heinrich’s domino model, with a 
further update two years later (Bird and Loftus, 1976). Heinrich’s original 
model, Bird’s 1974 update and the Bird and Loftus’s 1976 revision update all 
explain accident causation as a one-dimensional sequence of events. 
 
More recent research suggests that the ratios of Heinrich’s Law may be 
misleading when considering the relationship between big and the small 
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consequence accidents; fatal versus non-fatal occupational accidents being 
one subset and major and occupational accidents being another. In some 
cases, bigger and smaller severity consequence accidents are thought to be 
related because of models like Bird and Germain (1985) in which unsafe acts 
and unsafe conditions are considered symptomatic of larger problems. In 
others, however, they are thought to be unrelated. Baker et al. (2007) in the 
report of the Texas City refinery explosion concluded with criticism the use of 
occupational injury statistics to measure process safety performance. Five 
years previously, Hale (2003) concluded that thinking the prevention of minor 
accidents leads to the prevention of major accidents is based on careless and 
unsupported reasoning. Hale’s research (ibid) highlighted a need to take a 
scenario specific approach to understanding accident causation. In a similar 
vein, Dekker (2014: 124) makes a direct plea to readers considering human 
error as a topic to “Please stop using the triangle” on the basis that the 
mechanistic rationality of fixed ratio’s is harmful to considered thinking about 
actual and future safety performance. Hopkins (2012) by reference to the 
Macondo Deepwater Horizon disaster sums it up clearly. The day before the 
accident senior company managers were offshore on the asset celebrating six 
years of injury free safety performance and covering the topic of falls from 
height very thoroughly. The celebration and safety topic conversation did not 
cause the explosion however, it was the senior managers skipping straight 
past the critical process safety issues about pressure readings with an 
‘everything okay’ question that begged a ‘yes boss’ type of response. Dekker 
(ibid) considered six years injury-free performance should have delivered 
3,600 years of accident performance in accordance with the Heinrich’s 
triangle logic. 
 
2.2.2 More Recent Research 
 
Moving beyond one-dimensional cause and effect accident causation 
modelling, Reason (1990) introduced multi-causality of accidents into the 
safety science debate. Reason considers that accident causation is the result 
of an interaction between latent and active failures existing within an 
organisation. Active failures are the immediately observable causes of an 
accident; by contrast latent failures (e.g. deficient design, lack of competence 
and inadequate supervision) may have been present an organisations system 
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for a considerable time, perhaps years. Critically, and to circumvent active 
and latent failure interaction, pro-active engagement from top management 
was identified to be critical. 
 
Uncovering causal factors leading to accidents has remained an active and 
principal topic within current safety research activity. From a broad range of 
studies (for example Reason, 1990; Rasmussen, 1997; and Underwood and 
Waterson, 2013) it is generally accepted that the occurrence of accidents 
reflects a complex systems-phenomenon where potential exists for causal 
[contributing] factors being present and interacting across all levels of socio-
technical systems. An academic debate on accident models persists; new 
models created with simultaneous criticism and attempts to discredit older 
ones (Underwood and Waterson, 2013). Salmon et al. (2012) conclude that 
three accident causation models continue to dominate HF literature and 
academic debate: the Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) (Reason, 1990); risk 
management framework (Rasmussen, 1997); and Systems Theoretic 
Accident Modelling and Process Model (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004). All three 
models are underpinned by a systems approach, however there are 
compelling differences in theoretical grounding, adopted methodology, and 
outputs produced. Salmon et al. (ibid) consider that the selection of any one 
method over the other is likely to be driven by theoretical preference rather 
than any other consideration. 
 
Within the UK Oil and Gas industry, James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model 
(SCM) is the common point of reference (Figure 2.2). The model was 
originally presented during 1990 and has undergone several revisions since 
(Reason, 2008). The SCM is a sequential loss causation model because it is 
based on the principle that there are successive safety barriers (figurative 
‘cheese’ slices) that, when they fail, provide a hole through to the next 
barrier. If all the barriers fail, then all the ‘cheese’ holes line up, providing a 
path for an accident to occur. The concept of the model is such that a loss is 
never the causal responsibility of a single person or event, rather it relates to 
the incremental and accumulating failures in the chain of decisions and events 
leading to an accident. There needs to be a convergence of events and 
conditions (i.e. lining up of the holes in the various barriers) that permit 
accidents to occur. Within the oil and gas industry, this safety barrier 
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approach has become part of the orthodoxy in safety science and 
management. The Swiss Cheese Model rationale can describe, and be applied, 
to both occupational and MAH’s within an organisation. The model recognises 
that an accident can only be caused by the simultaneous failure across all 
barriers. The SCM has been criticised by several researchers (e.g. Dekker, 
2006, Hollnagel, 2012, and Leveson, 2012) who consider that the sequential 
nature of the model serves to oversimplify accident causation by not 
sufficiently accounting for the complex interactions across socio-technical 
systems. By implication, such criticism denigrates the SCM as no longer being 
capable of providing an applicable description of accident causation. However, 
Underwood and Waterson (2013) concluded that the SCM “remains a viable 
model for understanding accidents”.   
 
 
Figure 2.2 Swiss Cheese Model, adapted from Reason (2008) 
 
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (Wiegmann 
and Shappell, 2003) is a taxonomy-based accident analysis approach inspired 
by Reason’s Swiss Cheese model. The impetus for HFACS came from the 
absence of taxonomies of latent failures and unsafe acts within Reason’s 
Swiss Cheese model, which according to Wiegmann and Shappell (ibid) 
limited its utility as an aviation accident analysis method. HFACS was 
subsequently developed based on an analysis of aviation accident reports and 
provides analysts with taxonomies of failure modes across the following four 
levels: unsafe acts; pre-conditions for unsafe acts; unsafe supervision; and 
organisational influences. The structure of the HFACS method is presented in 
Figure 2.3, and shows the different categories mapped onto Reason’s model. 
Working backward from the immediate causal factors, analysts classify the 
errors and associated causal factors involved using the taxonomies 
presented. Whilst the HFACS framework was originally developed and applied 
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successfully in the analysis of aviation accidents, other industries have also 
successfully used the original framework, or a modified version, in accidents 
analysis, for example the maritime and railway industries plus medical 
organisations. More recently Theophilus et al. (2017) researched and 




Figure 2.3 HFACS taxonomies overlaid on Reason’s Swiss Cheese model from Salmon et al 
(2012) 
 
Returning to the base-SCM concept (Reason, 1990 and 2008), it was utilised 
it as the cornerstone of the analysis of ‘Human and Organisational Causes of 
the Gulf of Mexico Blowout’ (Hopkins, 2012). The rationale for using the SCM 
was that, as well as acknowledging and depicting the complex nature of major 
accidents, it facilitated the consideration of each [and every] barrier failure 
without leading to an assumption that one barrier failure alone is the single 
cause. Storseth et al. (2014) subsequently conducted a re-analysis of the 
Hopkins 2012 study, placing significant and specific emphasis on the 
organisational barrier element of the in-place safety defences. Psychological 
forces, an integral part of HF, were concluded as direct contributors to risk 
transfer across established barriers and safety defences. The Storseth et al. 
(ibid) research provided significant impetus for the doctoral research 
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2.3 HUMAN FACTORS IN THE WORKPLACE 
 
The role of Human Factors (HF) in safety within the UK offshore oil and gas 
industry has been a source of primary interest since Lord Cullen’s 1990 
Inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster. Based on the evidence available at the 
time, the immediate cause of the incident was judged to have been the 
ignition of a leakage of gas condensate resulting from the pressurization of 
pipework that was undergoing maintenance. This resulted in a series of 
explosions and fires leading ultimately to the structural collapse of the 
platform and the loss of 167 lives. However, during the Inquiry, Lord Cullen 
uncovered a litany of organisational and management failures perpetuated 
by the platform Operating company that indirectly contributed to the 
accident. These had significant HF implications and included inadequate 
training, non-adherence to safety procedures and the Permit to Work (PTW) 
systems poor communication, inadequate procedures and arrangements for 
securing evacuation and escape, plus evidence of a culture that appeared to 
emphasise the importance of production over and above safety. 
 
HF is an extremely broad and multi-faceted topic. At a macro-level HF is 
concerned with all those factors that influence people and their behaviour in 
safety-critical situations at work. In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive 
in their ‘Reducing error and influencing behaviour’ publication consider HF as 
the working environment elements that influence behaviour at work in a 
manner that can affect health and safety outcomes: organisational factors; 
job factors; plus human and individual factors (HSE, 1999b). Kariuki and 
Lowe (2007) consider HF to be factors of environment, organisation, job, 
human and individual characteristics which influence behaviour at work with 
resultant health and safety affects. Cai et al. (2013) document that HF were 
identified to be clear contributors to the Deepwater Horizon disaster during 
2010. When considering marine and offshore accidents over 70% have HF as 
contributing causes with only 30% attributed to technical failures (Cai et al., 
ibid). In a similar vein, Christou and Konstantinidou (2012) denoted bad 
safety culture of the Operator and its main contractors as the underlying 
cause of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Fundamentally, HF influence human 
failures; they are a cause, with human failure being the resultant effect 
(Pranesh et al., 2017). 
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HF are traditionally seen to be significant contributors to workplace accidents 
and incidents. According to the HSE (ibid: 6) up to 80% of accidents may be 
attributed to the “actions or omissions” of people in the workplace. In 
dynamic complex systems such as aviation, nuclear, Oil and Gas the human 
contribution has been recognized as a root factor in 80–90% of accidents and 
incidents (Reason, 1990; Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003). Taking a different 
perspective, some researchers consider that human ability to adjust 
performance due to changing circumstances is a critical element of success 
(Hollnagel et al., 2006). Realistically, the human contribution in complex 
socio-technical systems is high; there are ever increasing technology 
demands requiring attention (Kirwan, 2001) with increased complexity 
creating greater propensity for error. Some research, however, concludes 
human error to be an unwanted side effect of workforces trying to succeed in 
imperfect, unstable environments with less than desirable or necessary 
resources (Dekker, 2002; Hollnagel et al., 2006). In such research human 
error is considered the consequence outcome rather than the antecedent.  
 
The prevalent [negative] view on propensity for human error has 
unfortunately driven a short-sightedness within safety performance 
improvement endeavours, combined with a tendency to blame the 
individual(s) directly involved in tasks resulting in accident or incident. The 
rather one-sided perspective has frequently led to conclusions for the human 
element to be substituted by a [presumed to be] more predictable and 
reliable engineered solution. This approach ignores the deep and fundamental 
failures leading to accident or incident which are commonly located deeper in 
organisational design, management, and decision-making processes. Woods 
and Dekker (2000) consider the idea that new technology can be introduced 
as a simple substitution of machines for people thereby preserving the system 
though improving the results to be a gross over-simplification and therefore 
fundamentally flawed.  
 
The research field of HF is vast as it ‘‘studies the intersection between people, 
technology and work, with the major aim to find areas where design and 
working conditions produce human error” (Woods and Dekker, 2000: 272). 
Re-visiting early literature and research on accident investigation practice, 
human error was the primary focus as opposed to the conditions and factors 
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that produced it. The definition of one single human factor, as well as its 
importance has varied over the years. Heinrich (1931) advocated analytic 
focus on ‘man failure’ and factors immediately exposed by incidents and 
accidents. The idea of faulty persons continued to influence work on accident 
prevention. It remained in literature from the late 50s. (e.g. Heinrich, 1959). 
Of note, the original study by Heinrich described causes of a ‘supervisory 
nature’ to account for 88% of all accidents in that study. The formulation 
which was later changed into ‘unsafe acts of person’ (Heinrich, 1959). It is 
unclear whether the change meant that accidents were attributed to the 
operator closer to the accident event instead of the supervisor, or that 
‘supervisory nature’ had been generalised into a broader category ‘human 
error’.  
 
The old Heinrich (1931, 1959) categorisation included a set of labels (e.g. 
ignorance of regulations, recklessness, nervousness, and excitability), which 
were not utilised in later works. More recent literature on safety has kept the 
principle ‘ignorance of regulation’ through use of the labels such as ‘error’ and 
‘violations’. An error is unintentional, while violations are intentional. Errors 
were further classified into skill-based errors (which included things such as 
slips of action or lapses in memory) and mistakes (which could be rule based 
or knowledge based); while violations could be routine, situational, or 
exceptional. (Reason, 1990). Slips occur when an action does not go as 
planned, and they are potentially observable, e.g. slips of performance or 
slips of the tongue. Lapses represent a more covert form of error forms, 
largely involving failures of memory but which do not manifest in actual 
behaviour or accidents; hence they may only be apparent to people who 
experience them. Mistakes include deficiencies in the process of making 
judgements or inferences, where people take the wrong action but believe it 
to be correct and appropriate. They are more complex and less well 
understood than slips; for that reason, they constitute a greater degree of 
danger in a Major Accident Hazard (MAH) industry environment such as 
Offshore Oil & Gas and are much harder to detect. Mistakes can arise at a 
rules-level or a knowledge-level. Rule-based mistakes occur when an 
individual’s action is based on remembered rules and procedures, typically in 
familiar circumstances while knowledge-based mistakes result from 
misdiagnosis and miscalculations when dealing with unfamiliar 
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circumstances. Violations represent a further and different type of human 
error; they are deliberate and intentional acts which breach regulations, 
policies, directions, instruction, or commonly accepted ways of working. 
Violations may be routine, situational, or exceptional. The intention of a 
violation may not be to deliberately cause harm (sabotage) rather to gain 
time or simply to make a job easier by taking a short cut.  
 
Thus, and despite recent interdisciplinary research on more peripheral 
factors, it seems that the idea of (individual) human erroneous acts (tracing 
back to Heinrich) nevertheless persist in research. Similar to Heinrich’s 
conclusions and statistics (Heinrich, 1931, 1959) concerning so called moral 
and supervisory failure, studies (for example Wagenaar and Groenweg, 1987; 
Cook and Woods, 1994; plus Schappell and Wiegmann, 2000;) repeatedly 
show that approximately 70–80% of human errors may be attributed to 
individuals or to human cognition. It is to be observed, however, that analytic 
categories and taxonomies in research on human errors do not agree but 
rather complement one another. Where an accident starts, which factors it 
involves and how individual actors are analysed in relation to this is thus 
something that is under constant re-construction (for example Rasmussen, 
1982; O’Hare, 2000; and Lundberg et al., 2009r) as is the use of the concept 
of human factor. Also, some additional theories view undesired events as 
something normal and expected. Typified by Hollnagel (1993) who does not 
speak of human error, rather function and performance variability where 
different sorts of deviations may be expected. A trend in more modern 
research is to turn away from the search for single bad individuals, so called 
‘‘bad apples”. Attention moves from what in hindsight obviously was wrong 
to explaining why those actions made sense at the time (Dekker, 2002). This 
has moved attention from issues near the operator (the sharp end) to factors 
that have shaped the conditions for work, such as management decisions (the 
blunt end). At the same time taxonomies of causes have broadened to, for 
example, general human cognitive properties, environments, organizations, 
technologies, infrastructures, and preparedness. Consequently, more recent 
safety research is closer to the definition of the area of human factors cited 
above (Woods and Dekker, 2000) than to early research. 
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In the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry attention remains focused on fostering 
safety strategies such as ‘defence-in-depth’, with a focus on barriers that 
prevent accidents from happening but with HF taken strongly into 
consideration. Figure 2.4 depicts the Step Change in Safety (2017) Human 
Factors and barrier model, building on the Reason (1990) Swiss Cheese 
model by acknowledging that established safety barrier defences may be 
influenced by a range of HF.   
 
 
Figure 2.4 Step Change in Safety (2017) Human Factors and the barrier model 
 
The principle applied in the model is that through failure to account for Human 
Factors, gaps may open-up in one or more of the barriers, permitting energy 
transfer through the barriers and thereby increasing the chances of an 
accident event. The model does not, however, directly acknowledge the 
psychological forces dynamic and propensity for risk transfer across 
established safety barriers (Storseth et al., 2014) but it does acknowledge 
the important influence of organisational and safety culture. Finally, Vogt et 
al. (2010) considered that a balanced scorecard approach to Human Factors 
within safety strategy would provide a means of identifying enablers of safety 
plus a means of systematically allocating resources to them. It becomes clear 
therefore, that effective management of HF within overall business and safety 
strategy may become capable of delivering business benefit through 
increased efficiency and prevention [plus reduction] of accidents and 
incidents (Vogt et al., ibid). As a strategic component, effective HF 
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management becomes capable of delivering competitive advantage to 
businesses engaged in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry. 
 
2.4 SAFETY INFLUENCING CAPITAL 
 
2.4.1 Human Capital 
 
Research literature highlights the importance of human capital to 
organisational competitiveness, innovativeness, improved performance, and 
economic success (Marimuthu et al., 2009; Unger et al., 2011; Diaz-
Fernandez et al., 2014; Kottaridi et al., 2019;). An organisations’ human 
resources were considered by Barney (1991) to be its greatest source of 
competitive advantage, consequently, the relationship between an 
organisation’s strategy requires further examination particularly regarding 
safety performance. In a similar vein, Schultz (1993) considered human 
capital to be a key element of increasing productivity and sustaining 
competitive advantage. With specific regard to competitive advantage, 
Pasban and Nojedeh (2016) declared for an organisation to distinguish its 
products and services from those of competitors it must employ more 
talented and skilled employees although this consideration overlooks the 
development of human capital from within the existing organisational 
[human] resource pool. Rastogi (2000) considered the concept of human 
capital to include but advance beyond the conventional concept of human 
resources. Rastogi (ibid) reflected that although training and development of 
employee’s skills, motivation, and involvement of employees in decision 
making are common, the essential focus of human capital is to ensure that 
the competitiveness of an organisation is sustained. To be value-adding in 
nature, human capital itself requires to be continually developed as a 
reflection of an organisations changing environment; adaption is required to 
consistently convey [internal and external] customer-valued deliverables. 
Furthermore, the focus on human capital as a source of competitive 
advantage has also led to a tighter coalescence between the research fields 
of strategic management and strategic human resource management to 
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At a macro-level, accidents and incidents deteriorate human capital and 
detrimentally affect the productivity and competitiveness of nations 
(Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2009). At a micro-level, the same conclusion may 
be drawn for industry sectors and individual organisations. The common 
denominator being significant human cost, loss of economic potential and 
decreased productivity, starkly illustrated by two previously mentioned Oil 
and Gas industry examples. Firstly, the fire and explosions on Piper Alpha 6th 
July 1988 led to 167 fatalities, complete loss of the production facility and 
remains the deadliest accident in the history of the offshore Oil and Gas 
Industry; it affected 10% of the UK’s oil production at the time and resulted 
in financial losses of an estimated £2 billion (IChemE, 2018). Secondly, the 
Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Horizon well blow-out 20th April 2010. In addition 
to 11 fatalities and complete loss of the drilling asset, it spilled 4-million 
barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico, disrupted a regional economy and 
damaged fisheries and critical environmental habitats (Christou and 
Konstantinidou (2012). Considering these two illustrations of the [potentially 
significant] effect from accidents and incidents, it becomes apparent that an 
organisations’ performance may be viewed in financial or non-financial terms 
with safety performance being a component of the latter. Marimuthu et al. 
(2009) concluded that financial performance is positively impacted through 
consideration of human capital and additionally paves the way for improved 
achievement through creativity and innovation. From a resource-based 
perspective human capital study Shaw et al. (2013) demonstrated that 
investment in human capital had a moderating effect on organisational 
accident rates. The study results give credence to the discourse where, 
instead of being an economic burden on organisations, focusing on accident 
reduction through the human element provides business opportunity since it 
has the potential to deliver a positive effect [competitive advantage] on 
organisational performance. Consequently, there is propensity to lessen the 
deterioration of human capital while positively affecting productivity and 
competitiveness. Luthans and Youssef (2004) identified that Human Capital 
may be managed to generate sustainable improvement contributing to an 
increase in competitive advantage. Techniques identified in the research 
included: processes to address selection and selectivity; training and 
development activities; and building tacit knowledge through increased 
competence and awareness, even by relatively simple job rotation. 
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2.4.2 Social Capital 
 
Rastogi (2000) purports social capital to be the base of human capital. 
Although papers have been written which seek to clarify the concept (Lin, 
1999; Paldam, 2000; Adler and Kwon, 2002; Durlauf, 2002; and Sobel, 
2002). Adler and Kwon (ibid) conclude that several definitions remain rather 
than one single accepted definition. Ostrom (2000: 176) defines social capital 
as the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and expectations 
about patterns of interactions that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent 
activity. Putnam (2000) considers social capital to be the connections 
between individuals, social networks in addition to the norms of reciprocity 
and trustworthiness that subsequently arise. Rastogi (ibid: 199) defines social 
capital as “a shared vision and a shared value system, and an ethos of help 
and care unimagined resource capabilities for wealth creation and excitement 
emerge in an organization”. From the range of definitions, and for the purpose 
of research, it was determined that social interaction in the workplace is 
central to the ongoing development of social capital, in turn human capital. 
It occurs within the framework provided by an organisations’ structures, 
systems, and processes. To be positive in nature it requires trust and 
cooperation, plus a clear unity of purpose. Over time, interactions will develop 
and mature with the resultant continually developing social capital influencing 
human capital growth such that people (individually and collectively) are able 
to direct their efforts (creativity, energy, intelligence, and competencies) into 
value-adding activities: i.e. delivering competitive advantage, including 
positive safety performance. More recently, occupational health and safety 
has become considered to be an essential element of human capital (EHS 
Today, 2017) with corporate reporting of human capital metrics 
demonstrating improved corporate performance and risk mitigation. In this 
way the effective management and deployment of human capital for value 
creation is becoming increasingly important to actual [and potential] 
investors, reflecting further competitive advantage. 
 
The relationship between social and human capital resonates for safety 
performance as a non-financial indicator of organisational performance. 
Previously identified in Chapter 1, the “dynamics of social interaction” have 
clear potential to generate safety barrier defeating forces (Storseth et al., 
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2014: 54) when acted upon may subsequently result in accident and incident. 
The indicative interpretation being that trust, cooperation, and unity of 
purpose within social interaction have been substantially undermined. 
Storseth et al. (ibid) suggest that consensus-mode decision making, 
confirmation bias and groupthink are among the significant psychological 
mechanisms capable of detrimentally impacting social interaction processes. 
Human psychology thus became a causal element of the Gulf of Mexico 
Deepwater Horizon disaster along with both organisational and technical 
failings. For current research, this latter deduction reflected the position 
where human and social capital aspects conveyed into Human Factor 
considerations for safety performance, accident and incidents within the UK 
Oil and Gas Industry.  
 
As in the case with Human Capital, Luthans and Youssef (2004) identified 
that Social Capital may be managed also to generate sustainable 
improvement contributing to an increase in competitive advantage. 
Techniques identified in the research include creating and maintaining open 
communication channels; developing cross-functional teams; and building 
sustainable work-life balance programs. 
 
2.4.3 Psychological Capital 
 
The Oil and Gas Industry’s high propensity for accidents, both major and 
occupational health, drives organisations working in the value chain to be 
classified as safety critical organisations (SCO’s). Ergo, initiatives to reduce 
accidents, near misses and to continually improve safety performance 
outcomes are a primary concern for such organisations. Protection from 
harm, irrespective of what model is followed (e.g. SCM) relies on the 
consistent and effective implementation of policies, practices, and procedures 
by personnel in the workforce. The Researchers practical experience plus 
published formal accident enquiry reports (e.g. Bohai 2, China 1979 – 72 
fatalities; Alexander L Kielland, Norway 1980 – 123 fatalities; Piper Alpha, UK 
1988 - 167 fatalities; Mumbai High North, Indian Ocean 2005 – 22 fatalities; 
and the Usumacinta Jack-up, Gulf of Mexico 2007 – 22 fatalities) inform that 
personnel, both individually and collectively, are not always compliant and 
that deviations still occur. Henning et al. (2009) consider this lack of 
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compliance due to factors such as employee attitudes, individual risk 
propensity and organisational [safety] climate. Havold (2007) considered 
factors influencing positive safety behaviour within the workforce to be 
individuals’ satisfaction with safety activities plus management attitudes 
towards safety.  Hence it is essential for SCO’s working in the Oil and Gas 
Industry to identify factors that can improve the implementation and 
effectiveness of planned safety arrangements (i.e. pre-identified safety 
defences). 
 
Over at least the past four decades Researchers have been seeking to identify 
various characteristics that affect people’s performance in addition to that at 
the organisational level. A range of approaches have been pursued, from the 
industrial organisation view of the 1980’s (Porter, 1998) to the resource-
based view (RBV) of organisations developed in the 1990s (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). Through the progress of time organisations have had to 
adapt, for example, to technological changes, market movements, an 
evolving competitive landscape, political instability and regulatory (local and 
international) changes to remain competitive. Unsurprisingly, other 
performance affecting significant elements (e.g. human capital, leadership, 
and organisational culture – all considered in the current research) have come 
under scrutiny (Aras and Crowther, 2010; and Dahlgaard et al., 2013). 
Regrettably, many organisations fail to maximise their performance and 
competitive potential and from a safety perspective, disasters still occur e.g. 
the Deepwater Horizon explosion in the Gulf of Mexico during April 2010, 
where there were 11 fatalities and an environmental catastrophe with a total 
cost estimated to exceed $65 billion US dollars (Offshore Technology, 2019) 
Gulf of Mexico disaster. Clearly there is a difference in understanding between 
the relevance and importance of theory versus its enactment to stimulate 
organisational performance improvement and hone competitive edge. One of 
the main reasons to be considered for the deficit is shallow knowledge about, 
and deficient understanding of humans, both individually and collectively in 
groups. 
 
Psychological capital is a form of positive organisational behaviour with the 
capacity to develop and manage personal strengths. Luthans (2002: 59) 
defines positive organisational behaviour as “the study and application of 
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positively orientated human resource strengths and psychological capacities 
that can be measured, developed, and effectively managed for performance 
improvement”. Reichard, et al. (2011) and Avey (2014) consider that PsyCap 
is consistently, positively, and significantly related to employee performance. 
This is particularly relevant within the Oil and Gas Industry where individuals 
must frequently adapt to rapid and unpredictable situations in their hazardous 
working environment. Thus, positive organisational behaviour may be 
considered an important attribute leading to safe operation and continual 
improvement of safety performance outcomes. From Luthans et a. (2007) 
four psychological constructs constitute psychological capital: Hope; Efficacy; 
Resilience; and Optimism (HERO). They represent an individual’s positive 
psychological state of development. When combined with appropriate 
leadership interaction PsyCap may promote greater safety awareness and 
improve safety performance, both at the individual and group level. Each of 
the four constructs are considered individually. 
 
The word Hope is commonly used in everyday language but as a concept it 
refers to an individuals’ ability to persevere towards goals and, as necessary, 
modify the steps to goal attainment and success. Hope was defined by Snyder 
et al. (1991) to be a positive motivational state generated through the 
combination of goal-directed energy (agency) and the ability to plan for goal 
achievement (pathways). Expressed another way, hope is constructed from 
both willpower and waypower thinking (Avey et al., 2009) where willpower is 
an individual’s expectancy and motivation for attaining a desired goal with 
psychological resources (pathways) assisting with alternative routes to goal 
attainment. It is the alternative pathways thinking that assists individuals to 
achieve goals despite the presence of impediments. As such, individuals with 
greater levels of hope can conceive many strategies for goal attainment and, 
importantly, develop alternates when success is not achieved at the first 
attempt. Also, success breeds confidence for future activity in hopeful 
individuals (Snyder, 2000). For an individual with low levels of hope, the 
pathway to goal attainment will not be well thought through and alternate 
plans difficult to establish in the event of initial failure. Consequently, 
individuals with low levels of hope have greater propensity to disengage from 
goal attainment, with the associated negative emotions adversely affecting 
future goal setting and pursuit. From a safety performance perspective, a 
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hopeful individual will seek out new opportunities and comfortably implement 
new safety measures and provisions when obstacles appear with the 
propensity to hinder originally laid plans and goal achievement. Such an 
individual is more likely to retain a positive focus on safety and is less likely 
to drift into an overconfident and/or complacent attitude towards safety. 
 
Efficacy implies that individuals have the confidence take on and succeed 
when they confront complex and challenging tasks. As a concept, its origins 
lie within social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997) and its link to workplace 
performance were established through Stajkovic and Luthans studies (1998). 
To develop efficacy in individuals, Bandura (ibid) defined four recognisable 
approaches: mastery or success experiences; vicarious learning or modelling 
the experiences of [relevant] other people; social persuasion and positive 
feedback; finally, physiological, and psychological arousal. A strong sense of 
efficacy enhances human accomplishment and personal well-being in many 
ways. People with high confidence in their capabilities consider difficult tasks 
as challenges to be accomplished rather than as threats to be avoided, 
fostering an intrinsic interest and deep engrossment in challenges. Such 
individuals set themselves challenging goals and maintain strong 
commitment to them throughout, heightening, and sustaining effort in the 
face of potential failure. In the event of failure or setback, individuals quickly 
recover their sense of efficacy, attributing the failure or setback to insufficient 
effort or deficient knowledge and skills which are ultimately attainable. 
Further, they approach threatening situations with confidence that they can 
exercise control over them (Bandura, 1994). From an Oil and Gas Industry 
perspective, individuals must feel confident they have the necessary skills 
and technical knowledge to perform their assigned tasks, have the necessary 
hazard and risk awareness for the working environment plus the confidence 
and empowerment to report potential hazards and problems (Eid et al., 
2012). Clearly, the development of efficacy within individuals offers 
opportunities for developmental success and improved safety performance. 
 
A resilient individual possesses the ability to sustain performance and 
importantly recover when beset by problems and hard times. Such an 
individual never gives up and will always strive to overcome difficulties. 
Luthans (2002: 702) defined resilience as “the capacity to rebound or bounce 
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back from adversity, conflict, failure or even positive events, progress and 
increased responsibility”. Masten and Reed (2002) contend that resilience 
within individuals is characterised by patterns of positive adaption in the face 
of significant adversity or risk. The concept is considered to represent the 
application of positive patterns of adaption and psychological processes to 
overcome adversity, or risk factors, by leveraging personal, social, or 
psychological assets. When the outlook is bleak, such patterns of positive 
outlook result in individuals searching for opportunities to convert adversity 
and setback into opportunities for personal learning and development 
(Bonanno, 2004; Mancini and Bonanno, 2006). Resilience ultimately 
represents the difference between individuals who recover well from adversity 
and those who cannot or find it difficult to move on. Research (Avey et al., 
2009) has disclosed that resilient individuals are better equipped to deal with 
stressors in constantly changing work environments due to being: adaptive 
to changing demands; emotionally stable in the face of adversity; and more 
open to new experiences. Translating these attributes into an Oil and Gas 
Industry application, resilient individuals may be considered highly valued 
assets in the constantly evolving, unpredictable, challenging and frequently 
hazardous environment. 
 
Optimism refers to an individuals’ ability to make positive and realistic 
assignment about success, current and future. In a general sense, optimists 
expect good things to happen. It is a positive explanatory style that attributes 
positive events to personal, permanent, and pervasive causes. Conversely, 
negative events are attributed to external, temporary and situation specific 
factors (Carver and Scheier, 2002). The researchers postulate that when 
individuals possess positive expectancy, they will persist with positive efforts 
despite increasing adversity whereas pessimists, lacking positive expectation, 
are unable to initiate action leading to goal attainment. An alternative 
definition was proposed by Seligman (1998) where optimism is considered as 
an explanatory style where individuals explain to themselves why self-defined 
good or bad things happen to them. On this basis, optimists make internal, 
stable, and global causal attributions of positive outcomes; external, 
unstable, and specific attribution of negative events. Pessimists, conversely, 
attribute positive outcomes with external, temporary and situation specific 
attributes; negative outcomes attributed to personal, permanent, and 
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pervasive causes. Optimists therefore possess a positive psychological state 
that enables them to keep moving forward through retained motivation. To 
generate success, being solely optimistic is not sufficient. However, when 
combined with hope goal attainment may be broken down into practical steps 
towards achievement. As such, optimism has become associated with a range 
of positive performance outcomes, including job performance (Youssef and 
Luthans, 2007). Considering the Oil and Gas Industry perspective, possessing 
an optimistic tendency to see the possibility for [positively] changing 
situations is important for acting in accordance with safety plans, policies, 
and procedures; generating improvement; and taking action to avoid 
negative safety outcomes. 
 
Avey (2014) acknowledged that from literature, there is not much evidence 
to prove the antecedents of PsyCap. Although many prior studies have 
focused on the ability of PsyCap in anticipating workplace attitudes and 
behaviours, Avey (ibid) considered there to be void concerning the 
antecedents of PsyCap. However, in a more recent study, Wu and Nguyen 
(2019) confirmed leadership to be an antecedent of PsyCap, particularly 
authentic and ethical leadership styles. Also, in terms of consequences 
(outcomes) of PsyCap the research results demonstrated that positive 
leadership such as authentic leadership positively related to desirable work 
attitudes such as organisational commitment. Overall, PsyCap is an evidence-
based core construct and positive approach that managers [and safety 
practitioners] may leverage to tap into underutilised human strengths to 
deliver excellence in organisational performance. Emphasis on the criteria of 
being positive, measurable for validity, developmental, and related to 
desirable work outcomes has helped PsyCap to grow as an approach due to 
its retained scientific rigor and practical relevance. The solid foundation 
established during the past decade-and-a-half strengthens PsyCap, and 
positivity in general, as a valuable capital resource for individuals, teams, and 
organizations. Building a conceptual model of the affiliation between PsyCap 
and safety performance (Eid et al., 2012) contended that PsyCap may 
represent a more positive motivational state thereby promoting an increased 
level of safety behaviour and associated practice. In a study to examine the 
role of PsyCap in the perception of safety climate amongst Air Traffic 
controllers it was concluded that there were significant positive associations 
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between safety climate and PsyCap, highlighting the important role that 
PsyCap appears to fulfil in developing and sustaining safety climate 
(Bergheim et al., 2013). Furthermore, a recent maritime industry study 
(Bergheim et al., 2015) concluded that PsyCap would be a desirable and an 
interesting construct to include in future research on safety related matters, 
hence relevant to the current research.  
 
Consistent with Human and Social Capital, Luthans and Youssef (2004) 
identified that PsyCap can be managed to generate sustainable improvement 
and contributing to an increase in competitive advantage. Managed 
improvement can be achieved through all the construct feature levels: self-
efficacy (e.g. through vicarious learning, experience mastery and positive 
feedback), hope (e.g. goal setting and contingency planning); resiliency (e.g. 
through asset and risk-focused strategies); and optimism (e.g. through 




Culture has been studied for many years by both anthropologists and 
sociologists producing extensive debate and numerous resultant definitions. 
There remains, however, no single agreement on what the concept means. 
More recently researchers have focused on the linkage between 
organizational culture and performance, recognising the importance of 
leadership in understanding, building, and sustaining aligned cultures through 
their strategic endeavours to deliver performance and competitive advantage 
(Mohelska and Sokolova, 2015; and Warrick, 2017). Considered to be a major 
factor in the success of any given organisation, culture has significant 
influence over key organisational aspects: performance and effectiveness; 
morale and productivity; plus, the ability to attract and retain talented people. 
Clearly culture has strong implications for the ongoing development of social 
capital, in turn human capital (Rastoggi, 2000). An extension of this debate, 
relevant to the current research, would be to consider how organisational 
culture might influence the development of a safety culture, and subsequently 
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2.5.1 Organisational Culture 
 
The concept of organisational culture was the focus of significant attention 
and research during the 1970’s and 1980’s. As a concept it is complex and 
difficult to define (Guion, 1973; Glick, 1985; Schein, 1992; and Guldenmund, 
2000). There are many ways to define organisational culture given it is 
influenced by numerous factors, for example the sector in which the 
organisation operates, its geographic location, the events that occurred 
during its history, personalities of its employees, and their patterns of 
interaction. The diversity of these concepts being both global and abstract 
have the propensity to be virtually meaningless and of little benefit to the 
current research. In the seminal research paper ‘The nature of safety culture’ 
Guldenmund, (ibid) concludes that organisational culture is a shared 
construct: somewhat stable; multidimensional in nature; that provides a 
frame of reference giving meaning to (or is reflected) in organisational 
practices. Seven key characteristics of organisational culture were deduced 
through Guldenmund’s research which also importantly identified differences 
between the concepts of safety culture and safety climate. 
 
Edgar Schein, a celebrated and leading authority of organisational culture 
studies deliberately uses the word group to describe social units of all sizes. 
The recognition being that the term group could refer to a complete 
organisation or a small group of individuals that, regardless of size, are likely 
to form a specific culture (Schein, 1992). Complimentary to Schein’s 
perspective a further elementary description to focus upon is that culture 
represents the unspoken, and usually invisible sets of beliefs and assumptions 
shared by individuals in an organisation (Hudson et al., 2002). This definition 
reflects in practical terms organisational culture describes the environment in 
which people work and the influence it has on how they think, act and 
experience work. Not unexpectedly, cultures may differ significantly between 
and within organisations. This may bring out the best in people and create 
effective and productive working environments; alternatively, it may bring 
out the worst in people where dysfunctional environments of stress and 
tension become created. Of relevance and recalling Chapter 1, it was 
identified that the “dynamics of social interaction” have clear potential to 
generate safety barrier defeating forces (Storseth et al., 2014:54) which 
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when acted upon may subsequently result in accident and incident. 
Continuing to write extensively on organisational culture and leadership, 
Schein (2017) declared a dynamic definition of culture that, importantly, 
takes into consideration organisational experiences of external adaption and 
internal integration. It reflects the constant evolution of culture: 
 
“The culture of a group can be defined as the accumulated shared learning of 
that group as it solves its problems of external adaption and internal 
integration: which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, 
feel and behave in relation to those problems. This accumulated learning is a 
pattern or system of beliefs, values, and behavioural norms that come to be 
taken for granted as basic assumptions and eventually drop out of 
awareness.” 
 
Schein (ibid) through this definition has concluded the most value-adding 
means of arriving at a meaningful definition of something as abstract as 
culture is to consider it from a dynamic perspective, acknowledging what 
groups have learned through strident efforts to: survive; grow; adapt to the 
external environment; and become efficiently organised internally. This 
definition resonates for the current research given its alignment with the Miles 
and Snow (1978) typology – organization strategy, structure, and process 
(the adaptive cycle) addressed in Literature Review section 2.8.2. 
 
Clearly, many factors have the propensity to influence the development of 
organisational culture, the result reflecting each organisations’ leaders. 
Steers and Shim (2013) concluded that leaders influence the development of 
culture through their developed strategies, implemented strategies, 
established values, style, and personally demonstrated behaviours; strong 
leaders delivering strong cultures. Following on from this, Warrick (2017) 
defined ten guidelines for building and sustaining culture. First and foremost 
is to make culture and strategy an important leadership priority, the belief 
being that when leaders are focused on both culture and strategy through 
their planning and decision-making processes strong alignment will be 
achieved. More effective performance and competitive advantage will be 
delivered plus cultural development will not be left to chance. 
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Considering competitive advantage through the lens of improved safety 
performance, it was noted previously in literature review that effective 
management of HF within overall business and safety strategy provides a 
capability to deliver business benefit through increased efficiency and 
prevention [plus reduction] of accidents and incidents (Vogt et al., 2010). 
With a clear focus towards safety performance, Reason (1997) considers 
Uttal’s (1983) definition of organizational culture most closely capture the 
essence of organisational culture: “shared values (what is important) and 
beliefs (how things work) that interact with a company’s people, 
organizational structures and control systems to produce behavioral norms 
(the way we do things around here)”. Consideration for the concept of safety 
culture was therefore required within the current research. Although it has 
been used widely for an excess of three decades the concept of safety culture 
remains somewhat abstract and is at times a contentious notion (Le Coze, 
2019). 
 
2.5.2 Safety Culture 
 
The roots of safety culture lie in the wider concept of organisational culture 
and have a relatively recent history (Schein, 1985; Meek, 1988; and Denison, 
1995) in organizational psychology. Meek (ibid) noted that the culture 
concept was borrowed from the structural–functional paradigm of the 
anthropological tradition. The concept is characterised by complexity; in one 
respect it is challenging content-wise, and in another it may be considered a 
multi-dimensional and cross-disciplinary research domain. It is also not 
without contention among researchers and business users (van Nunen et al., 
2018; Le Coze, ibid). Overall, safety culture as a concept appears to be 
derived from the tradition of organizational culture (Cox and Flin, 1998; 
Richter and Koch, 2004). 
 
Many high reliability and safety critical industries around the world have 
developed an ever-increasing interest in the concept of ‘Safety Culture’ as a 
means of realistically lessening the potential for catastrophic events and 
disasters. Research has also concluded that organisations with good safety 
culture tend to have fewer accidents (Mearns et al., 2001; and Zohar, 2010). 
Linked to safety management systems (Corrigan et al., 2019) consider that 
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if there is no real commitment or culture towards safety then an 
organisations’ established safety management system will have reduced 
effectiveness as part of overall business strategy since safety will not receive 
prioritisation in the decision-making process; therefore a threat to safety 
performance and a reduction in organisational competitiveness. In a recent 
bibliometric analysis of safety culture, i.e. a quantitative analysis of published 
information without a qualitative analysis of its content, van Nunen et al. 
(ibid) revealed 1789 publications relating to safety culture published between 
1900 and 2015 through the Web of Science. The 1789 publications covered 
4591 authors and 775 journals. The research indicated that safety culture has 
been a field of extensive research during the last ten years or so as defined 
by an exponential growth in research output. However, the data trends also 
indicated a saturation of scientific output in this field. 
 
The term 'Safety Culture' was first used by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) through the International Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) 
Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on 26th April 1986 
Chernobyl nuclear accident (INSAG, 1986) and subsequently expanded upon 
during 1988. The INSAG proposed definition of safety culture was: 
 
“Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in 
organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, 
nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their 
significance.” 
 
As originally conceived, safety culture had two general components: firstly, 
the necessary framework within an organization and is the responsibility of 
the management hierarchy; and secondly the attitude of staff at all levels in 
responding to, and benefiting from, the identified framework.  Ultimately the 
purpose was to provide clarification and develop a commonly shared 
understanding of safety culture within the nuclear industry. It reflected a 
tangible commitment to safety at all levels within [nuclear industry] 
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During the intervening three-plus decades, safety culture has been a widely 
debated and researched subject and has made its way into the fabric of many 
high-risk industries (e.g. aviation, chemical, medical, nuclear and oil and gas) 
as a means of framing the issue of safety performance from an organisational 
perspective. Organisations operating in such industries are acknowledged to 
be complex sociotechnical systems. Taking an interpretive organisational 
theoretical stance, rather than the functionalist view of an organisation (plus 
its human capital) Reiman and Oedewald (2007) contend that complex 
sociotechnical systems are both socially constructed and dynamic in nature. 
Aligned with this purview Weeks and Galunic (2003) culture to be an 
emergent social phenomenon, created and shaped by agency and power: not 
by any official order or mandate. Further, Weeks and Galunic (ibid) 
acknowledge that for cultural evolution, some persons have more influence 
in an organisation than others, with organisational authority alone not 
sufficient to shape cultural development. For the current research, the 
dynamics of social interaction (Storseth et al., 2014) are interpreted to have 
a key role to play in cultural evolution where, for example, it becomes 
culturally acceptable to bypass formally established safety practice policies 
and procedures. 
 
Unfortunately, the safety culture concept is frequently considered separately 
from the other characteristics of the organisation, such as the organising of 
work, technology, organisational structure, and business strategy. This leads 
to safety culture being considered independent of wider organisational 
culture; at best loosely connected (Reiman and Oedewald, 2004). As a result, 
the conceptual separation leads to safety culture being considered only in 
relation to factors that are clearly connected with safety, such as safety 
attitudes and safety values. This outcome is typified in the definition offered 
by Arezes and Miguel (2003: 23) where safety culture is described as “the 
enduring value and priority placed on worker and public safety by everyone 
in every group at every level of an organization”. Here safety culture reflects 
the extent of commitment individuals and groups have in relation to personal 
responsibility for safety, safety preservation, safety enhancement and 
communication of safety concerns within their organisation. Overall, the 
definition results in the loss of the holistic perspective originally sought from 
the organisational culture concept (Guldenmund, 2000; Choudhry et al., 
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2007). More encouragingly, however, recent research indicates increased 
inclusion of human aspects in the safety culture concept in addition to 
[acknowledged] technological aspects (van Nunen et al., 2018). This positive 
development is reflected in Reiman and Rollenhagen’s (2014) perspective 
that safety culture represents a holistic, comprehensive term that comprises 
a totality of technological, organisational, and human factors. 
 
Finally, van Nunen et al’s (ibid) bibliometric analysis of safety culture research 
recorded that the most cited research paper is from Guldenmund (2000). This 
seminal research considered the nature of safety culture through a review of 
theory and research. Importantly it considered the concepts of both safety 
culture and safety climate, providing a means of differentiation. It was 
concluded that the assessment of safety culture may provide insight into 
attitudes leading to safety performance improvement and the avoidance of 
major accidents; measurement of safety climate might be utilised as an 
alternative safety performance indicator beyond the traditional recording of 
accident and incident events.  
 
2.5.3 Safety Climate 
 
During the past three decades the presence of a positive relationship between 
safety climate and the safety behaviour of persons working in high risk and 
safety critical organisations has been confirmed by an extensive number of 
research studies, including from within the Oil and Gas Industry (Griffin and 
Neal, 2000; Clarke, 2006; Clarke and Ward, 2006; Agnew, Flin and Mearns, 
2013; and Dahl et al., 2014). Safety climate can be defined as the set of 
perceptions that employees share regarding safety in their work environment 
(Zohar 2010) and the body of research, in summary, demonstrates that 
individuals who perceive that safety is prioritised and valued within their 
organisation display more positive safety behaviours than those who perceive 
their organisation to place lower priority and value on safety. 
 
According to Clarke (2006), the safety climate of an organisation acts as a 
frame of reference for safety-specific behaviour and attitudes of both 
individuals and groups of employees. Further, Zohar (2010) assumes that it 
is within this frame of reference that employees receive, interpret, and make 
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sense of signals from a complex web of sources (colleagues, policies, 
leadership, competing domains, etc.) about what sort of role behaviour is 
expected, supported, and rewarded. Employee behaviour will then tend to 
align with these perceived expectations. For current research Zohar’s 
assumption is interpreted to align with the identified literature that complex 
sociotechnical systems are both socially constructed and dynamic in nature, 
with culture (reflected through safety culture) as an emergent social 
phenomenon, created and shaped by agency and power (Weeks and Galunic, 
2003; plus Reiman and Oedewald, 2007).  
 
Arezes and Miguel (ibid: 23) consider safety climate to include a “temporal 
state measure of safety culture, subject to commonalities among individual 
perceptions of the organization”. When considering safety climate, it is 
important to be distinguished from safety culture within research (Flin et al., 
2000; Guldenmund, 2000) where the former is a manifestation of the latter. 
Safety climate is therefore situationally based and refers to the perceived 
state of safety at a particular location and time. Potentially this makes safety 
climate relatively unstable and subject to changes influenced by the working 
environment or prevailing conditions. Amongst members of a social unit, 
safety climate may be defined as shared perception of policies, procedures 
and practices related to safety in the organisation (Zohar, 2000; and Griffin 
and Neal, 2002). 
 
Mearns et al. (2001) consider safety climate to be an important element of 
organisational reliability. Zohar (2003 and 2010) concludes that 30 years of 
research has validated the use of safety climate as a robust leading indicator 
of safety performance. Further traction is provided by Bjerkan (2010) who 
acknowledges that it has become increasingly recognised within the oil and 
gas industry that safety culture and climate are of particular importance in 
securing the health and safety of people at work. This gradual shift of focus 
has been driven by the awareness that Human Factors rather than purely 
technical failures are prime causes of accidents in high reliability industries 
where significant hazards are present. As previously stated, they feature in 
80% of all types of accident and in almost every major accident. Associated 
with the Human Factor dimension, many studies have identified that a 
significant number of accidents and incidents may be attributed to unsafe 
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work practices of the workers rather than unsafe working conditions (e.g. 
Garavan and O’brien, 2001). Some studies (Mullen, 2004) reveal that 
organisational and social factors are not to be discounted because these 
factors influence safety behaviours; if unsafe conditions prevail, they become 
normalised with the risks accepted and adapted to. Research has more 
recently demonstrated that by establishing a positive safety climate may lead 
to improvements in hazard recognition and improvements in risk perception 
(Pandit et al., 2019) potentially leading to accident and incident reduction 
through the Human Factor. 
 
O’Connor et al. (2011) report a variety of qualitative and quantitative tools 
have been utilised for measuring organisational safety climate, of these, 
questionnaires are by far the most typically deployed. Payne et al. (2009) 
consider that safety climate assessments may be able to highlight where 
threats to safety lie in an organisation thereby allowing the targeting of 
available intervention resources. It is proposed that an effective safety 
climate measurement tool should capture shared perceptions but may not 
include other psychological constructs such as safety attitudes. Each 
individual respondent should be considered as an observer and reporter of 
the shared safety perception (Kines et al., 2011). Consistent with this, the 
HSL Safety Climate Tool, described as a reliable and valid psychometric 
instrument (Sugden et al., 2009), should facilitate such a measurement 
exercise and lead to the effective targeting of available safety climate 
intervention resources. This research instrument is described in further detail 
within Chapter 4. O’Connor et al. (2011: 264) concluded that “The use of long 
and complex surveys should cease to be the measurement method for 
assessing safety climate.” They recommended that a triangulation approach 
with quantitative and qualitative aspects should be used to provide a detailed 
analysis of organisational safety climate as an element of safety [and 
organisational] strategy. The outcome was considered a vital concept within 











At the UK Oil & Gas Piper 25 Conference, along with appropriate business 
strategies, the Head of Strategic Intervention HSE Energy Division espoused 
the need for effective safety leadership (Hackitt, 2013). The espousal 
reflected the Regulators recognition that no matter how well strategy is 
established, defined, and communicated it requires to be effectively 
implemented if organisational goals and objectives are to be achieved. 
Effective leadership is therefore required at each strategy level (corporate, 
business, and functional).  
 
There are numerous definitions of leadership. For example, Flin and Yule 
(2004) consider leadership to encompass the skills relating to influencing a 
group to attain a specific set of organisational goals. Babcock-Roberson and 
Strickland (2010) view leadership as a social influence process where one or 
more individuals prevail upon one or more followers by explaining the tasks 
to be accomplished then subsequently providing the means and motivation 
to achieve established goals. Mullins (2010: 373) provides a synthesis 
defining it as “a relationship through which one person influences the 
behaviour or actions of other people” Some forty years ago, Cohen (1977) 
concluded that strong management commitment to safety plus close contact 
and interaction between workers, supervisors, enabling open communications 
on safety were clear distinguishing factors for successful safety programs and 
safety performance.  
 
Safety leadership is deemed to be a sub-set of leadership that can be defined 
as “the process of interaction between leaders and followers, through which 
leaders can exert their influence on followers to achieve organizational and 
safety goals under the circumstances of organisational and individual factors” 
(Wu et al., 2008: 308). These interactions are vital within the oil and gas 
industry due to the high level of organisational complexity and the safety 
critical nature of production operations. In this research context, strategic 
and operational leadership within the industry are required to influence or 
perhaps transform safety behaviours of personnel from across the value chain 
(i.e. Operators, Contractors and Sub-contractors with inherent and differing 
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safety standards) to meet the safety performance expectations of asset 
Operators and Duty Holders.  
 
Previous studies have investigated the outcome of safety leadership on safety 
performance (O’Dea and Flin, 2001; Barling et al., 2002; Neal and Griffin, 
2006; Zohar, 2010; Griffin and Hu, 2013; Fernandez-Muniz at al., 2014; 
Pilbeam et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2016; and Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2017). 
Safety leadership combined with safety culture are two important predictors 
of a good safety performance and in developing a positive safety climate. Wu 
et al. (2008: 315) consider it necessary for senior management and 
managers “to demonstrate visibly the strongest commitment and action on a 
regular basis”. This indicates a need for high level safety leadership to 
encourage the operational supervisors to influence group safety. Consistent 
with this position, Kapp (2012: 1123) identifies the value of leaders and 
supervisors “… who are perceived to place a high value on safety achieve 
greater levels of safety compliance from their employees …” 
 
Effective managers and supervisors can directly and indirectly influence 
workforce behaviour (Mullins, 2010). Indirectly, they establish and reinforce 
norms relating to working practices and procedures thereby influencing safety 
culture and climate. Directly, their portrayal of safe and unsafe behaviours 
and the reinforcement of behaviour through interaction, monitoring, control, 
intervention, and reward are significant. These leadership actions influence 
workforce expectations and motivation thus impacting upon behaviours 
(activity) and (safety) outcomes. As such, effective leadership behaviour 
affects safety culture and indirectly affects safety performance (Yang et al., 
2009). Safety leadership is a multifaceted role requiring leaders and 
supervisors to engage with the workforce on a personal level and to possess 
a consistent and systematic view of organisational safety practices. The skill 
inventory (Figure 2.5) highlights four skills that leaders need to possess to 
build a safe and dynamic work environment (Griffin and Rodriguez, 2013). As 
a result of personal correspondence with authors Griffin and Talati (2013) it 
was established that the existing safety culture of an organisation may 
influence the kind of leaders who are attracted to it.   
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Figure 2.5 Four Skills Required for Safety Leadership, adapted from Griffin & Rodriguez 
(2013) 
 
In a study of safety compliance on offshore platforms, Dahl and Olsen (2013) 
noted that in addition to having a direct effect on safety compliance, a high 
level of leadership involvement was critical to the formation of a climate that 
that stimulates compliance with rules and procedures. It was further 
highlighted that appropriate leadership training is necessary when aiming for 
improved safety compliance. 
 
Safety research has drawn some parallels between safety leadership and 
transformational leadership (Barling et al., 2002; Mullen and Kelloway, 2009; 
and Conchie, et al., 2011). Of the many leadership theories, transformational 
leadership rather than transactional leadership has been considered 
extremely pertinent in achieving improved safety behaviours because it is a 
process of engendering higher levels of motivation and adherence among 
followers (Mullins, 2010). Transformational leadership is composed of four 
elements (Barling et al., 2002): idealised influence; inspirational motivation; 
intellectual stimulation; and individualised consideration. In a comparison of 
safety-specific versus general transformational leadership Mullen and 
Kelloway (ibid: 255) summarised that “a safety-specific transformational 
leader engages in behaviour that is characteristics of the components of 
transformational leadership, yet specifically focused on inspiring and 
promoting positive safety-related practices”. Transformational leadership is 
considered a positive leadership style (e.g. Bass, 1998) along with others 
such as charismatic (Conger et al., 2000; Jacobsen and House, 2001; 
 
Page 59 of 255 
 
Babcock-Roberson and Strickland, 2010; de Hoogh et al., 2010; and Dartey-
Baah and Addo, 2018) and ethical (Brown et al., 2005).  
 
Charismatic leaders were described by Bass (1985) as possessing strong 
referent power with associated influence. Further conceptualised by Conger 
and Kanungo (1987), Charismatic leadership was described as possessing 
three stages through which a leader must take an organisation from present 
times through to the future operations: first, the environmental assessment 
stage; second the vision formulation stage; and finally the implementation 
stage. Individuals choose to follow such leaders in a workplace setting, not 
from formal designation of position and associated power, but due to the 
perception of the leaders [apparently extraordinary] character. Kark, Sghamir 
and Chen (2003) as cited in Babcock-Roberson and Strickland (2010) 
considered that charismatic leaders influence their follower’s social 
identification that I turn influenced their follower’s sense of empowerment. 
With follower’s empowered they develop a genuine belief that they are 
capable of influencing outcomes at work to make a value-adding difference. 
This constitutes evidence that charismatic leaders exploit, to their own 
advantage, the dynamics of social interaction in the workplace. 
 
To define and visualise ethical leadership, Brown et al. (2005) evoked social 
learning theory (Bandura, 1977; Bandura, 1986) to suggest that ethical 
leaders influence their employees through observational learning, in which 
employees learn by proxy from witnessing ethical leaders' behaviours and 
subsequent consequences (Bandura, 1977; Bandura, 1986). Ethical 
leadership is defined by Brown et al. (2005: 120) as “the demonstration of 
normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal 
relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-
way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making”. According to 
Mayer et al. (2009), ethical leaders concentrate entirely on the ethical 
dimension rather than on ethics as an aspect of leadership. Adding to the 
concept further, Brown et al. (ibid) concluded that ethical leadership 
incorporates two dimensions: firstly, traits such as honesty, fairness, and 
morality; plus behaviours exampled by balanced decision making, promoting 
ethics within the workplace and managing with a moral perspective. Dust et 
al. (2018) also suggested that ethical leaders influence their employees' 
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psychological empowerment through social learning processes with 
subsequent positive motivational implications. Dust et al’s (ibid) research 
advocates that ethical leaders are proficient role models who strive to bring 
out the best in their employees through psychological empowerment, in turn 
facilitating employees' current success plus their future success potential.  
 
However, the current research considered authentic leadership, with roots 
firmly anchored in positive psychology and positive organisational behaviour 
(Luthans and Avolio, 2003) to be a positive leadership style worthy of 
extended scrutiny. Authentic leadership is a combination of the moral and 
ethical components of leadership; they care about other people and society. 
Avolio and Gardner (2005) defined authentic leadership as having several key 
components: positive psychological capital; a positive moral perspective; 
leader self-awareness; leader self-regulation; leadership processes or 
behaviour; subordinate self-awareness or regulation; plus a genuine interest 
in subordinate [follower] development. Jensen and Luthans (2006) 
subsequently determined three characteristics of authentic leaders: firstly, 
they are motivated by personal beliefs rather than the attainment personal 
benefits; secondly, they are original in character and nature rather than being 
attempted copies of someone else; and finally, their actions are based on 
personal values. From these perspectives on authentic leadership, Eid et al. 
(2012) proposed the leadership style to be worthy of inclusion in future 
research to determine how leadership may affect safety outcome in safety 
critical organisations such as the Offshore Oil & Gas Industry. 
 
The establishment of authentic leadership as an accepted construct is the 
direct result and reflection of its multiple underlying dimensions; it lies at a 
junction of leadership, ethics, and positive organizational studies (Avolio et 
al., 2004; and Cooper and Nelson, 2006). Luthans and Avolio (2003: 243) 
defined authentic leadership as the “process that draws from both positive 
psychological capacities and a highly developed organisational context, which 
results in both greater self-awareness and self-regulated positive behaviours 
on the part of leaders and associates, fostering self-development”. Such a 
leader operates in neither the vacuum of self-interest nor under the 
organisational ‘Dulce et Decorum Est pro patria mori’ banner (Owen, 1920). 
In this context, authentic leaders sustain and develop based on their 
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psychological abilities plus their highly developed organisational contexts to 
achieve positive results. This results in self-development for both themselves 
and their [supporting] associates. There is an extrapolated expectation of 
resultant positive influence on subordinates which, in turn, has made the 
authentic leadership construct a subject of significant interest to the academic 
research. There have been numerous research studies conducted during the 
past two decades to examine the role of authentic leadership in multi-faceted 
organisational aspects such as employee job satisfaction (du Plessis and 
Boshoff, 2018), and safety perception (Gardener et al., 2005: Iverson, 2005; 
Neilsen et al., 2011; and Eid et al., 2012). It was concluded by Neilsen et al. 
(2011) that the four elements of authentic leadership (namely transparency, 
internalised moral perspective, balanced processing, and self-awareness) are 
integral components of leader-follower exchanges that can contribute to 
worker perceptions of safety climate, also to subsequent hazard and risk 
perception in the workplace of safety critical organisations such as those in 
the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry. 
 
For the current research, authentic leadership was selected to be a primary 
point of focus because, regarding matters of safety, the leadership style 
directly affects safety outcomes through the promotion of positive safety 
climate perceptions (Nielsen et al., 2011; Eid et al., 2012). Authentic leaders 
are also noted to augment engagement, motivation, commitment, and the 
involvement required by associates and subordinates to continually improve 
their performance outcomes through their evolution of both personal and 
social identification (Avolio et al., 2004). 
 
2.7 SOCIAL DYNAMICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES 
 
Hopkins (2012) in analysing the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Macondo disaster 
identified that social psychological processes had contributed to a sense of 
denial regarding a possible well blowout and subsequent catastrophe. Those 
processes were confirmation bias, normalisation of deviation, inadequate 
situational awareness, and groupthink. The four processes are an integral 
part of group dynamics, the influential actions, processes, and changes that 
occur between and within groups. 
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Confirmation bias is pervasive and strong and, according to Nickerson (1998) 
refers to the seeking or interpretation of evidence in a manner that is partial 
to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis to the fore. Schultz-Hardt et 
al. (2000) confirmed that confirmation bias existed at group as well as the 
individual level; significant in many workplaces since a considerable number 
of decisions (e.g. safety critical ones) with far-reaching implications are made 
at a group rather than individual level. Schwind and Buder (2012) consider 
confirmation bias to reflect a trait for the selection of preference-consistent 
information, a hindrance from taking dissenting information into account 
during decision making and, ultimately, an impediment to critical thinking.  
 
Normalisation of deviation is a phenomenon recognised in the aftermath of 
the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, January 1986 where subsequent 
studies of the NASA organisation revealed a series of mis steps, flawed 
assumptions and a culture of risk taking in the run up to the fatal launch 
(Vaughan, 1996). Pinto (2014) succinctly summed the phenomenon up as 
“the unexpected becomes the expected, which becomes the accepted”. This 
drift into failure has become acknowledged to be gradual in action, where 
individuals in an organisation may only recognise the deviance [it appears 
normal at the time] only with the benefit of hindsight. Further, the drift and 
acclimatisation to deviant behaviour takes place as a stepped process, over 
an extensive time period (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988); unacceptable 
behaviours do not all occur at once, rather they may be considered as the 
summation of multiple decisions. In this way, the potential for accident is 
never seen to be a realistic outcome until it realistically occurs, and only then 
becomes recognisable through hindsight.   
 
The concept of situational awareness, a cognitive skill, refers to individuals 
having an accurate and clear picture of the crucial factors comprising their 
environment (Saetrevik and Hystad, 2017). Endsley (1988: 97) defined 
situational awareness to be “the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of space and time, the comprehension of their 
meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” and wider 
research indicates that loss of situational awareness is correlated with poor 
system performance (Stanton et.al., 2001). Flin et al. (2015) consider that 
since situational awareness influences both performance and decision making 
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it has a crucial role to play in safety performance outcomes. Further, research 
conducted by Sneddon et al. (2013) concluded that higher levels of stress 
and fatigue are associated with lower levels of situational awareness, an 
increase in unsafe behaviours and higher accident risk potential. Overall, 
Salmon and Stanton (2013) considered the body of research conducted 
demonstrated situational awareness to be a salient safety-related concept. 
 
Groupthink is essentially “the tendency of cohesive groups to reach consensus 
on issues without offering, seeking, or considering alternative viewpoints” 
(Lunenburg, 2010: 1). Janis (1972, 1982) introduced the term from studies 
based primarily on political and military decision making; Lunenburg (ibid) 
subsequently confirmed that the potential for groupthink exists in any 
organisational setting. In a recent review, Waring (2015) noted additionally 
that groupthink consensus is frequently built around an authority figure 
despite the figure’s view perhaps not being supported by factual evidence to 
permit data-driven decision making; or necessarily be in the best interests of 
the group members. Waring (ibid) identified groupthink as being a contributor 
to inappropriate decision-making and subsequent actions in the lead up to 
safety disasters. Waring’s conclusions resonate with Janis’s (1971) belief that 
Groupthink, as a by-product of group decision making processes, is endowed 
with a consensus-seeking conformity so strong and fuelled by group 
cohesiveness it is capable of restricting and destroying the decision-making 
process. 
 
Forsyth (2019) notes that individuals frequently utilise groups to solve 
problems and make decisions in the belief that groups can process more 
information, more thoroughly, than individuals working alone. The intent of 
such group decision-making is fundamentally to ensure effective decision 
making that leads to safe operation and the prevention of accident and 
incident. However, as seen with Macondo, there exists a negative side of 
group dynamics that must be addressed when considering safety barrier 
elements and loss causation. Forsyth (ibid) noted that when rationality is put 
aside by a group in pursuit of unity, subsequent decisions have the propensity 
to deliver disastrous consequences 
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Storseth et al. (2014) in their re-analysis of the Hopkins 2012 study stated 
that the four specific psychological mechanisms identified by Hopkins are 
infused with social context, specifically a triumvirate of persuasion, pressure, 
and power. Macondo was deduced to be an extreme example of where the 
social forces existing within the work group onboard [the drilling rig] subdued 
attempts to think differently in the lead up to the disaster. The identified 
psychological mechanisms combined to defeat the established technical, 
operational, and organisational safety barrier elements established to prevent 
such a major accident event. In the same way in which psychological forces 
can serve to disseminate organisational strategies, processes, procedures, 
and decisions through a whole barrier system they may also contribute to the 
transmission of risk potential. 
 
2.8 BUSINESS STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY SAFETY CHALLENGES 
 
At the UK Oil & Gas Piper 25 Conference, the Head of Strategic Intervention 
HSE Energy Division (Hackitt, 2013) highlighted that to meet and overcome 
present-day safety challenges it would be essential for organisations to 
develop, implement and sustain appropriate business strategies. Before 
considering safety strategy as a specific topic subset, a review of the strategy 




For several decades, the formulation of strategy and strategic management 
has been an important element within the private sector industries (Grandy 
and Mills, 2004). A factor relevant to the research given that the value chains 
of Oil & Gas Operators in the UKCS are typically comprised of private sector 
organisations. Strategy is viewed as the key to successful business operations 
through increased competitiveness (Finlay 2000; and Johnson et al., 2011) 
while obtaining and sustaining strong competitive advantage is a critical task 
for organisations (Aggarwal, Siggelkow and Singh, 2011). At the same time, 
however, the lack of a general model of organisational strategy content 
persists (Steensen, 2014); such a model would [ideally] include the 
distinctive and individualistic organisational characteristics to enable 
discourse on the effects of different components of organisations’ strategy. 
 
Page 65 of 255 
 
The concept of strategy has been extensively written about within 
management texts, with numerous and different meanings nascent from the 
literature. For example, strategy has been viewed as an organisation’s 
formally stated goals, objectives, policies, and plans (Andrews, 1971; Hofer 
and Schen-del, 1978; James, 1984). Some authors advocate that strategy is 
best viewed as the general language and narrative used by managers as an 
attempt to give meaning and to influence the behaviour of organisation 
members (Pfeffer, 1981; Barry and Elmes, 1997; and Eccles and Nohria, 
1998). Other authors have defined strategy as managers’ intentions of 
reaching a unique competitive position (Porter, 1979), building a resource 
base (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993) or testing opportunities inside specific 
boundaries for future activities (Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001; and Markides, 
2004). 
 
In a similar manner, academics and researchers have analysed and described 
different applications of the strategy concept. For example, several outcomes 
have categorized applications as strategy ‘models’ (Chaffee, 1985; and 
Ansoff, 1987), ‘perspectives’ (de Witt and Meyer, 1998; Whittington, 2001; 
and Jenkins and Ambrosini, 2002), ‘lenses’ (Johnson et al., 2011) or notably 
as ‘schools of thoughts’ (Mintzberg, 1990; Mintzberg and Lampel, 1998). 
Although these contributions generally emphasize differences between 
strategy researchers’ focus and the basic premises of their work, they are not 
necessarily relevant in relation to defining the content of an organization’s 
strategy; more specifically, how to identify the distinctive and individualistic 
compositions of organizations’ strategy content. 
 
Several attempts have been made to classify an organization’s strategy 
content (for example Hax, 1990; Peattie, 1993; and Moncrieff, 1999). 
Possibly the most celebrated work is Mintzberg’s (1987) ‘The Strategy 
Concept 1: Five Ps for Strategy’, that describes five ways of defining the 
strategy concept: as a plan; ploy; pattern; position; and perspective. 
Mintzberg claims that each definition competes, but also complements, and 
adds important elements to an understanding of what strategy is. The 
inadequacy in applying such frameworks for generally understanding the 
distinctive and individualistic content of organizations’ strategy can be 
exemplified by Mintzberg’s ‘five Ps’ framework. First, three out of Mintzberg’s 
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five types cannot be assumed to be present in all organizations. Not all 
organizations have thought out something that can be viewed as a ‘strategy 
plan’, search for a specific position or articulate ploys to mislead competitors. 
Thus, the framework may not be relevant for describing the strategy content 
for all organizations. Further, the framework does not address the relations 
between the five defined types of strategy. This is problematic because 
interaction between strategy types may be critical in understanding the 
distinctive and individualistic characteristics of an organization’s strategy 
content, e.g. whether ‘plan’ or ‘position’ relates to ‘pattern’ in any one specific 
organisation. Moreover, Mintzberg’s model and those of Peattie (ibid), Hax 
(ibid), and Moncrieff (ibid) leave out the question of how the strategy of an 
organisation is composed since there may not be one plan, ploy, search for 
position, pattern, or perspective in an organization, but many (formal and 
informal) among key influencers (plans, positions, perspectives). These may 
be relatively concurrent in some situations but diverse and conflicting in 
others. Such seminal contributions emphasize, however, the need for 
redefining organisational strategy content in a less rationally mechanistic 
manner; one that acknowledges multiple and potentially conflicting aspects 
thus considering organizational level diversity in strategy content level. This 
is described as the need to move from a ‘mechanistic’ to an ‘organic’ 
perspective on strategy, where ‘in the organic view interaction and mutual 
influences are highlighted’ (Farjoun, 2002: 570). With respect to strategy in-
practice, such a perspective strongly indicates that [for successful 
implementation] organizational strategy requires evolution to being more 
adaptively emergent rather than rationally deliberate and functional. Indeed, 
the “myth” of organizational effectiveness through instrumental rationality is 
strongly disputed by Stacey (2007: 300, 301) who advocates that “change 
emerges in predominantly unpredictable ways”, particularly in complex 
organizations such as many included in Oil & Gas Operator value-chains, 
where complexity may never be fully known, understood, or controlled 
(Stacey, 2009). 
 
2.8.2 Strategic Management 
 
Strategic management involves formulation and implementation of the major 
goals and objectives undertaken by an organisation’s top management on 
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behalf of shareholders (Nag, Hambrick and Chen, 2007). This includes 
consideration of available resources plus an internal and external assessment 
of the environment in which the organisation competes. Studies on strategy 
can, from a broad perspective, be differentiated into two types. Firstly, one 
that prioritises the analysis of an organisation’s external environment such 
as Porter’ (1980) model and one that takes more account of the internal 
environment, as in the Resourced Based View (RBV) model (Wernerfelt, 
1984). Porter (ibid) emphasises that the source of competitive advantage is 
related to an organisation’s positioning, and therefore, it must identify and 
locate to a position from which it is capable of defending itself against 
environmental forces with the potential to detrimentally affect its 
competitiveness and results. The resource-based view (RBV) perspective 
(Wernerfelt, ibid) analyses internally for the sources of competitive by 
recognising the heterogeneity of organisations. In their seminal adaptive 
cycle research, Miles and Snow (1978) placed themselves philosophically in 
between the Porter and RBV views of strategy and strategic process. The 
presented logic was that organisations must adjust their strategies to the 
experienced and prevailing environmental conditions and align its structures 
to the established strategies, therefore ensuring that process of obtaining 
strategic fit purpose becomes dynamic in nature. In the view of Miles and 
Snow (ibid) achieving strategic alignment is not an isolated event but rather 
a continual process of adaptation and change. 
 
Miles and Snow (1978) proposed four basic types of strategy for business, 
recognising there may be nuances of difference depending upon the nature 
of the industry [being observed]. Firstly, Defenders are organisations that 
prosper through stability plus reliability, and efficiency. Secondly there are 
Prospectors, organisations that generate success by utilising market and 
product opportunities in a stimulating manner. Analyzers are successful by 
being more innovative in both product and market initiatives than Defenders 
albeit more cautiously and selectively than Prospectors. Reactors are the 
most likely of the four organisational types to not prosper since they tend to 
hesitate in their approach to the external environment. The four basic types 
of strategy were overlaid by Miles and Snow (ibid) with the concept of an 
adaptive cycle, interpreting organisations to be perpetually engaged in their 
own entrepreneurial problem (selecting and adjusting to the market-product 
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domain), their engineering problem (producing and delivering their products 
and services) and finally their administrative problem (establishing the 
necessary roles, working relationships, and processes). The Miles and Snow 
(ibid) deduced logic was that through enough rotations of the adaptive cycle 
an effective organisation becomes aligned with either Defender, Prospector, 
or Analyzer typology. Failure to grasp the alignment opportunities presented 
by the adaptive cycle inevitably leads to alignment with the Reactor typology.  
 
Miles and Snow (ibid: 30) acknowledge that any one typology is unlikely to 
encompass every form of organisational behaviour given that that the world 
of organisations is “too changeable and complex to permit such a claim”. With 
organisations proceeding through the adaptive cycle, perhaps continually 
over time, there will inevitably be some that organisations identify between 
the defined typology types. The Miles and Snow typologies has been 
consistently and widely adopted in strategic research (Desarbo et al., 2005; 
Lin et al., 2013; and Helmig et al., 2014) since their 1978 inception, primarily 
due to their applicability to all business types and industry applications. Miles 
and Snow (ibid) predicted that their typology designations would support 
codification and prediction in research. However, no application of the Miles 
and Snow typology was identified for use in the Offshore Oil & Gas industry, 
hence originality of the current research. 
 
Considering strategy formulation, Hart (1992) produced a typology of five 
strategy-making modes that has gained wide acceptance as a theoretical 
model. The typology has implications for the research through outlining 
alternative processes for strategy formulation with which differing value chain 
organisations may adopt. In the Command Mode strategy is made by a strong 
individual leader supported by a few top managers. Analysis and option 
evaluation become used to provide deliberate, fully formed, ready to 
implement strategies. Other people in the organisation are ‘good soldiers’ 
who execute the strategy. This might work in an industry environment that 
is relatively simple and hence can be understood by one or a few people. The 
organisation will probably be relatively small, so that one person can still 
maintain effective control. 
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In the Symbolic Mode, top management create a clear and compelling vision, 
which gives meaning to the organisation’s activities and provides a sense of 
identity for employees. This long-term vision can be translated into specific 
targets and there is an implicit control system based on shared values. 
Speeches, persuasion, new projects, and recognition provide focus and 
momentum to guide the creative actions of individuals. The flexibility of this 
mode is said to suit dynamic environments, and larger more differentiated 
organisations which may be growing or re-orienting through proactive 
strategies; this is well aligned with Miles and Snow typologies of Prospector 
or Analyzer. In the Rational Mode, there is a more comprehensive system of 
formal strategic planning with written strategic and operating plans. There is 
upward sharing of data and a high level of information processing and 
analysis. Detailed plans and well-developed control systems are seen. It is 
likely to be found in larger firms defending established strategic positions in 
relatively stable environments; aligned with the Miles and Snow typology of 
Defender. The Transactive Mode employs strategy making based on 
interaction and learning rather than the execution of a predetermined plan 
(which is precluded by the inability of top management to understand a 
complex environment fully). Features of this mode are cross-functional 
communication, feedback and learning, and dialogue with key stakeholders, 
thus necessitating an iterative approach to strategy making. Initiatives such 
as just-in-time (JIT), total quality management (TQM) and customer focus 
provide vehicles for these transactions. Top management is concerned with 
facilitation and linking outcomes over time to determine strategic direction. 
This is said to suit large mature firms operating in complex environments, 
e.g. following analyser strategies aimed at incremental product or service 
improvement. Finally, the Generative Mode has features that were also 
highlighted in the work of Wooldridge and Floyd (1990). New ideas emerge 
upwardly from “entrepreneurship”. Top managers mainly encourage 
experimentation and select and nurture high-potential proposals. New 
strategies are germinated by separating innovative activity from the day-to-
day work of the operating organisation. Product champions, who can link new 
ideas with organisational resources to make them a commercial reality, are 
important. The strategy is continuously adjusted to reflect the pattern of high 
potential innovations that emerge from below. This mode is said to suit 
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turbulent environments, and Prospector strategies in complex and 
fragmented markets.  
 
Hart’s later empirical work (Hart and Banbury, 1994) produced evidence that 
the more capable an organisation was to develop competence in multiple 
modes of the strategy-making process, the higher its performance. Firms able 
to accumulate more complex resources and capabilities in strategy making 
should be more successful at sustaining competitive advantage than those 
firms with simpler or less-developed capabilities (Barney, 1991, cited in Hart 
and Banbury, 1994). In turn, environmental analyses are an active and 
essential input into an organization’s strategic development; it is categorically 
not a ‘passive’ exercise (Fitzroy et al., 2012: 93). The strategic tools and 
techniques utilised are imperative for business, to maintain competitiveness 
and effectiveness. Wright et al. (2013:92) conclude from research in the field 
that “they form a critical and cognitively demanding element in the practice 
of effective strategy workers”. 
 
2.8.3 International Oil Company (IOC) Strategic Approaches 
 
IOC’s, during the past five decades, have been predominantly responsive to 
changes in their external environment resulting in changes to the strategic 
architecture of the companies themselves. In the early days of the Oil & Gas 
Industry (i.e. early 19th century from when the first commercial oil well was 
drilled in North America – 1818) through to mid-20th century the 
predominance appears to have been the dynamics of advantage leading to 
the 1950's when seven giant oil companies owned approximately 85% of 
global reserves. Such enormous organizations had similar tendencies to those 
of mass-production industries and governments with strategies rationally 
deliberate and controlled in nature (Lampel et al., 2014). Since that period, 
the competitive market of IOC’s has been assailed by a range of diverse 
factors and challenges: market conditions; political; geological; and technical 
(Labban, 2010; Casertano, 2013; Mitchell and Mitchell, 2014). The oil price 
collapse towards the end of the 1990’s resulted in a series of mergers and 
acquisitions that eradicated former prominent independent oil company 
names (Mohn and Misund, 2009) as a consequence of the strategic phase to 
improve competitiveness.  Casertano (ibid: 212) comments that the oil 
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companies have reacted with “remarkable strategic flexibility” during this 
period of significant change, but the flexibility was noted to be reactive in 
nature.  
 
During the 1990’s when the global oil and gas industry was experiencing a 
phase of turmoil, mergers, and acquisitions (Mohn and Misund, 2009) the 
Business Scorecard (BSC) model first introduced by Kaplan and Norton 
(1992; 1996) was gaining traction. At this time, the strategies deployed by 
IOC’s were considered responsive rather than emergent in nature. The BSC 
is a technique used to establish a structure capable of translating an 
organisational strategy into operational terms. The aim of the BSC (Figure 
2.6) is to translate the organizational mission and strategy into a 
comprehensive set of performance measurements which become the basis 
for a strategic performance measurement system.  
 
 
Figure 2.6 Balanced Scorecard Model, adapted from Kaplan and Norton (1996) 
 
By employing a BSC-based approach many Oil & Gas Operating companies 
adopted a rational functionalist approach that focuses on scientific 
reductionism resulting from dividing the organizational mission and strategy 
into constituent variables. However, research has concluded that such 
rational paradigms may fail when confronted with unpredictable and unstable 
environmental conditions (Stacey, 1995; Combe and Botschen, 2004). As 
Casertano (2013) and Ermida (2014) acknowledged, oil companies have been 
subject to a constantly changing environment during the past forty years. By 
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reacting to environmental change through a predominantly rational, 
deliberate, and functionalist approach may have served to limit rather than 
maximise company competitiveness.  
 
The BSC has more recently come in for additional criticism. Flamholtz (2003) 
concluded that if factors used in the BSC were invalid then the organization 
may focus on the wrong strategic aspects with potentially damaging 
consequences. Voelpel et al. (2006:43) refer to “The tyranny of the Balanced 
Scorecard in the innovation economy”, concluding that the BSC has become 
obsolete due to competitive nature in business fundamentally changing since 
the BSC’s inception. A concept developed to address twentieth century 
economic and strategy paradigms cannot be effective in an economy that has 
evolved from industrialised to innovative; it does not sufficiently address 
emergence in organizational environments. Specifically, Voelpel et al. (ibid) 
advocate that the BSC exhibits severe limitations when applied to a rapidly 
changing and networked corporate environment.  Effective use of the BSC is 
also challenged due to senior management’s remaining inclination to use 
traditional financial measures as the primary factor to demonstrate successful 
strategy implementation (Chia et al., 2009). Further, culturally the BSC has 
been criticised for being a product of the USA, where performance-based 
remuneration systems are the norm (Bourguignon et al., 2004). However, 
many Operator organisations active within the UK Oil & Gas Industry have 
strong American corporate links with those values embedded and therefore 
there may be less of an ideological mismatch through use of a BSC-based 
approach. 
 
The “myth” of organizational effectiveness through instrumental rationality is 
strongly disputed by Stacey (2007: 300, 301) who advocates that “change 
emerges in predominantly unpredictable ways”, particularly in complex 
organizations such as IOC’s where complexity may never be fully known or 
controlled (Stacey, 2009). Change in such organizations requires complex 
responsive processes (Stacey et al., 2000), not a structured and rational 
systems approach. This logic applies equally to the driver of performance 
excellence – environmental, ethical and safety (section 3.5). To ensure 
maximum benefit, IOC strategy practice requires evolution to being more 
adaptively emergent rather than rationally deliberate and functional as per 
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the existing BSC approach. This evolution, by necessity of strategic 
alignment, may extend into organisations (contractors and subcontractors) 
that [typically] comprise an IOC’s value chain. To counter criticism of the 
BSC, Kaplan and Norton (2006) published a response to Voelpel et al. (2006). 
The response is professionally scathing and provides rebuttal to the five 
alleged failings. It states that the BSC may be used with additional 
perspectives in addition to the essential four; the tool is a means of adapting 
strategies through changing knowledge and economic conditions; the revised 
BSC includes external focus and relationships and is not limited by an internal 
perspective only. Furthermore, innovation can be incorporated within the 
BSC; and it must be adapted for use in an uncertain environment as part of 
a dynamic strategy management system – it does not have to be tyrannically 
mechanistic with linearity limitations. Kaplan and Norton (2006) have also 
presented an approach to successful strategy application, utilising the 
‘improved’ BSC as part of a closed loop management system model; their 
model is shown in Figure 2.7. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Closed-Loop Management System Linking Strategy and Operations,  
taken from Kaplan and Norton (2006) 
 
IOC’s desiring to retain a BSC-based approach to strategic management 
practice the company may benefit from reviewing the modified and more 
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adaptively emergent BSC as well as the closed-loop management system 
model. Stages 1 and 2 of the Closed-Loop Model provide a clear opportunity 
for the inclusion of safety strategy elements, e.g. safety climate and HF 
aspects, as a means of improving safety performance outcomes and 
enhancing organisational competitive edge. 
 
2.9 MANAGING FOR OFFSHORE SAFETY ACROSS THE VALUE CHAIN 
 
One of the biggest challenges to achieving successful safety performance on 
offshore assets is managing the working relationship between Contractors, 
Sub-contractors, and the Operator company that they work for (Sutton, 
2014). As such, these workers are involved in many activities with the 
potential to initiate Major Accident Hazard events in addition to occupational 
accidents (slips, trips and falls), as noted by Hopkins (2102) in his analysis 
of the Deepwater Horizon incident. Given the diversity of Contractor and Sub-
contractor organizations across the value chain (small and medium sized 
enterprises with fewer than 250-employees, micro-businesses with fewer 
than 9-employees, through to self-employed personnel) a one-size-fits-all 
approach to contracting and safety management is considered most unlikely 
(Offshore Safety Management, ibid). 
 
Within the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry, Contractor and Sub-contractor 
organisations are typically subject to a risk-based safety evaluation and 
selection process to assess fit and suitability with the Operator company’s 
safety management system. This activity is typically and initially conducted 
as part of pre-contract award supply chain activity; subsequently performed 
at periodic intervals during the lifetime of the [awarded] contract based on 
assessed risk or identified need (poor safety performance). To facilitate the 
evaluation and selection process, many Operator companies participate in the 
Achilles FPAL Verify audit program (FPAL, 2020) which is an onsite 
management system audit that covers Health & Safety, Environment, Quality 
and Competence & Training practices. The Health, Safety and Environmental 
elements of the FPAL Verify audit are consistent with recognised industry 
standards IOGP 423 and NORSOK S-WA-006:2018. Other Operator 
companies self-manage evaluation and selection processes, similar to FPAL 
Verify, these self-managed programs are typically based upon international 
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safety management system standards such as ISO 45001:2018 Occupational 
health and safety management systems, the UK Health and Safety 
Executive’s HSG 65, the Tender Efficiency Framework (OGUK, 2017), and the 
NORSOK Standards S-WA-006 HSE-evaluation of contractors standard. 
 
The standards anchoring Contractor and Sub-contractor evaluation and 
selection processes are nationally and internationally recognised. Their tie-
back to organisational strategy may be considered delicate and open to a 
range of interpretations. For example, ISO 45001:2018 merely states 
“ensuring that the OH&S policy and related OH&S objectives are established 
and are compatible with the strategic direction of the organization”. The other 
requirements contained in the standard are detailed and therefore more 
straight-forward to audit and assess. From the same standard it becomes 
incumbent on the Operator company to ensure workers (Operator, 
Contractor, or Sub-contractor) are “competent (including the ability to 
identify hazards) on the basis of appropriate education, training or 
experience”. Practical experience of the researcher identifies a natural default 
to technical competencies of operators and less so managerial competencies 
of supervisors and managers. Considering evaluation and selection of 
Contractors and Sub-contractors the standard makes it incumbent on the 
Operator organisation to “ensure that the requirements of its OH&S 
management system are met by contractors and their workers”. Given that 
the majority of Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations have 
independent third-party certification to international safety management 
systems, assessment of alignment to an Operator’s safety management 
system becomes relatively easy to evaluate without interrogating safety and 
business strategy alignment, Human Factors understanding, and safety 
leadership approaches adopted.  
 
Management system standards contain a very rationally mechanistic 
approach to auditing, one based upon checking activities against governance, 
policy, and procedures and rules defining activities with the HSE Auditor 
drawing conclusions on the level of compliance observed from interview and 
documentary evidence of systems implementation provided (Le Coze, 2005). 
Further, the management system standards are not explicit in the 
management of psychosocial hazards and risk. Indeed, deploying 
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psychosocial audits (Bergh et al., 2014; and Jespersen et al., 2016) would 
provide a proactive and effective means for monitoring and subsequently 
managing the status of psychosocial factors influencing the risk of stress with 
accident-causing potential within the offshore workforce. 
 
Gambetti and Marchi (2014) recognise the importance of Contractor and Sub-
contractor HSE evaluation processes plus the need for evolution to generate 
improvement in the achievement of objectives and safety performance. 
However, their conclusions do not include a clear and detailed look at 
strategy, Human Factors (HF) or safety leadership. 
 
Given the research is based on a typical UK Offshore Oil & Gas Operator’s 
value chain, it is important to state that the Operator in question did not 
participate in the Achilles FPAL Verify audit process. Instead, it self-managed 
a risk-based Contractor and Sub-contractor evaluation and selection process 
based upon HSG65, Managing for Health and Safety plus ISO 45001: 2018 
Occupational health and safety management systems. 
 
2.10 SYNTHESIS OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Several emergent, interdependent, and pivotal concepts were identified from 
critical review and the relationship of the key themes of literature review and 
concepts is depicted in Figure 2.8. Firstly, Piper 25’s conclusion to a review 
of the Cullen Recommendations [Piper Alpha] questioning their current 
relevance given that in the UK Oil & Gas industry accidents and incidents still 
occur for ‘old’ reasons. The UK Regulator suggested that to meet these 
challenges, it would be essential for organisations working in the industry to 
develop and implement appropriate business strategies supported by 
effective leadership. The Piper 25 conclusion resonated that the industry 
remained predominantly focused on the engineering and technical aspects of 
safety. Secondly and supportive of this conclusion was Storseth et al. (2014) 
in the re-analysis of the Hopkins (2012) study of the Deepwater Horizon 
accident. They concluded that psychological mechanisms (the dynamics of 
social interaction) may have contributed to risk transfer across established 
safety barriers (technical, procedural, and organisational) thus contributing 
to the catastrophic disaster.  
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Figure 2.8 Literature Synthesis (Source - Researcher) 
 
The researcher’s considered the triangulation of persuasion, pressure and 
power within managers and supervisors as being capable of creating conflict 
with the planned arrangements for safety defences thus helping to defeat in-
place barriers. It became a research imperative to determine the inclusion 
extent of the psychological forces element of HF in formalised safety 
strategies; lack of inclusion may detract from the appropriateness of strategy 
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that the UK Regulator was calling for. Thirdly, in critically reviewing strategy 
literature, it became clear that the Miles and Snow (1978) strategy typology 
had been both enduring and widely used in a wide variety of strategic 
research studies. The “adaptive cycle” and the deduced four basic strategy 
types of Defender, Prospector, Analyser and Reactor are acknowledged to still 
be relevant in reflecting the general business landscape. However, the 
researcher identified that the typology had not been utilised for Oil and Gas 
industry strategic and safety studies, therefore providing a uniqueness of 
purpose for the research undertaken. For strategy implementation to be 
successful the review clearly indicated that the important consideration of 
human capital must not be overlooked; this was the fourth concept identified. 
Human capital was highlighted as important to organisational 
competitiveness (Barney, 1991; Schultz, 1993; Rastogi, 2000; and Shaw et 
al., 2013) significantly noting the need for continual human capital 
development as a reflection of organisations’ need for adaption to ever 
changing environments. The critical review also identified that accidents and 
incidents deteriorate human capital (through human cost and decreased 
productivity) thereby decreasing organisational effectiveness. Rastogi (ibid) 
purports social capital to be the base of human capital and the relationship 
resonates for safety performance. If trust, cooperation, and unity of purpose 
through social interaction become substantially undermined (a potential 
effect from the dynamics of social interaction) safety barrier arrangements 
may be defeated, resulting in accident and incident. Psychological capital 
(PsyCap), a form of positive organisational (Luthans, 2002) was the fifth 
concept emergent from the literature review as a psychological construct, 
when combined with appropriate leadership interaction, may promote greater 
safety awareness and safety performance (Mearns et al., 2012). In 
conjunction with the PsyCap review, a range of leadership styles were 
considered, with authentic leadership (Luthans and Avolio, 2003) particularly 
noteworthy due to such leaders enhancing engagement, motivation, 
commitment and involvement of personnel and teams necessary to 
continually improve performance outcomes through social interaction 
processes (Avolio et al., 2004).  
 
Neilsen et al. (2011) also concluded that the four elements of authentic 
leadership are integral components of leader-follower exchanges that can 
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contribute to worker perceptions of safety climate, also to subsequent hazard 
and risk perception in the workplace of safety critical organisations, such as 
in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry. The final concept to emerge was safety 
culture and climate, the latter being a measurable organisational frame of 
reference for safety-specific behaviours and attitudes of individuals and 
groups (Zohar, 1980; Clarke, 2006; Dahl et al., 2014). Measuring safety 
climate within a UK Oil and Gas industry value chain offered a real and 
innovative prospect, considering the Miles and Snow typology, to evaluate 
the effects of implemented safety strategy, through authentic leadership and 
individual psychological capital within front line UK Offshore Oil & Gas 
Industry operations and the associated value chain contributors. 
 
2.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This second chapter encompassed the literature review undertaken to 
address topics considered significant to the research conducted and in 
support of the established research aim and objectives. It provided the reader 
with a critical appraisal and synthesis of the current body of knowledge 
related to the research topic; provided a foundation for satisfying research 
questions and objectives; and facilitated the identification of gaps leading to 
incremental contributions to the existing safety science knowledge base. 
 
The chapter commenced by acknowledging the near five-decade significant 
interest in organisational strategy as a concept relative to structure and 
management processes, how these aspects drive competitiveness and 
business success. Also, that considerable amount of research and writing has 
been undertaken considering the organisational dimension of accidents and 
incidents in the workplace. However, it was recognised that there appears to 
be a paucity of research within the fields of strategy and safety to develop an 
understanding of how strategy contributes to the capability of high-risk socio-
technical organisations to function competitively and effectively within safe 
operating parameters. The research was solely focused on the relationship 
between organisational strategic typology and achievement of positive safety 
performance outcomes within the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry, given that 
accidents within this sector can lead to devasting consequences for 
individuals, the environment and for business survivability itself.   
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Eight key subject matter areas were the focus of critical literature review, 
namely: Accident Causation; Human Factors in the Workplace; Safety 
Influencing Capital; Culture and Climate; Leadership; Social Dynamics and 
Psychological Processes; Business Strategies for Industry Safety Challenges; 
and managing for offshore safety across the value chain. Following literature 
review, the data and information was synthesised as depicted in Figure 2.8 
leading to the formulation and finalisation of five research questions, 
necessary to be answered to ensure ultimate attainment of the declared 
research aim and objectives. With critical literature synthesized and research 
questions formulated, the elements for inclusion in the subsequent data 
collection exercise were identified.  
 
For the semi-structured interviews were to be utilised for [qualitative] 
research data collection from onshore management personnel representing 
the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry typical Exploration and Production (E&P) 
value chain: Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor. The focus areas 
identified for inclusion in the researcher developed interview script were 
organisational typology identification; safety strategy construct, 
communication, and implementation (including Human Factors inclusion); 
workforce psychological capital; safety leadership; and safety climate on 
offshore assets. In addition to qualitative data collection, the critical literature 
also identified research value-added subjects for quantitative data collection 
through inclusion in an Offshore Workforce Safety Study. The identified topics 
were: authentic leadership; safety climate; and psychological capital. Each to 
be measured using academically respected and previously validated 
instruments under academic licence. 
 
The following chapter will provide the reader with a description and critical 
evaluation of the theoretical perspective, methodology and methods deployed 
for quantitative and qualitative data collection to subsequently fulfil the aim 
of the research study, satisfy the research questions and to ensure delivery 
of a robust and thorough response to the established research objectives. 
 
*** *** *** 
  
 







This chapter will provide the reader with a description and critical evaluation 
of the theoretical perspective, methodology and data collection methods 
deployed to fulfil the aim of the study to ensure a thorough response to the 
established research questions and objectives. The purpose was to provide a 
research audit trail, both intellectual and physical, to deliver trustworthiness 
of the research inquiry (Koch, 2006; and Carcary, 2009). The established 
audit trail provides a clear and comprehensive account of how the research 
was conducted from establishment of the aim through to reporting of findings 
and recommendations while, at the same time, providing a means of quality 
assurance for the study (Akkerman et al., 2006). The trustworthiness 
generated served to provide a platform for future and further topic research.  
 
3.1 SOCIAL RESEARCH WITHIN SAFETY SCIENCE 
 
Safety science is recognised to be a scientific discipline that can provide a 
means to prevent accident and incidents plus the consequential and 
associated losses. It has wide theoretical foundations rooted in varied 
disciplines, for example: engineering, leadership, management, psychology, 
and sociology. It is viewed as both inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary in 
nature, with diverse industrial applications (Aven 2014; Le Coze et al., 2014; 
Pillay, 2016). With such a broad foundation, there clearly are a plethora of 
methodological issues facing any prospective researcher. Considerations of 
epistemology, ontology, theoretical perspective, methodology and methods 
come to the fore, particularly what to be utilised and when? Le Coze et al. 
(ibid) view contentiousness over such considerations to be an indication of 
the vitality of the safety science field and the variety of ways of approaching 
safety research as healthy rather than a damaging prospect. Further, Le Coze 
(2016) advocates that diversity within safety science research should be 
valued, arguing that overlapping concepts, indeed hybridisations, may be key 
to better understanding the multi-dimensional attributes of complex 
sociotechnical systems. 
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To build-out the required [intellectual and physical] audit trail the “Four 
Elements” of social research defined by Crotty (2015) plus associated and 
relevant terms were used as a foundation for the research. The four elements 
identified to inform one another and provide a framework for research are 
diagrammatically represented in Figure 3.1. below: 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Founding Four Elements of Social Research - Crotty (2015: 4) 
 
Crotty (ibid: 3) defines epistemology to be the “theory of knowledge 
embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby in the methodology”, 
therefore the researchers [ontological] and epistemological position 
underpins and influences this research study. Interestingly Albert Einstein, 
the eminent physicist and Nobel Prize winner, considered “Epistemology 
without contact with science becomes an empty scheme, Science without 
epistemology is – insofar as it is thinkable at all – primitive and muddled” 
(Calaprice, 2011: 429). Accepting epistemology to inform theoretical 
perspective, Crotty (ibid: 3) states the latter to be the “philosophical stance 
informing the methodology and thus providing a context for the process and 
grounding its logic and criteria”. It guided the researcher to select and 
proceed with an appropriate methodology.  
 
Following on, Crotty (ibid: 3) defines methodology to be the “strategy, plan 
of action, process or design lying behind the choice and use of particular 
methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes”. 
Finally, methods are defined to be the “techniques or procedures used to 
gather and analyse data related to some research questions or hypothesis” 
(Crotty, ibid: 3). Following the four-element model for successful research, 
Crotty (ibid) unsurprisingly contends that any research activity commences 
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with a question that needs to be answered. Accordingly, the next section 
serves to restate the research aim, research questions and research 
objectives for the research undertaken.  
 
3.2 RESEARCH AIMS, QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The three critical foundations of research reflected within the aim, questions 
and objectives served a number of crucial research purposes:  they guided 
the critical literature review conducted; were pivotal to the research design 
developed; influenced the data collection process; and plus framed the data 
analysis conducted. Overall, they were intended to provide thesis readers 
with a clear sense of why the safety science research was conducted. Prior to 
detailing the research methodology developed it was considered instructive 
for readers to have the aim, questions and objectives restated.  
 
From chapter 1, section 2.0, the research aim was established to be: 
 
‘Explore the ways in which organisational typology, strategy, leadership, and 
psychological forces contribute to safety performance’. 
 
The subsequently generated six general focus research questions used to 
direct the literature review and provide the basis for research objective 
development, leading to greater specificity in the research to be undertaken, 
were defined in section 7.0, chapter 1: 
 
1. What are the organisational typologies displayed by value chain 
organisations ’Operator’, ‘Contractor’, and Sub-contractor’? The purpose 
of this question was to determine if there was a pattern of typology 
prevalent across the value chain comprising the Operator, Contractor and 
Cub-contractor organisations; one consistent with a credible and 
recognised academic model. 
 
2. To what extent is safety strategy, with HF content, included as an aligned 
element of organisational business strategy for the differing 
organisational typologies? The second research question was developed 
to explore safety strategy constructs associated with identified 
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organisational typologies, including alignment with broader organisational 
strategy. 
 
3. What is the relationship between workforce psychological capital and 
organisational typology within value chain organisations? The third 
research question was constructed to stimulate research into the ability 
of offshore personnel to resist the adverse dynamics of social interaction 
(position, power, and persuasion) that have the recognised ability to 
defeat safety barriers and defences in depth; evaluate whether 
psychological capital varies with organisational typology. 
 
4. What is the relationship between organisational typology and safety 
leadership style within value chain organisations? In a manner similar to 
research question 3, the research question was constructed to stimulate 
research into effective safety leadership on offshore assets; evaluate 
whether safety leadership effectiveness varies with organisational 
typology. 
 
5. What is the relationship between organisational typology and perceived 
workforce safety climate at offshore assets involved in Exploration, 
Operations, Asset Life Extension and Decommissioning? Considering 
safety climate as an indicator of safety performance this question was 
constructed to stimulate research into safety culture and safety climate 
plus consideration to variations that may be associated with different 
organisational typologies. 
 
6. What effect does the Operator company safety message(s) have in 
creating alignment between all involved parties, irrespective of typology, 
to deliver acceptable safety performance? The final question was 
constructed with due consideration to safety messages being artefacts of 
safety culture. The intent was to stimulate research into safety culture 
alignment across the value chain representatives working on offshore 
assets to determine the critical influencer of safety performance, i.e. 
organisational typology of Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor 
organisations or the Operator company’s safety message. 
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The six established research questions were subsequently operationalised 
into five research objectives as defined in section 8.0 of chapter 1 to provide 
clear and specific statements identifying the intended accomplishments of the 
research undertaken:  
 
1. To determine the extent of the influence exerted by organisational 
typology on the construction of safety strategy as an aligned element of 
overall organisational strategy. (From research question 1). 
 
2. To establish whether the psychological forces component of Human 
Factors is embraced within constructed safety strategies, considering 
psychological capital as an antecedent of safety focused behaviour.  
(From research questions 2 and 3). 
 
3. To describe the organisational typology associations with specific styles 
of safety leadership at the operational level on offshore assets during the 
lifecycle phases. (From research question 4). 
 
4. Determine how the preceding three aspects of safety strategy 
implementation combine to produce individual asset safety climate 
profiles. (From research question 5) 
 
5. Determine whether safety performance as reflected through safety 
climate perception is driven by individual organisational typologies or by 
the Operator company overarching safety message. (From research 
question 6). 
 
Upon completion of data collection and analysis, the research aim, questions, 
and objectives provided a framework for data outcome discussions and 
formulation of data-driven conclusions: plus, guidance for the thesis write-
up. 
 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Academic research entails making connections between the mantle of 
fundamental assumptions from epistemological, ontological, and theoretical 
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positions, using them as design inputs to the methods and techniques to be 
utilised in the overall research process (Klockner and Pillay, 2019). 
 
The research undertaken utilised an interpretive ontology plus the 
epistemology of social constructionism. Essentially, both view knowledge to 
be a constructed by individuals through the process of assimilation and 
accommodation (Dole and Sinatra, 1998; and Crotty, 2015). Young and Collin 
(2004) note that terms such as ‘constructivism’ and ‘constructionism’ are 
employed inconsistently and individualistically to the extent that they appear 
to defy definition. However, they can be distinguished; specifically, 
‘constructivism’ focuses on making meaning and constructing social and 
psychological worlds through individual cognitive process while 
‘constructionism’ considers that social and psychological worlds become 
constructed to be real through social processes and interaction. Given that a 
cornerstone of the current research was re-analysis of the Hopkins (2012) 
Deepwater Horizon accident study where it was concluded that the “dynamics 
of social interaction” contributed to the safety barrier failures (Storseth et al. 
(2014), the terms ‘social constructionism’ and ‘constructionism’ were utilised 
within the research study with regard to epistemology. In particular, the 
social constructionist paradigm enticed as being useful for exploration of 
emergent gaps between organisational typology, safety strategy, policy, and 
actual safety performance outcomes. 
 
The philosophy adopted for this research was one of pragmatism working with 
variations in epistemology and ontology (Saunders et al., 2009). Pragmatism 
is consistent with the use of mixed methods, i.e. quantitative and qualitative, 
within a single research study despite the very different theoretical and 
philosophical assumptions. Within this research the paradigms of positivist/ 
post-positivist viz. scientific methods or empirical science; and interpretivist 
paradigms viz. socially constructed meanings, were combined to benefit the 
research (Petty et al., 2012). 
 
It was necessary for the researcher to acknowledge their objective limitations 
as a former consultant, educator [and during the research period] a full-time 
employee with the Duty Holder and Operator company in the value chain 
under review. Grbich (2004: 4) supports the premise that the researcher 
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cannot be separated from their “background, life experience and memories”. 
The researcher recognised that these frames of reference may filter and 
potentially distort their impressions of the action, behaviour, and responses 
of others. This was particularly relevant for a Professional Doctorate student, 
when attempting to empirically test assumptions drawn from professional 
exposure and workplace experience. Lee (2002) had reviewed the impact of 
the researchers’ life experience on both research methodology and (to a 
lesser extent) the evaluation and assessment of empirical products 
commenting on the difficulty of suppressing and avoiding self-reflectivity. In 
the research undertaken it was essential for the researcher to put aside 
assumptions and preconceptions from previous [career] exposure to the Oil 
and Gas industry activities under review. Davies (2007: 9) suggested that 
discovering answers to questions is “the purpose of research…the application 
of scientific procedures”. He appeared to refute the limitation of Lee (ibid) 
imposing a universal real-world framework, thus enabling science to exist, 
although he does recognise both ‘experimenter’ and ‘experimental bias’. 
Having a comprehensive understanding of the processes, activities and 
culture being studied, the researcher was aware of the potential to 
unintentionally bias or prejudice the research. Acknowledging that these 
factors can potentially amplify the risk (Bell, 1999), the researcher did not 
include any operations or activities in the study where there was direct vested 
interest or any element of management control and influence. Nevertheless, 
Locke’s (2001) proposition that our intellect relies, exclusively, on our senses 
may suggest that, unwillingly, the researcher may have been deceived 
through a ‘research fallacy’ by simply seeking to affirm an idealistic 
perception and employing sense data that is ontologically privileged. Coleman 
(1999) supports a realist epistemological approach; essentially based on a 
critique of positivism (but not a rejection of it). He embraced the views of 
Davies (2007); whilst apparently attempting to tread a compromising path 
between the modernist and the classical view. Coleman (1999) suggests that 
realist studies employ (and potentially exploit) science for ‘discovery’ and to 
study and describe hidden mechanisms and structures of reality, albeit these 
may be beyond our immediate experience but within our sensual perception. 
He explained that observational data are the manifestation of “the workings 
of hidden reality and, facts are acknowledged and explained by the revelation 
of casual links from ‘structural mechanisms” (Coleman, 1999: 11). 
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Sobh and Perry (2006) argues that epistemology is the relationship between 
reality, ontology, and the researcher, whilst Hamlyn (1995: 242) suggests 
that its epistemology deals with 'the nature of knowledge, its possibility, 
scope and general basis'. By employing an epistemological approach, the 
researcher is seeking an effective way of understanding and explaining how 
we know what we know. It deals with the “the nature of knowledge, its 
possibility, scope and general basis” (Hamlyn 1995: 53); “and is concerned 
with providing a philosophical grounding for deciding what kinds of knowledge 
are possible and how we can ensure that they are both adequate and 
legitimate” (Maynard, 1994: 28). Bahari (2010) considers that the qualitative 
methods adopted in this research are typified by narratives, ethnographies, 
and case studies. This supported proposals that these are characterised by 
the development of a theory resulting from empirical data (Saunders, et al., 
2009: 17). In addition, Bryman (2012) considered that qualitative research 
normally emphasises words rather than qualifications in the collection and 
analysis of data. By adopting an inductive approach, it was necessary to 
gather information from participants and to process and develop the 
information into themes, broader patterns, or generalisations. Finally, these 
findings are compared with personal experience and existing literature related 
to the topic; according to Rocco et al. (2003) this inductive logic or qualitative 
method is generally associated with gaining understanding of a particular 
phenomenon within a social context. From an epistemological point of view, 
the objective truth can be “exposed because understandings and values are 
objectified in the people being studied” (de Quiros et al., 2007: 2-3); 
extending this position, meaning is not so much discovered, but constructed 
given there is no ‘objective truth’ to be discovered. The philosophical or 
worldview considerations have been acknowledged, and the research design 
was qualified to complement this form of pragmatic investigation and social 
research (Grady, 1998). 
 
3.3.1 Methodological Triangulation 
 
A systematic research design has been identified as imperative for in-depth 
scholarly research, such as that required for a DBA thesis. Accordingly, the 
philosophy adopted for this research study was one of pragmatism working 
with variations in epistemology, ontology, and axiology (Saunders et al., 
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2009). Pragmatism is consistent with the use of mixed methods, i.e. 
quantitative and qualitative, within a single research study despite the very 
different theoretical and philosophical assumptions. Within this research the 
paradigms of positivist/ post-positivist viz. scientific methods or empirical 
science; and interpretivist paradigms viz. socially constructed meanings, 
were combined to benefit the research (Petty et al., 2012). Methodological 
triangulation, also referred to in literature as mixed-method research 
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2006), is defined as the use of two or more 
research methods in a single study (Boyd, 2001). Burns and Grove (2005) 
conclude that the use of triangulation in research can enhance its credibility. 
This research utilised a triangulation approach as a blend of both qualitative 
and quantitative methodologies. Overall, triangulation with quantitative and 
qualitative methods provided an indicator for convergence among multiple 
and different sources of information, thus forming themes or categories in 
the study (Cresswell and Miller, 2000). 
 
In addition to data gathered from critical literature review, a further two 
methods of data collection were used in the research. Firstly, providing 
quantitative data for subsequent statistical analysis, an Offshore Workforce 
Safety Study Questionnaire comprising three credible and validated data 
collection instruments: Authentic Leadership Questionnaire; the Health & 
Safety Laboratory (HSL) Safety Climate Tool V1.0; and the Psychological 
Capital Questionnaire. Secondly, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
onshore with senior management personnel from Operator, Contractor and 
Sub-contractor organisations from the Operating company’s value chain. The 
individual interviews provided in-depth qualitative information as an 
enhancement to the quantitative analysis conducted; results were subject to 
manual content analysis. Overall, triangulation with quantitative and 
qualitative methods provided an indicator for convergence among multiple 
and different sources of information, thus forming themes or categories in 
the study (Cresswell and Miller, 2000). 
 
Social scientists first referred to triangulation when discussing the use of 
several methods to measure a single social structure or concept (Campbell 
and Fiske, 1959). Triangulation provided an accurate and robust means to 
address the established research questions by employing more than one 
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research method (Denzin, 1978; and Jick, 1979). Triangulation in research 
involves the multiple use of data sources, observers, methods, or theories, in 
investigations of the same phenomenon (Ammenwerth et al., 2003). The 
emphasis is on reducing bias by integrating theories, methods, data sources 
and researchers with complementary strengths and non-overlapping 
weaknesses. Wilkinson (2007: 631) considers that “multiple snapshots, even 
if some are not totally in focus, give a better picture than one poorly aimed 
photograph”. Jick (ibid) considered the justification for method triangulation 
was through enhancement of the validity of research findings and a reduction 
in experimental bias. Denzin (ibid) expanded its scope to pertain to the whole 
research design, considering that triangulation helps to avoid the error factor 
implicitly present in research based on a single method, a single researcher, 
a single observer, or a single theory analogously to the logic of navigation. 
Boyd (2001) provided the essential motivation behind the use of triangulation 
is the enhancement of validity of qualitative research through the 
confirmation of findings from two or more data-collection methods.  
 
Triangulation approaches can be differentiated (Fotheringham, 2010): 
theoretical (or method) triangulation; data triangulation; and investigator 
triangulation. Method triangulation has been used in research either to 
confirm the concept under study or to capture the completeness of the 
phenomenon under study (Cresswell et al., 2003). It has also been proposed 
that studies with a multiple-method approach can, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, represent both the effort to confirm validity and the aim to 
capture the holistic completeness of the phenomenon (Coyle and Williams, 
2000; and Risjord et al., 2002). Method triangulation can be sub-divided into 
two categories: within-methods; and between-methods.  
 
Triangulation within-methods utilises multiple techniques within a given 
method to collect and interpret data. For example, multiple indices focused 
on the same construct within (quantitative) survey research and multiple 
comparison groups for (qualitative) observational studies. Triangulation 
between methods, on the other hand, refers to the combination of a 
quantitative and a qualitative method in the same study which means that 
data are collected about the phenomenon under study by means of 
interviews, observations, inquiries, or document analysis (Denzin, 1978; and 
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Cresswell et al., 2003). According to Jick (1979: 603) “within-method 
triangulation essentially involves cross-checking for internal consistency or 
reliability while between-method triangulation tests the degree of external 
validity”. External validity was considered an essential element of the 
research. Denzin (ibid) is dismissive of the within-method approach and holds 
the opinion that between-methods triangulation reaps the benefits of each 
method while also compensating for their weaknesses. This position was 
considered pivotal to the research and has been used as an input to the 
methodology framework. Boyd (2001) considers that when the purpose of 
triangulation is completeness it may contribute towards the comprehensive 
nature of a study. Completeness was considered an essential feature in 
answering the research questions. Finally, triangulation was adopted for this 
research to reduce sources of error and to increase the validity and reliability 
of the findings. This approach is consistent with the view held by Bryman 
(2012: 635) where within triangulation “the results of an investigation 
employing a method associated with one research strategy are cross checked 
against the results of using a method associated with the other research 
strategy”.  These considerations led to the between methods approach being 
adopted as most appropriate for the safety science research undertaken. 
 
3.4 RESEARCH DATA POPULATION 
 
Research data was collected from two distinct sample populations from within 
an Operator company’s value chain. The research data population was 
considered representative of the typical UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry value 
chain and therefore determined to be valid. The Operator company that 
granted permission for the research was one of the world’s largest 
independent Exploration & Production company based on production and 
proved reserves. Headquartered in Houston, Texas, the company had 
operations and activities in 17 countries, $69 billion of total assets, and 
approximately 11,200 employees as of June 30, 2018. The annual production 
average during 2018 was 1,216 MBOED and its proved reserves were 5.0 
billion BOE. The Operator was an archetypal International Oil Company with 
competitors similar in nature operating in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry. 
Adding to the data population representativeness and validity, all Operators 
active within the UK must follow the same safety governance and legislative 
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requirements. Also, many of the Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations 
working for the Operator organisation engaged in the safety science research 
frequently (and simultaneously) work with the other Operator companies 
active within the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry. 
 
Qualitative data pertaining to organisational strategic typology factors 
influencing safety performance outcomes was collected through purposive 
semi-structured interviews conducted onshore. The individuals interviewed 
were representatives from middle and senior management from Operator, 
Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations; all had personnel working on 
offshore assets working for or on behalf of the Operator. A total of 39 
personnel submitted for semi-structured interview: 16 (41%) were from the 
Operator company; 14 (36%) were representatives of Contractor 
organisations; and 9 (23%) were Sub-contractor personnel. The interviews 
were conducted between June 2018 and March 2019. 
 
Quantitative data pertaining to Leadership, Safety Climate and Psychological 
Capital was collected from seven separate offshore assets engaged in the full 
scope of the Operator’s value chain activities: drilling and exploration; 
hydrocarbon production; asset life extension; well plug and abandonment; 
and decommissioning. The seven assets sampled were diverse in nature and 
the total research population presented during data collection was 755-
persons maximum on any one given day. To accommodate for personnel 
movements and variations in shift patterns, a total of 1000 data collection 
questionnaires were administered across the assets between October 2018 
and March 2019. A brief outline of individual asset functionality is provided. 
 
Situated approximately 70 miles east of the Lincolnshire coast Asset A1 was 
originally brought onstream during 1988 with further upgrades during 1993 
and 2011. It consisted of a single gas gathering complex developed to collect 
gas from a total of sixteen satellite platforms and six subsea centres 
distributed up to a maximum distance of 20-miles from the main complex 
within the UK’s Southern North Sea (SNS) sector. The asset comprises of five 
jackets linked together by fixed bridges, each jacket with a specific operating 
function: Personnel Accommodation; Wellhead; Main Gas Riser; Production; 
and Gas Compression. Produced gas from the complex was subsequently 
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exported via a 36-inch pipeline to an onshore Gas Terminal prior to entry into 
the UK National Grid. Maximum Personnel Onboard (POB) at the time of 
research was limited to 103 persons in accordance with the Regulatory 
approved Safety Case. At the time of research, the Operating Company held 
25% to 61.1% in the field operations (including satellite platforms and subsea 
centres) along with a further five Field Partners each with holdings of between 
15% and 75%. Field Partners have influence over commercial aspects of oil 
and gas production. They do not influence safety outcomes through day-to-
day control of work arrangements. During August 2018 while the research 
project was being undertaken, total field production was terminated by the 
Operating Company and the asset entered a Decommissioning phase. Wells 
were to be plugged and abandoned, platform topsides to be cleaned and 
drained for hydrocarbon free status, then the Asset (jacket and topsides) 
prepared for eventual physical removal within a maximum four-year period 
based on structural engineering assessments. Asset A1 was in a Warm 
Suspended, Live Wells and Manned status when the research was conducted. 
 
Situated approximately 112 miles north east of the Lincolnshire coast, Asset 
A2 was originally brought onstream during 1993, with subsequent expansions 
during 1996 and 2002. Like Asset A1, it was a single gas gathering complex, 
collecting gas from eight satellite platforms and seven subsea centres within 
the SNS. The asset comprises of three bridge linked jackets, each with specific 
operating functions: Wellheads; Risers; Separation; Compression; and 
Accommodation. Produced gas from the complex was subsequently exported 
via a 26-inch pipeline to an onshore Gas Terminal prior to entry into the UK 
National Grid. Maximum POB during the asset’s operating phase was 37 
persons in accordance with the approved Safety Case, with an increase to 
103 persons for Decommissioning. At the time of research, the Operating 
Company held 39% to 59.5% in the field operations (including satellite 
platforms and subsea centres) along with a further three Field Partners each 
with holdings of between 9.5% and 44.5%. At the time of research, the Asset 
was progressing through the phases of Decommissioning, i.e. well plugging 
and abandonment, topsides cleaning and hydrocarbon freeing, with 
preparation for eventual removal. A2 was in a Warm Suspended, Live Wells 
and Manned status with a projected Cold Suspension-Unmanned timeline for 
Spring 2020. 
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Asset A3 was situated approximately 150 miles south east of Aberdeen and 
comprises of a Wellhead Platform and a bridge-linked Accommodation and 
Utility Platform. Field production commenced during 2013 and at the time of 
research POB was restricted to 38 persons in accordance with the approved 
safety case. Hydrocarbons (gas and oil) extracted at Asset A3 are exported 
along an approximately five-mile multiphase export pipeline to Asset A4 for 
subsequent processing and onward distribution. At the time of research and 
in addition to the Operating Company equity of 36.5%, there were two Field 
Partners with 33% and 30.5% interest in Asset A3. Additionally, while the 
research was ongoing, Asset A7 was conducting exploration and drilling 
activities alongside Asset A3 in Combined Operations where drilling activities 
were conducted simultaneously with hydrocarbon production operations. This 
presented an additional suite of [potential but recognised] hazards to be 
effectively managed by the Operating Company. 
 
Asset A4 was located approximately 150 miles East of Aberdeen commenced 
hydrocarbon (oil and gas) production during 1997. Production facilities 
include: a 24-slot well bay; hydrocarbon separation; gas compression; power 
generation; and personnel accommodation. The Asset processes 
hydrocarbons received from Asset A3, a further subsea development plus a 
normally unattended satellite. Subject to periodic upgrade, permissible POB 
in accordance with the approved Safety Case has risen from the originally 
approved 50 up to 103 by the time of research. Produced gas from the Asset 
is shipped through the Central Area Transmission System Pipeline (CATS) for 
processing at Teesside; produced liquids are also transported to Teesside 
through the Norpipe System, both critical pieces of UK infrastructure. In 
addition to the Operator (36.5%) there were two Field Partners with 33% and 
30.5% interest in Asset A4 Asset at the time of research. 
 
Situated approximately 130-miles north east of Aberdeen, Asset A4 
commenced production operations during 1998. The Asset incorporates 
accommodation, utilities, gas and associated liquids processing, compression, 
metering, export and drilling facilities. It processes hydrocarbons from a total 
of six different fields in an adjacent 26-mile radius. POB at the time of 
research was 168, the largest of any asset included in the data sampling 
exercise. Hydrocarbon gas condensate is exported through the Forties 
Pipeline to an oil stabilisation and processing plant, Kerse of Kinneil, near the 
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Grangemouth Refinery in Scotland. Natural gas is transported through a 
dedicated pipeline to the Scottish Area Gas Evacuation (SAGE) facility at St. 
Fergus, Scotland. In addition to the Operator (36.5%) there were two Field 
Partners with 32.3% and 9% interest in Asset A5 at the time of research. 
 
Asset A6 was Jackup Drilling Rig with a maximum POB capacity of 90 in 
accordance with its approved Safety Case. At the time of research, it was 
engaged in well plug and abandonment activities at a normally un-manned 
satellite facility within the Operating Company’s SNS portfolio. It was also 
hosting teams conducting associated decommissioning activities required to 
facilitate Cold Suspension status and preparations for final dismantlement 
and removal. Asset A6 had been used exclusively by the Operating Company 
for this specific purpose during the previous four years. The operation was 
being conducted under a Bridging Document that comprehensively described 
the organisational interfaces between the Operating and Drilling companies, 
along with the safety management control of work arrangements, and 
governance for the operations being undertaken. 
 
Asset A7 was also a Jackup Drilling Rig with a maximum POB capacity of 150 
in accordance with its approved Safety Case. At the time of research, it was 
engaged in combined operations with Asset A3, drilling several development 
and exploration wells and had been on location for approximately one year. 
Mirroring Asset A6, the work was being undertaken in accordance with an 
approved Bridging Document. 
 
3.5 DATA COLLECTION TOOLS 
 
3.5.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Individual interviews, although time consuming, were selected as a 
qualitative method for obtaining in-depth information to illuminate the 
relationship between organisational typology, safety strategy and safety 
performance. The thematic semi-structured interview as a qualitative 
research tool was adopted in compliance with a pragmatic view that research 
must add value and be unequivocally useful to both the researcher and 
audience of the findings (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This element of the 
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research was guided by the methodological tenets (and tools) described by 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 14) who stated that “the topics and concepts must 
be appropriate and relevant to the concept of the study”. The semi-structured 
interview themes were developed from the research aim and objectives and 
an interview schedule of the topics and questions to be addressed was used 
(see Appendix 1). The researcher had some discretion about the order in 
which questions were asked, but the questions were standardised, and all 
were asked. This interview method was chosen since it enabled the collection 
of detailed information in a conversational style (Harrell and Bradley, 2009). 
The semi-structured the interviews did not deviate from the subject matter 
permitting some opportunity for the interviewee to expose their views. The 
assured confidentiality encouraged the interviewees to express opinions and 
beliefs; when an interviewee proved knowledgeable or exposed a strong 
opinion on specific topics, this was explored. Interviews were recorded with 
the interviewee’s permission and transcribed for subsequent content analysis. 
 
Researchers have advocated guidelines for qualitative sample sizes. Charmaz 
(2006: 114) for example suggests that "25 (participants are) adequate for 
smaller projects"; according to Ritchie et al. (2003: 84) qualitative samples 
often "lie under 50"; while Green and Thorgood (2009 [2004]: 120) state 
that "the experience of most qualitative researchers (emphasis added) is that 
in interview studies little that is 'new' comes out of transcripts after you have 
interviewed 20 or so people". For this research, a purposive sampling method 
was used. It was necessary to generate sufficient good quality data to 
illuminate patterns, concepts, categories, properties, associations, and 
dimensions (Thomson, 2011).  In this respect an appropriate sample size was 
established (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003) achieving theoretical saturation 
(Glaser, 1992) and delivering data with a reasonably rigorous claim to true 
representation.  Considering Green and Thorgood (ibid) this was established 
as 45 representatives from middle to senior management from across the 
Operator company’s value chain. Theoretical saturation was to be recognised 
when further interview data yielded no additional information; no relevant 
data became emergent with regard to determined content analysis (CA) 
categories; and the relationship amongst (and between) categories had been 
established and validated (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
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3.5.2 Offshore Workforce Safety Study Questionnaire 
 
During the timeframe granted for offshore research and data collection one 
study questionnaire was administered that combined four separate 
measurement tools: Authentic Leadership; Safety Climate; and Psychological 
Capital. To maximize respondents, the questionnaires were provided to 100% 
of the seven offshore assets population (755) with some additional 
questionnaires to capture rotational personnel change-outs. A total of 1000 
questionnaires were issued offshore.  Due to computer and internet access 
limitations for personnel working offshore, data collection was manual; no 
electronic survey tool, e.g. SurveyMonkey® or Zoomerang® was utilised. 
The Study was facilitated by the individual asset Safety Advisor’s at weekly 
Safety Meetings with voluntary participation requested. The Questionnaire 
was designed to take approximately twenty minutes to complete and there 
was an opportunity provided for respondents to provide additional comments 
about leadership, safety climate, safety performance, and/or other safety 
matters on their asset. Additionally, respondents were requested to comment 
on Questionnaire ease of use across a 5-point scale from easy to difficult. The 
request to return uncompleted Questionnaire documents was fully complied 
with. The three components of the Study Questionnaire are described below. 
 
Part One, the Authentic Leadership Questionnaire (ALQ) used under Academic 
Licence for the research project was developed by Avolio et al. (2008) as a 
theory-based measurement tool to quantify the four dimensions of authentic 
leadership: self-awareness; relational transparency; internalized moral 
perspective, and balanced processing. Previous testing has demonstrated 
satisfactory validity (Luthans et al., 2007) however Caza et al. (2010) 
determined a sizable positive correlation between the constructs of 
psychological capital and authentic leadership where it had been theorised 
(Gardner and Schermerhorn, 2004) that authentic leaders will increase their 
followers’ psychological capital. Prior to the Caza et al. (ibid) study there has 
been no empirical test of such a predicted relationship (Luthans and Avolio, 
2009). The ALQ had two component elements, ‘Self’ and ‘Your Leader’. 
Respondents were asked to rate their Leader’s style. If the respondents led 
teams of two or more persons, they were requested to rate their own 
leadership style. In both cases, respondents were requested to report the 
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frequency on a 0 to 4 Likert Scale (from ‘not at all’ to ‘frequently if not 
always’) with which they (or their supervisors) adopted the 16 
behaviours/attitudes specified. The Academic Licence and permission for use 
was granted on 31st August 2018 and did\ not permit inclusion of the 
research instrument and question set in the produced thesis. 
 
Part Two, the Safety Climate Assessment Tool (SCT) used under Academic 
License for research had been developed by the Health and Safety Laboratory 
(HSL), and as such was regarded as a reliable and valid psychometric tool. 
Conditions of the Academic Licence (granted 29th November 2018) prevents 
publication of the SCT question set. The SCT was first published by the Health 
and Safety Executive in December 1997 before being withdrawn during early 
2007 and subsequently revised (Sugden et al., 2009). The questionnaire has 
been designed for respondents to rate their responses to statements on a 1 
to 5-point summated rating (Likert) scale from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree. A measurement tool utilising a Likert scale was selected for research 
purposes ahead of other measures, e.g. Thurstone scale, Guttman scale, Q-
sorting or semantic differential scales (Robson, 2011) primarily because of 
familiarity of use within the offshore workforce. Ten Klooster et al. (2008) 
note that Likert scaling is a well-accepted technique for attitude 
measurement. They also consider that, mainly due to simplicity and 
reliability, Likert scales have gained in popularity over other measurement 
scales as research instruments. The SCT had been purposely designed to seek 
the views of all levels of the workforce so that their results can be compared. 
Some statements are inverted so as not to ‘lead’ respondents towards one 
particular point of view. For example, ‘People here are sometimes pressured 
to work unsafely by their work mates’ and ‘Management only bother to look 
at health and safety after there has been an accident’. The survey comprises 
of 40 statements that map onto eight safety climate attributes; it is written 
in clear English and leading and/or ambiguous items were removed during 
the 2007 revision process. The SCT is a survey tool designed to capture 
workers’, supervisors’ and managers’ perceptions of health and safety issues 
thereby providing an insight into the safety culture present within an 
organisation (Healey and Sugden, 2012). Use of the SCT may also provide a 
within-organisation benchmarking opportunity, leading to increased 
motivation for safety practitioners involved in controlling risks (Mearns et al., 
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2001). Further, the SCT was successfully validated for offshore Oil and Gas 
industry use during earlier research (Spence, 2013). 
 
Part 3, the Psychological Capital Questionnaire, used under Academic Licence 
was developed by Luthans et al. (2007). It is regarded as a valuable tool for 
predicting performance in the workplace (Luthans et al., 2010), workforce 
satisfaction (Luthans, Avolio, Avey and Norman, 2007; Luthans, Norman, 
Avolio and Avey, 2008), in-role performance (Gooty et al., 2009), as well as 
organisational commitment (Luthans et al., 2008). The concept of PsyCap 
draws extensively from the positive psychology movement with the 
questionnaire being constructed from four scales (self-efficacy, hope, 
resiliency, and optimism) as a means of supporting investment in people to 
create competitive advantage (Youseff, 2004). The construct has firm roots 
in positive psychology, focusing on a positive approach to managing human 
resources in modern workplaces (Luthans et al., 2007). Eid et al. (2012) 
considered PsyCap to have the potential to mediate the relationship between 
authentic leadership and safety climate within safety critical organisations, 
such as offshore oil and gas assets, where personnel must regularly adapt to 
a fast-paced, hazardous, sometimes-unpredictable, and frequently hostile 
environment. The PsyCap Questionnaire was developed from measures 
widely recognized and published in academic literature and has twenty-four 
items, six for each of the four dimensions (hope, optimism, self-efficacy, and 
resilience), to which respondents should indicate their level of agreement 
using a 1 to 6-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). 
Similar in nature to the SCT, the PsyCap Questionnaire also contains some 
inverted items. Given that Eid et al. (2012) contended that PsyCap may 
represent a more positive motivational state thereby promoting an increased 
level of safety behaviour and associated practice plus Bergheim et al. (2015) 
concluded that PsyCap would be a desirable and an interesting construct to 
include in future research on safety related matters, the 24-Point PsyCap 
Questionnaire was included as an element of the Offshore Workforce Safety 
Study. Scoring for PsyCap is purely total points but may be broken down into 
the constituent elements of Hope, Efficacy, Resilience and Optimism. The 
Academic Licence and permission for use was granted on 31st August 2018 
and did not permit inclusion of the research instrument and question set in 
the produced thesis.  
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All three data collection tools utilised were unaltered for the purposes of the 
research undertaken to ensure there was no detrimental impact upon 
assessed construct reliability and validity. The Terms of signed Academic 
Licenses plus associated Confidentiality Agreements prevented reproduction 
of the entire data collection instruments in the final written thesis. Inclusion 
of three sample items from both the ALQ and PCQ were authorised. Zero 
inclusion of sample items was granted for the academic use of the SCT. 
 
The Offshore Workforce Safety Study Questionnaire was initially piloted with 
a group of Safety Practitioner colleagues and known persons with Offshore 
working experience. This relatively small group of volunteers reflected and 
were comparable to members of the eventual Asset research population. The 
purpose was to refine the Questionnaire to ensure that offshore-based 
respondent difficulty in answering questions and recording data was reduced 
to as low as reasonably practicable (Saunders et al., 2009). Further, piloting 
provided an opportunity to ensure that the compiled research instrument 
functioned effectively (Bryman, 2012) and provided viable data. Given that 
the developed research instrument was a self-completion questionnaire, 
piloting provided an opportunity to avoid considerable wastage before 
questionnaire problems for respondents became manifest; particularly 
essential since the Researcher would not be present when the Questionnaires 
were administered across the seven individual Assets providing the research 
population. Variants of the Questionnaire were trialled with: different ordering 
of the three data gathering components (SCT, ALQ, and PCQ); short and long 
versions of the PCQ Self-Rating questionnaire; plus inclusion or omission of 
the PCQ Other-Rating questionnaire. None of the piloting activity was 
conducted with personnel that would [eventually] form part of the formal 
research study population. 
 
An abbreviated version of the Offshore Workforce Safety Study is contained 
in Appendix 4; question sets were not included to maintain compliance with 
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3.6 CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 
Content Analysis (CA) was employed to systematically examine the interview 
transcribed material. CA is a research method that provides a systematic and 
objective means to make valid inferences from verbal, visual, or written data 
to describe and quantify specific phenomena. 
 
As with any research strategy, the objective of content analysis is to provide 
knowledge and understanding of the phenomena under study (Downe-
Wamboldt, 1992). Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1278) define qualitative 
content analysis as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of 
the content of text data through the systematic classification process of 
coding and identifying themes or patterns”. The semi-structured interview 
transcripts were subjected to conceptual CA. In conceptual analysis (known 
also as thematic analysis) the text is scrutinized to check the existence and 
frequency of a concept/theme (Krippendorf, 2004). In this method, dominant 
concepts/themes in the text were categorized into codes (Franzosi, 2007). 
Instead of counting the frequency of word usage as used in word-based 
content analysis, the approach attempted to find similar cognitions under the 
same concept (Swan, 1997). The underlying principle was to identify the 
occurrence of selected terms within the text. These terms can be implicitly or 
explicitly related to the concepts/themes under consideration (Colorado State 
University, 2009). Even though identifying the explicit terms was 
straightforward, capturing the implicit terms related to a concept/theme had 
to be done with care. Since the latter is based on the judgments of the 
researcher, it may affect the reliability and validity of the data. As such, the 
development of a good conceptual/thematic analysis required the researcher 
to be familiar with the text and pretesting of the codes (Franzosi, 2007) to 
clearly define the implicit terms before starting the data analysis process 
(Colorado State University, 2009).  
 
Although a relatively time-consuming process CA provides, as stated by 
Moretti et al. (2011: 427), an example “of how qualitative data analysed in a 
systematic way can be able to balance the richness of data obtainable from 
qualitative methodologies with the scientific rigour of quantitative 
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approaches”. For this reason, CA was considered an important element of the 
methodological triangulation approach adopted for the research. 
 
Interview transcripts were reviewed for identification of organisational 
typology plus the presence of safety strategy (documentation, HF content, 
communication, and execution). Transcripts were also reviewed for content 
reflecting the dynamics of social interaction leading to inaccurate hazard 
identification, represented by the phrases: consensus mode decision making; 
confirmation bias; warnings normalisation; and group think. Evidence of 
pressure by management and supervision to place productivity before safety 
performance was evaluated by phrases relating to the imposition of: position; 
power; and pressure. Similarly, evidence of psychological capital was 
searched for with phrases relating to people characteristics: hope; 
efficacy/confidence; resilience; and optimism. Finally, authentic leadership 
traits were sought through terms reflecting: safety culture/climate 
promoting; engaging; motivational; committed; and involved. 
 
3.7 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
There are certain types of data where the meaning may not be immediately 
evident when presented in statistical, text or tabular formats. As the number 
of variables increases, in this case ALQ, SCT, and PCQ factors, there may be 
a commensurate challenge to describe their meaning (Saary, 2008). To 
overcome this, Radar Plots (MS Excel™) were used to display and compare 
ALQ, SCT and PCQ scores for the Asset workforces. Radar Plots provided a 
clear summary of complex data; Stafoggia et al., (2011: 777) noted that, as 
a management tool, such a graphical method may “facilitate the setting of 
priorities for improvements, resource allocation as well as accountabilities”.  
 
The data collected from the instruments and scales of the Offshore Worker 
Safety Study was analysed utilising non-parametric techniques since the data 
was measured on and produced from ordinal (ranked) scales. Distinct from 
parametric techniques, the non-parametric techniques make no assumptions 
about underlying population distribution from which the data sample has been 
drawn. Consequently, non-parametric techniques may have disadvantages 
through reduced sensitivity and in some circumstances fail to detect 
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differences in data groups that does exist. There are key assumptions for 
non-parametric data analysis techniques to be necessarily checked. Firstly, 
that the samples are completely random. Secondly that observations are 
independent; each person (or case) can be counted only once and not appear 
in more than one group; the data from one subject must not influence the 
data from another. The IBM® SPSS® Statistics (Version 26) package was 
utilised to conduct a range of analysis of ALQ, SCT and PCQ data obtained. 
From SPSS®, the Mann-Whitney U Test was utilised to test for differences 
between two independent groups on a continuous measure. It is the non-
parametric alternative to the t-test for independent samples. Whereas the t-
test compares the mean of the two groups, the Mann-Whitney U Test 
compares medians; it converts the scores on the continuous variable to ranks 
across the two groups and then evaluates whether the ranks for the two 
groups differ significantly. Given the scores are converted to ranks, the actual 
distribution of the scores ceases to be relevant. The Kruskal-Wallis Test 
(alternatively referred to as the Kruskal-Wallis H Test) as a non-parametric 
alternative to a one-way between-groups analysis of variance was also 
utilised. Similar in nature to the Mann-Whitney U Test, it permits comparison 
of scores on a continuous variable for more than just two groups. In the test, 
scores become converted to ranks and the mean rank for each group gets 
compared. Given that test is a between groups analysis, different people must 
be in each of the different groups.  
 
Finally, correlation analysis was conducted to evaluate the strength and 
direction of the linear relationship between two continuous variables (SCT - 
ALQ, SCT - PCQ, and ALQ – PCQ). Given that the data being analysed was 
obtained from ordinal (ranked) scales the SPSS® technique selected and 
utilised was the Spearman Rank Order Correlation (rho), the non-parametric 




At the outset of research, the intention was to collect data from multiple 
operating organisations within the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry, utilising a 
working relationship previously established with an industry representative 
body comprised of different stakeholders from across the industry. Following 
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a 2018 change in [senior] personnel the opportunity for intended data 
collection necessitated revision and subsequently the research study was 
conducted within the confines of a single UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry 
operating company. This unforeseen change delayed data collection by 
approximately six to nine months given that research approval had to be 
negotiated with an Operator organisation. Consequently, the modified 
approach resulted in data collection and benchmarking from one Operator 
organisations value chain, hence a potential limitation. However, the 
operating company researched was one of the largest Exploration & 
Production (E&P) organisations operating the UK Industry with a complex and 
industry-representative value chain, the data collection opportunities were 
considered [and agreed by the researcher’s Supervisory Team] to be rich. 
Further, many of the Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations associated 
with the Operator worked for many other E&P organisations operating within 
the UK Oil & Gas Industry. For these reasons, the potential for reduced 
external validity of the research (Saunders et al., 2009: 158) became 
eliminated. 
 
No inhibits or restrictions to accessing organisational data and personnel were 
identified, provided that the Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor 
organisational confidentiality was maintained through the thesis publication. 
The ALQ, SCT and PCQ data collection tools were used in accordance with the 
terms of the Academic Licences granted. As such, confidentiality of the 
question sets was, in all three cases, a Licence condition prohibiting 
publication of a thesis containing the original question sets in any public 
domain to prevent plagiarism of copyrighted material.  
 
A potential limiting factor with the triangulation methodology utilised was the 
potential for difficulty during attempts to fully to synthesise the data accruing 
from qualitative and quantitative methods. Sim and Sharp (1998) noted this 
to be a likely possibility when assumptions underlying the different 
approaches to data collection, for example, questionnaires and individual 
interviews, may differ so greatly as to prevent any meaningful combination 
or comparison of the data obtained by each.  
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As previously stated, data collection for the Offshore Workforce Safety Study 
was conducted manually due to computer and internet access limitations for 
personnel working offshore. As a direct consequence, data was manually 
transcribed prior to subsequent analysis. Manual transcription of numerical 
and written data is known to be prone to error, notably omissions, illegibility, 
and numerical error (Kawado et al., 2003: Black et al., 2004: Kozak et al., 
2015). Such data entry errors introduce a source of random error into 
research findings that have the potential to distort statistical results and 
detrimentally impact research conclusions. (Barchard and Verenikina, 2013). 
As a minimum, such errors reduce reliability, effect sizes, and statistical 
power, making significant findings less likely. In extreme cases, they can 
invalidate a statistical analysis. There are two common methods used for 
prevention of data entry errors, double entry, and visual checking (Barchard 
and Pace, 2011). Typically, for double entry with mis-match checking, the 
researcher enters the data twice. A computer program subsequently 
compares the entries to identify mismatches. Where mismatches are 
identified, the researcher is prompted to the original data recording to 
determine the correct value. With a visual checking approach, the researcher 
enters the data once directly into a spreadsheet or a statistical package then 
visually compared the data entered against the original and raw data 
recording; errors corrected when found. Both the Kawado et al. (ibid) and 
Barchard and Pace (ibid) studies concluded that the double entry approach 
was significantly more effective in entry error detection than visual checking. 
However, Johnson et al. (2009) concluded that double entry was not 
necessary for transcription of data where extensive logical checks can be 
utilised. For the current research, a visual checking approach was adopted by 
the researcher. Data from the Offshore Worker Safety Survey was numeric in 
its entirety, separated into four discrete sections; there was no interpretive 
component or word transcription required. The logical checks adopted were 
in the form of Hold Points at the end of each section for the entered data to 
be checked against the raw data record. This was supplemented by a ten 
percent sample check for transcription accuracy performed by a person 
independent from the research project.  
 
For Content Analysis, the validity of the deduced outcome may be questioned 
due to possible subjectivity through selective questioning and intervention, 
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categorisation, and interpretation. Attempting to reduce researcher induced 
bias, the categories produced by the researcher were validated by an 
independent HSE Professional. 
 
Social desirability, with individuals reporting inaccurately on sensitive topics 
to present themselves in the best possible light, may have affected the results 
of both the semi-structured interviews and the Offshore Workforce Safety 
Study despite the assurances provided of anonymity and confidentiality. 
Consideration for any future research may be given to controlling such bias 
by using, for example, the Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability Scale or 





The research was carried out strictly in accordance with the current Robert 
Gordon University Research Ethics Policy. As required, a Student Proposal 
Ethical Review (SPER) Form was originally submitted (29th January 2016) to 
the Research Supervisor. The Form was regularly reviewed during the 
research project with no alterations required.  
 
The research was designed and undertaken consistently and fairly to preserve 
the honesty, integrity, and quality of the findings. All participation was 
undertaken on a voluntary basis and the research was undertaken openly. 
Strict confidentiality was assured to all respondents and interviewee’s and 
this has been preserved throughout the research by the exclusive 
employment of nominal codes, with limited descriptive data to identify 
respondents and interviewees. Prior to any request for interview, subjects 
were provided with a research information sheet (Appendix 2) that included 
an invitation to sign for interview consent. 
 
3.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter defined for the reader all four elements of social research 
underpinning the research project, namely the epistemology, theoretical 
perspective, methodology and methods. These four elements were critical to 
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building-out the necessary [intellectual and physical] audit trail thus 
providing a clear and comprehensive account of how the research was 
conducted from establishment of the aim, objective and research questions 
through to reporting of findings and recommendations; all within a quality 
assured research study. A methodological triangulation approach was 
selected for research with the philosophy adopted for this research study 
being one of pragmatism working with variations in epistemology, ontology, 
and axiology. The sample population was described for both onshore and 
offshore data collection exercises. In addition to data gathered from critical 
literature review, a further two methods of data collection were to be used in 
the research: semi-structured interviews with senior management personnel 
from Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations; and the 
administration of an Offshore Workforce Safety Study Questionnaire 
comprising three credible and validated data collection instruments. 
Qualitative data gathered from semi-structured interview was to be subject 
to manual content analysis. Quantitative data produced from the ordinal 
(ranked) scales contained in the Safety Study was to be analysed utilising 
non-parametric statistical techniques. 
 
The limitations to this operational research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 
2003) are acknowledged and the researcher has endeavoured to counter a 
number of the associated risks, by adopting a ‘systematic approach’ and 
employing a transparent research process, trusting that this supports the 
basis of enquiry and that the research findings became based upon a logical 
relationship and not just ‘supposition’ or belief (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2010). 
The richness of data collection potential from a single operating company 
within the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry was not considered to be a 
limitation, given the typical nature of the operators’ value chain and that 
involved Contractor and Sub-contractor organisation also worked for other 
industry Operating companies.  
 
It would have been unsafe for the research to have been exclusively reliant 
upon the researcher’s professional experience within the Oil and Gas 
Industry. The experience may have served to inform the primary research 
findings by supporting context placement and narrative interpretation, but in 
isolation, it did not form the basis of argument or proposition. In accordance 
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with the advice of Stake (1995: 240), the “researcher aspired to objectivity, 
giving proper regard to validity and reliability being provided with this 
salutary reminder that criteria of representation ultimately are decided by the 
researcher”. Thus, an interpretive approach to the research was adopted, 
acknowledging the researcher’s intimate relationship with the subject under 
review together with the “situational constraints shaping this process” 
(Rowlands, 2005: 81). The interpretive research did not seek to predefine 
variables, nor test hypothesis, rather it aimed to produce an “understanding 
of the social context the phenomenon and the process whereby the 
phenomenon influences and is influenced by the social context” Rowlands, 
ibid: 81-82).  
 
Finally, the ethical considerations of research were considered with 
acknowledgement that the research had been conducted strictly in 
accordance with the Robert Gordon University Research Ethics Policy. 
 
The following chapter will present to the reader data findings generated from 
the qualitative and qualitative data collected through semi-structured 
interviews plus application of the Offshore Workforce Safety Study (ALQ, SCT 
and PCQ). 
 












This chapter will, for the reader, detail the qualitative and quantitative data 
findings obtained from the adopted pragmatic research philosophy and 
through the established triangulation methodology, sometimes known as 
mixed method research. The results and outcomes from conducted content 
analysis on qualitative data, plus non-parametric statistical analysis of 
collected quantitative data, will be presented in detail with conclusions drawn 
where possible. The information generated will subsequently be utilised in the 
following chapter to discuss and relate the data findings to the established 
research aims, questions, and objectives previously defined in Chapter 1. 
 
4.1 QUALITATIVE DATA 
 
Qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews for which 
an interview schedule was developed (Appendix 1). The schedule was 
itemised to support subsequent evaluation and analysis. This was in 
accordance with Kumar’s (2005) recommendations that differentiate between 
the structured schedule as a qualitative research tool, and the interview itself 
which is recognised a method of data collection. This provided some 
advantage in that it delivered comparably “uniform responses which assures 
the comparability of data” (Kumar, 2005: 126). The semi-structured 
interviews were conducted amongst onshore management and senior 
management personnel associated with the assets where the Offshore Safety 
Study had been administered. Table 4.1 illustrates a summary of the 
interview subjects by value chain role and occupation. Interviewees were 
selected based of their roles, with the pre-existing knowledge that a focus on 
safety was central to the discipline and function; purposive sampling was 
employed to ensure the range of interviewees were drawn from across the 
Operators value chain. A strident attempt was made to achieve a-near equal 
balance between Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor. This ultimately 
proved more difficult with Sub-contractor interviewee’s who, for a variety of 
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reasons, frequently pulled-out of arranged interviews at late and short notice. 

















Operator 3 4 4 3 2 16 41% 
Contractor  3 3 4 2 2 14 36% 
Sub-
contractor 
5 1 2  1 9 23% 
Table 4.1 Interview respondents by value chain status and role 
 
Consent was provided for all interviews to be recorded; all interviewees gave 
the Researcher permission to follow-up with them in the event there were 
points of uncertainty from transcript creation. Subsequently, each interview 
recording was sent to an online service provider for transcription and 
subsequently returned as a downloadable Microsoft Word™ file. The process 
of transcription resulted in approximately 350 pages of transcript. Each 
transcript was reviewed, compared, and contrasted with the recorded 
interview file. Responses were tabulated onto a spreadsheet to enable manual 
content analysis of the data. The Researcher made a conscious decision 
conduct a manual content analysis rather than to use a software package 
thus remaining as close to the raw data content as possible. This was 
consistent with the process undertaken for the quantitative data where all 
Offshore Safety Survey questionnaires were processed manually prior to 
statistical analysis. The process of manual handling ensured immersion within 
the data, provided additional insight, and highlighted [potential] trends in the 
returned Survey responses. According to, de Graaf and van der Vossen 
(2013) both manual and automated methods of content analysis have 
advantages and disadvantages. It has been considered that automated 
methods may have different but persistent types of reliability problems. Also, 
for smaller samples such as the safety science research undertaken, manual 
methods can even be more efficient and effective than automated methods. 
A common experience previously observed was that automated methods do 
not lead to efficiency gains when working with small datasets (Matthes and 
Kohring, 2008). Also, due to the high time investment required to prepare 
data for analysis automated methods are typically more efficient for large 
samples (de Graff and van der Vossen, ibid). The completed spreadsheet of 
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interview responses was subsequently reviewed for common themes in 
response to the investigation points, each linked to a Research Question. 
Organisational typology across the three work groups was expressed as a 
perception percentage. Recognition of the research topics during interview 
are summarised P1 to P3, where P1 indicates comprehensive target phrase 
inclusion or subject recognition, P2 being partial, and P3 representing 
absence. Table 4.2 provides a summary with high-level narrative. 
 
 Operator Contractor Sub-contractor 
IPO1 - Typology 
(Research Objective 1) 
- - - 
IP01-1: Defender 76% 13%  
IP01-2: Defender/Prospector 24% 13%  
IP01-3: Prospector  74%  
IP01-4: Prospector/Analyzer    
IP01-5: Analyzer   58% 
IP01-6: Analyzer/Reactor   15% 
IP01-7: Reactor   27% 
IPO2 - Safety Strategy 
(Research Objective 2) 
P2 P2 P2 – P3 
IP02-1: Clearly defined? 
Expressed through 
goals, objectives, policy, 
and procedure 
Sometimes expressed 
through goals, objectives, 
policy, and procedure 
Variable to none 
IP02-2: Included in Business 
Scorecard? 
High level lagging 
metrics only 
High level lagging metrics 
only 
Variable to none 
IP02-3: Include HF? 
Nothing specific. HF 
stated to be a 
consideration in accident 
investigation procedures 
Nothing specific. HF stated 
to sometimes be a 
consideration in accident 
investigation procedures 
None 






Engage in Operator 
system 
Engage in Operator 
system 
IPO3- Psychological Capital 
(Research Objective 2) 
P2 P2 P2 
IP03-1: Avoidance of production 





Engage in Operator 
system 
Engage in Operator 
system 
IP03-2: Driven by safety 
strategy and included in 
scorecard 
No No No 
IP03-3: Offshore workforce 
description 
Safety focused 
Comply with Operator 
safety expectations 
Comply with Operator 
safety expectations 
IP03-4: PsyCap measurement 
for offshore workers? 
None None None 
IPO4 - Safety Leadership 
(Research Objective 4) 
P2 P2 P3 
IP04-1: Safety leaders in the 
offshore workforce 
Safety held as a core 
value and in-built across 
all leadership training 
Safety held as 
organisational value and 
included across leadership 
training 
Nothing specific. Only 
as good as the last job 
with Operator 
company 
IP04-2: Leadership style linked 
to strategy and included in 
scorecard measures 
No No No 
IP04-3: Safety leadership 
assessment or measurement? 
Staff appraisal but not 
safety leadership specific 
Staff appraisal but not 
safety leadership specific 
Informal to none 
IP05 - Safety Climate 
Research Objectives 4 & 5) 
P3 P3 P3 
IP05-1: Safety Climate 
measurement 
None None None 
IP05-2: Driven by safety 
strategy and included in 
scorecard 
Not included Not included Not included 
IP05-3: Validated measurement 
tool? 
None deployed None deployed None deployed 
IP05-4: Effect of Operator 
control of work rules? 
Own company rules and 
drives compliance 
Drives compliance; 
awareness of negative 
consequences for failure 
Drives compliance; 
awareness of negative 
consequences for 
failure 
Table 4.2 Content Analysis Summary 
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4.1.1 Organisational Typology 
 
The first focus area of the semi-structured interview was a consideration of 
organisational typology from Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor 
interviewees. The organisational typology categorisations were drawn from 
the Miles and Snow (1978) consideration of organisational adaption seen in 
response to business environmental change and associated uncertainty for 
each of their seminally identified organisational types: the Defender; the 
Prospector; the Analyzer; and the Reactor. The organisational types were not 
identified to the interviewees on the marking grid provided to them during 
their individual interviews. 
 
Table 4.3 provides a summary of interview perceptions across the thirty-nine 
Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor interviewees. Each of the thirty-nine 
interviewee was readily capable of identifying where their employing 
organisation was placed the Operator’s Value Chain, Operator, Contractor, or 
Sub-contractor. Attempting to determine the organisational typologies 
making up the Operator’s Value Chain, the interviewees were provided with 
the marking grid (Appendix 3) and requested to identify the statements that 
best described their organisation, giving regard to several key considerations: 
product/market sector; senior managers; new opportunities; major 
adjustments to structure, technology, or operating methods; and improving 
efficiency of existing operations.  
 
From the perceptions of Operator interviewees, it was observed that they 
described an Exploration and Production (E&P) company that strongly 
exhibited the characteristics of a Defender-type organisation, although some 
responses were rated between Defender and Prospector-type organisations. 
This was an entirely plausible position of perception given that Miles and Snow 
(1978: 30) acknowledge that any one typology is unlikely to encompass every 
form of organisational behaviour given that that the world of organisations is 
“too changeable and complex to permit such a claim”. From the responses 
provided on the marking grid, 76% identified with a Defender-type 

























typically in one 








their area of 
operations 
Operator 10 6  - - - - 
Contractor - 2 12 - - - - 
Sub-contractor - -  - 4 2 3 
Senior Managers Highly 
































Operator 11 5 - - - - - 
Contractor 2 3 9 - - - - 
Sub-contractor -  - - 5 3 1 






 Can be creators 




to their lead 
 Watch 
competitor 











Operator 10 6 - - - - - 
Contractor - 1 13 - - - - 
































Operator 14 2 - - - - - 
Contractor 2 1 11 - - - - 




















 Area of 
primary focus 











Operator 16 - - - - - - 
Contractor 5 2 7 - - - - 
Sub-contractor - - - - 5 2 2 
Table 4.3 Identification of Organisational Typology 
 
Interviewees from Contractor organisations predominantly identified their 
employing organisation to be more of Prospector in character. Again, there 
were instances where identification of defining characteristics was made that 
fell between the Prospector and the Defender-type organisation. Entirely 
plausible as previously described (Mile and Snow, ibid). From the responses 
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provided on the marking grid, 74% identified with a Prospector-type 
organisation, 13% identifying as between the between Defender and 
Prospector-type organisations, and 13% as Defender-type.  
 
The Sub-contractor group was diverse. Personnel interviewed came from a 
broad spectrum of organisational types representing small and medium sized 
enterprises (SME) with fewer than 250-employees, micro-businesses with 
fewer than 9-employees, through to self-employed personnel working on a 
sub-contract basis through a Limited Company status. The responses 
obtained from the semi-structured interviews indicated a less clear-cut 
perception of typology than was obtained for the Operator and Contractor 
interviewees, overtly perceived as Defender and Prospector-type 
organisations, respectively. From Sub-contractor responses provided on the 
marking grid 58% reflect an Analyzer-type organisation, 27% a Reactor-type 
and the remaining 15% falling between the two typologies. This was 
concluded to be entirely plausible, both from a Miles and Snow perspective 
(as in the case of Operator and Contractor responses) but also from the 
extent of diversity within the Sub-contractor group. 
 
4.1.2 Safety Strategy 
 
Proceeding on from organisational typology to consider safety strategy as an 
integral part of organisational strategy, differences were acknowledged 
between the Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor groupings. From 
Operator interviewees there was no awareness of a documented safety 
strategy, however it was unanimously confirmed that the Operator had clearly 
documented safety goals and performance targets that were confirmed and 
frequently re-set on an annual basis set each year. The goals and targets 
were said to be measured and monitored on a continual basis through 
established leading and lagging performance indicators. As a strategic tool, 
an Assurance Board process had been established to meet on a quarterly 
basis with a membership comprised of the UK President plus the Senior 
Leadership Team to assess performance, intervene, and adjust the direction 
of safety strategy execution if needed. The Assurance Board process 
considered leading and lagging indicators related to: Major Accident Hazard 
(MAH) Prevention; Asset and Operating Integrity; Operating Management 
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System implementation. The Operator organisation was said to be fully 
aligned with the global corporate business and its established safety 
priorities. Further, the corporate Safety Management System Standard 
(foundation for the UK Operators OMS) embodied the Deming Cycle of Plan, 
Do, Check, and Act. Therefore, it was aligned with key international safety 
management system standards for example ISO 45001: 2018 Occupational 
Health and Safety Management Systems and the UK Health and Safety 
Executive’s HSG65 Managing for Health and Safety. Annually established 
safety goals, aligned with corporate safety goals, were stated to be translated 
into functional (departmental goals) and subsequently carried through into 
individual goals and objectives. Delivery against established safety goals and 
objectives was to be achieved through safety management governance 
defined within the Operators documented Operating Management System 
(OMS). Interviewees from the Operator organisation consistently perceived 
strategy to be communicated through the established OMS plus daily, weekly, 
monthly meetings where safety is always the first agenda item. In addition, 
there are also Quarterly Townhalls with the UK President plus Departmental 
monthly safety meetings. At these events, safety is also the first Agenda item. 
From the Operator interviews, personnel consistently believed safety strategy 
to be clearly embodied in two statements. Firstly, that ‘No job is so urgent or 
important that we can’t take time to do it safely’. Secondly, the need to be 
‘Always Professional, Always in Control, every work site, every task, every 
day’. These messages are consistent and highly visible both onshore and 
offshore. They were stated during interview to apply for all persons working 
for or on behalf of the Operator, Staff, Contractors, or Sub-contractors. 
 
Operator interviewees confirmed that safety, both leading and lagging 
measures, was included as a measure in the organisational (UK and global) 
scorecard. The other elements of the scorecard were stated to be Operational 
Performance, Financial performance, Strategic Milestones and Total 
Shareholder Return. Given the business scorecard to be a measure of 
organisational strategy attainment it was concluded for the Operator that 
safety was an integral part of its wider organisational strategy. A number of 
the Operator interviewees were willing to [and did] share the UK 
organisations Scorecard. It was not included within the research document 
text, nor as an attachment to protect the anonymity of the Operator 
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organisation. The use of Operator documents had not been approved when 
research permission was originally granted by the UK President.  Further, no 
offer of similar document provision was received from either Contractor or 
Sub-contractor interviewees so to have utilised only Operator documentary 
evidence may have biased the safety science research. However, the 
Researcher was able to confirm that Human Factors (HF) metrics were not 
included as either leading or lagging metrics within the part of the safety 
element of the business scorecard. It was confirmed that there was some HF 
inclusion within OMS procedures, for example within Asset Safety cases, but 
it is very high level and aimed at positively influencing Hazard Identification 
only. Several of the interviewees stated that HF is acknowledged within the 
OMS incident investigation procedure with regard to identifying human causes 
of accidents and incidents where HF analysis is intended to form an important 
part of the investigation process, recognising that human behaviour should 
be considered alongside technical causal factors during an investigation. None 
of the interviewees gave recognition that the dynamics of social interaction 
as an element of HF possesses an ability to defeat safety barriers (Storseth 
et al., 2014) resulting in accident, incident and MAH. Several interviewees 
recalled HF training within the Operator eight to ten years previously with a 
strong focus on the reasons for Human Failure being errors and violations. 
Further, the Operator organisation had employed an eminent HF Academic 
and Researcher (stated to have been most likely 2013 or 2014) only to 
eliminate the post during the 2015 Oil & Gas industry downturn; three of the 
interviewees stated the position had been considered a luxury the business 
could not afford. From the Operator personnel interviews it was concluded 
that the understanding of HF is not mature within the Operator organisation, 
predominantly focusing on the technical and organisational antecedents of 
human failure and zero cognition for the dynamics of social interaction. An 
additional question was presented to both HSE Auditors interviewed. During 
Contractor (and Sub-contractor) HSE audits, either pre- or post-contract 
award, was the topic of safety strategy examined to any level of detail. Both 
interviewees indicated that safety strategy was not a specific topic of audit 
investigation. During pre-contract award audits, it was stated that focus was 
always given to safety policy, leadership, and planning activities, the latter 
particularly for safety objectives and their attainment. Both interviewees 
confirmed that these activities were not necessarily strategy based in content, 
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rather more centred on compliance with applicable safety management 
system standards, for example BS ISO 45001:2018 Occupational health and 
safety management systems or Operator internal safety management system 
requirements. 
 
From Contractor interviewees, a similar perspective was provided around 
safety strategy as had been presented by interviewees from the Operator 
organisation. Safety is clearly a strong organisational value in all cases but 
none of the interviewees recalled seeing a stand-alone safety strategy 
document within their own organisations. The existence of safety 
performance as part of a balanced scorecard for each of the organisation 
represented by interviewees was acknowledged. However, the safety 
measurements included within the scorecard were lagging in nature, for 
example Lost Time Injury (LTI) and Recordable Injury (RI) Frequency rates. 
The claims made during interview were verified by the Researcher reviewing 
a sample of Annual Reports published by the Contractor organisations in 
question. Communication of the safety strategy was through the documented 
safety management system within each Contractor organisation. Safety 
metrics both leading and lagging are set for each contract with the Contractor 
organisations safety strategy said to influence the process. The agreed 
metrics are formally reviewed on at least a monthly basis between the 
Operator and Contractor. Safety goals and objectives feed through into 
individual goals and objectives and are measured through formal 
performance appraisal systems. All Contractor personnel interviewed 
confirmed that there was no specific mention of Human Factors within 
strategy or on the business scorecard. Like the Operator organisation, 
Contractors do consider HF from the organisational and technical aspects of 
Human Error and consider behavioural causes of accident and incident. There 
was no acknowledgement of the dynamics of social interaction as an element 
of HF with potential to defeat established safety barriers leading to accident 
and incident events. As per the Operator HSE Auditor interviewees, the 
Contractor HSE Auditors were asked if, during HSE audits of their 
organisations supply chain (either pre- or post-contract award) was the topic 
of safety strategy examined to any particular level of detail, including Human 
Factors content. Both interviewees indicated that safety strategy was not a 
specific topic of audit investigation and that audits were significantly focused 
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on applicable safety management system standards, for example BS ISO 
45001:2018, or [Contractor] internal safety management requirements for 
in-place contracts or those due to be awarded. 
 
From Sub-contractor personnel interviewed there was less awareness around 
safety strategy. Interviewees from micro-business and Limited Company 
Sub-contractors confirmed that their organisations had no safety strategy 
established, documented, and communicated. Working entirely for Operator 
or Contract organisations they were engaged on the basis of their technical 
competencies and the most important thing was to follow the safety 
management governance and control of work arrangements provided by the 
organisation that they were working for. Sub-contractor interviewees from 
larger organisations frequently referred to the independent Third-Party 
certification of safety management system (for example BS OHSAS 
18001:2007 and ISO 45001:2018) held and the necessary establishment of 
objectives and programmes for attainment as safety strategy. In a similar 
vein to Sub-contractors from smaller organisations, all interviewees stated 
the necessity of following the safety management governance and control of 
work arrangements established by the organisation they were engaged to 
work for. Interviewees considered compliance with such governance and 
control of work arrangements more important, and relevant to them, than 
any safety strategy developed and executed by their employing organisation. 
Considering Human Factors, Sub-contractor interviewees had no awareness 
of aspects included within their employing organisations safety strategy (if 
one indeed existed). The majority of interviewees confirmed that their 
awareness and knowledge of Human Factors had been gained from 
experiences working for the Operator organisation; several interviewees 
confirmed that the Operator had a Human Factors focus circa 2012 and 2013 
with training on human failure (error versus violation) and human 
performance difficulty. The means of avoiding normalisation of warnings, 
consensus mode decision making, confirmation bias, and group think was 
confirmed by most interviewees as following the control of work 
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4.1.3 Workforce Psychological Capital 
 
Workforce psychological capital was identified as a topic of focus for the semi-
structured interviews, with interviewee’s being asked how their respective 
organisations ensure the offshore workforce does not succumb to production 
versus safety pressures; what activities are deployed to support and 
encourage both workers (followers) and leaders to avoid this [potentially 
dangerous] pitfall? Operator company personnel interviewed consistently 
mentioned the right that everyone working offshore has to stop the job if they 
witness or hear something that they think may be unsafe and have the 
potential to trigger an accident or incident. It is more formally referred to as 
the Stop Work Authority and the process applies to Operator, Contractor and 
Sub-contractor personnel. For the Operator company examined during the 
research, the Stop principle was stated to always contained in the Green Hat 
induction provided by the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) to personnel 
oncoming to an asset they have never visited before. Also, during the 
Induction talk, attention is drawn to the fact that all work conducted on the 
asset must be completed in accordance with the Operators control of work 
arrangements. All persons are advised to follow the Safety Triangle (Figure 
4.1) and work within the Law, follow correct policies and procedures 
(including the Operator control of work arrangements), and to work within 
their own level of competence and training. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The Safety Triangle 
 
The Stop Work Authority was stated to be supplemented by the deployment 
of a Safety Observation and Safety Conversation Card reporting system. The 
system deployed was developed as part of the Step Change in Safety (an Oil 
& Gas Industry trade association) Safe Working Essentials initiative. 
Personnel have been trained in how to conduct and receive conversations, 
plus how to respectfully make observations. The considered opinion of the 
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Operator interviewee majority was that these initiatives (tools) were deployed 
to assist with effective implementation of the safety and organisational 
strategy rather than as a direct result of inclusion within the strategy itself. 
Stop Work Authority plus Safety Conversation and Observation Cards are 
accepted, if not standard, components of a wider industry safety culture. The 
initiatives and tools are intended to empower individuals to have confidence 
to always work safely, without fear of reprisal if they speak-up over safety 
concerns in the workplace. Interviewee’s from Operational functions stated 
the organisation had, for several years engaged with a consulting company 
to deliver Safety Coaching both on and offshore. The declared purpose was 
to create safer workplaces through consistency, reliability, and improved 
resilience. The Safety Coaches worked with both leaders and followers. 
Onshore the Safety Coaches worked with staff personnel. At offshore assets, 
the Coaches worked with Operator, Contractor, and Sub-contractor 
personnel. The Operator organisation was not reported to engage in any 
measures of psychological capital within the workforce. The assessment of 
effectiveness for the initiatives and tools deployed appears to be reliant on 
the outcomes from accident and incident investigations; was an accident the 
result of human failure (error or violation) or was it due to inadequate 
leadership and supervision? Specifically addressing the HSE Auditors, the 
question was asked that when conducting audits internally, or externally on 
supply chain organisations, were psychological forces (position, pressure, 
power) and the dynamics of social interaction ever considered when auditing 
topics such hazard analysis, hazard identification, risk assessment and risk 
control? The response was uniform “no” from both Auditors who confirmed 
that the previously mentioned topics were predominantly engineering and 
technical in nature. 
 
From Contractor organisation interviewees it was determined that individuals 
were selected to work on the Operators contract, both on and offshore, based 
on their competence levels reflected through education, training, skills, and 
experience. Specifically, regarding the avoidance of a production versus 
safety pitfall, all interviewees referred to the Stop Work Authority and the 
Safety Conversation and Observation Card system deployed. It was 
unanimously commented that on the Operator’s assets, following the client’s 
control of work systems was of paramount importance; the Operators safety 
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expectations were clearly stated and [believed to be] understood by all. 
Frequent reference was made to the importance of staying within the Safety 
Triangle. None of the Contractor interviewees referred to the Safety Coaches 
being used by the Operator on and offshore. No measures of psychological 
capital levels appear to have been made by any of the Contractor 
organisations included in the semi-structured interview sample. Like the 
Operator organisation, the assessment of effectiveness for the initiatives and 
tools deployed appeared to be reliant on the outcomes from accident and 
incident investigations. Several of the interviewees commented that it could 
be difficult gaining access to accident and incident investigation data for 
events involving Contractor personnel but where only Operator personnel had 
conducted and reported the investigation. This was said to be typically when 
there were potential Legal consequences (such as an injury claim) however, 
it impeded the Contractor organisations from fully implementing their internal 
systems for people management. Two of the interviewees stated that their 
organisations were subject to safety management system audits by the 
Operator as a means of creating improvement. When further discussed, the 
‘human’ element of the audits was confirmed to have only addressed 
personnel competence and training topics, but no aspects of psychological 
capital for Operator contract personnel deployed on or offshore. Specifically 
addressing the HSE Auditors as in the Operator semi-structured interviews, 
the question was again asked that when conducting audits internally, or 
externally on supply chain organisations, were psychological forces (position, 
pressure, power) and the dynamics of social interaction ever considered when 
auditing topics such hazard analysis, hazard identification, risk assessment 
and risk control? The response was also a uniform “no” from both Contractor 
HSE Auditors.  
 
From Sub-contractor interviewees it was clear that individuals were selected 
for work based on their competence levels reflected through education, 
training, skills, and experience. At the offshore asset level, all interviewees 
confirmed that there was total reliance on the Operator’s control of work 
systems and governance to ensure safe operations. In a similar manner to 
interviewees from the Operator and Contraction organisations, Sub-
contractor interviewees referred to the in-place Stop Work Authority plus the 
Safety Conversation and Observation Card process. Staying within the Safety 
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Triangle was frequently referred to. There was no indication of any formal 
attempts being made to tackle issues of confidence, hope, resiliency, and 
optimism for Sub-contract personnel. Personnel interviewed confirmed there 
were no formal measurement of psychological capital levels for Sub-
contractor personnel deployed to offshore assets. Competency was 
acknowledged by several interviewees to be critical for delivering competitive 
edge to Sub-contract businesses.  
 
4.1.4 Safety Leadership 
 
Addressing Safety Leadership as a focus area of semi-structured interviews, 
it was consistently stated by Operator interviewees that the organisation 
desired to put leaders onto offshore assets who were aligned with the 
organisations ethics and values and who provided strong safety focus. This 
was confirmed not to result directly from inclusion in strategy or a metric on 
the scorecard. Rather, a safety strategy enabler to deliver positive safety 
outcomes and performance. From Operator interviews it was established that 
the Operator organisation has [globally] established a number of leadership 
competencies: Leading Self (Takes Accountability/Drives Performance/Makes 
Decisions) Leading Others (Communicates Effectively/Partners 
Collaboratively/Builds Talent and Teams/Empowers Others); and Leading the 
Business (Thinks Strategically/ demonstrates Financial and Quantitative 
Acumen/Leads Change). These competencies were stated to be linked to the 
grading structure and career map for staff personnel. As a core value, Safety 
was considered by Operator interviewees to be an integral part of the 
established leadership competencies rather than a specific and stand-alone 
competency itself. Leaders were encouraged to participate in a 360-degree 
feedback programme as an input to their annual appraisal, taking feedback 
from subordinates (followers), their line manager, peers and interested senior 
stakeholders from within the business. The feedback process was said to be 
structured around the career map and the established leadership 
competencies; safety leadership was confirmed not to be an element of the 
process. The Researcher concluded that aspects of authentic leadership 
attributes (transparency, internalised moral/ethical perspective, balanced 
processing, and self-awareness) were visible from the identified leadership 
competency elements, but that safety leadership was driven through the 
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organisational value position on safety. Engineering and technical 
competency programmes had been established for all offshore asset-based 
positions to help ensure delivery of safe and efficient production; competency 
attainment levels were said to be monitored monthly by Human Resources 
and Operations management. Interviewees confirmed there were no 
established leadership competency programmes. Other than the formal 
performance appraisal system, the Operator interviewees confirmed to the 
best of their knowledge that there was no other deployment of leadership 
assessment or measurement. Scepticism was expressed by several Operator 
interviewees over the reliability of performance appraisal to effectively assess 
leadership skills and attributes. Appraisals were said to be highly task 
attainment focused, biased towards technical rather than soft skill elements, 
plus tied to a force-ranked performance rating score. Beyond six-monthly and 
annual performance appraisals, the assessment of safety leadership 
effectiveness appeared to be reliant on the outcomes from accident and 
incident investigations; was an accident the result of inadequate leadership 
and supervision? Specifically addressing the HSE Auditors, the question was 
asked that when conducting audits internally, or externally on supply chain 
organisations, was safety leadership a specific topic. Both Operator HSE 
Auditors confirmed that leadership was a regular audit topic both internally 
and externally, primarily from a standards compliance perspective given that 
published safety management standards contain requirements relating to 
Leadership, for example Section 5.1. of BSI ISO 45001:2008 (Leadership and 
commitment). Both Auditor interviewees confirmed that the audits conducted 
did not result in the identification of safety leadership deployed by the auditee 
organisation, for example authentic, charismatic, transactional, or 
transformational. The interviewees confirmed that they would not feel 
capable of making such an assessment if required to. 
 
The Contractor personnel interviewed confirmed that their employing 
organisations engaged in a variety of leadership training activities. In a 
position not dissimilar to the Operator organisation feedback, interviewees 
reflected that safety was considered an organisational value and so was 
incorporated into leadership training rather than being a stand-alone 
leadership training activity itself. Evaluation of effective safety leadership was 
considered by interviewees to be achieved through improving safety 
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performance, as evidenced by key lagging performance metrics such as Lost 
Time Incident and Recordable Injuries. These performance measures feature 
on their business scorecards. In addition, several interviewees confirmed that 
their employing organisations also evaluated safety leadership by measuring 
and monitoring leaders’ engagement [and visibility] in safety related 
activities, for example conducting asset and work site visits, participation in 
safety audits, safety inspections and verifications. These lagging performance 
measures against established performance targets do not feature on the 
business scorecards. Several of the interviewees commented that it was 
frequently difficult for their leaders to meet such performance targets 
because they were heavily dependent on the Operator organisation to provide 
bed space and accommodation on offshore assets for what was frequently 
viewed as non-production critical activity. All Contractor personnel 
interviewed stated that their employing organisations had established annual 
performance appraisal processes. In a similar manner to the Operator 
organisation, the Contractor appraisal processes were stated to be heavily 
biased towards goal attainment and task accomplishment. With safety 
considered to be an integral company value, safety leadership was not a 
specific appraisal topic for any of the Contractor personnel interviewed. All of 
the Contractor personnel interviewed commented that the alternative means 
of determining safety leadership effectiveness within their employing 
organisations was through accident and incident investigation outcomes that 
delivered inadequate supervision or leadership as a root cause (direct or 
contributing). However, several of the Contractor interviewees commented 
that getting such information from the Operator organisation could be 
problematic, normally due to the legal position regarding potential injury and 
liability claims and was therefore of limited value. As per the Operator semi-
structured interviews, the Contractor HSE Auditors were asked that when 
conducting audits internally, or externally on supply chain organisations, was 
safety leadership a specific topic. Both HSE Auditors confirmed that 
leadership was a regular audit topic both internally and externally, again 
primarily from a standards compliance perspective. Both Auditor interviewees 
confirmed that the audits conducted did not result in the identification of 
safety leadership deployed by the auditee organisation, for example 
authentic, charismatic, transactional, or transformational. 
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Several of the Sub-contract interviewees commented that their company 
personnel offshore were only as good as their last job, with the Offshore 
Installation Manager’s (OIM) being law. Three of the Sub-contractor 
interviewees commented that the principle of Not Required Back (NRB) 
remains in the shadows despite Oil & Gas UK introducing guidelines during 
2009 setting out the principles and process to be followed in the event of 
permanent removal of contractor personnel from an offshore installation. The 
guidelines were endorsed by both industry and the trade unions and 
introduced in response to workforce concerns that the lack of a clear and 
transparent process could potentially prevent individuals from raising safety 
concerns. The three interviewees stated, for the Operator organisation, that 
everyone knew exactly who the difficult OIM’s and Operations Managers 
were. 
 
4.1.5 Safety Climate 
 
The final topic addressed by the semi-structured interviews was Safety 
Climate. Operator personnel interviewed made repeated reference to the 
organisation having a long heritage with a strong and positive safety culture. 
When asked to describe what safety culture meant, a variety of responses 
were achieved such as ‘our culture is based on the safety triangle’, ‘it’s the 
way the company has always just done things, safely’, ‘no job is so urgent or 
important that we can’t take the time to do it safely’ and ‘culture is our 
processes, procedures and the desire our people have to work safely all of 
the time’. None of the Operator personnel interviewed considered safety 
culture to be as a direct result of the business scorecard, rather the scorecard 
was viewed as a means of maintaining the culture. Nobody interviewed from 
the Operator organisation could recall ever having been asked to participate 
in a culture (or specifically safety culture) survey. When asked how safety 
culture was measured by the organisation, all interviewees referred the 
lagging safety performance data of accident and incident rates as proof that 
the organisational value of safety combined with a strong safety culture 
delivered [near] year-on-year improvement in accident and incident rates. 
When asked to discuss safety climate as distinct from safety culture, most of 
the interviewees were unaware that distinctions could be drawn between 
safety culture and safety climate with research Guldenmund (2000) 
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concluding that the assessment of safety culture may provide insight into 
attitudes leading to safety performance improvement and the avoidance of 
major accidents; measurement of safety climate might be utilised as an 
alternative safety performance indicator beyond the traditional recording of 
accident and incident events. Unanimously, the interviewees confirmed that 
there had been no safety climate measure conducted by the Operator 
organisation involving staff, Contractors or Sub-contractors. It was concluded 
that without a measure and consideration of safety climate, the Operator 
organisation may experience some difficulty in moving beyond its continued 
and heavy reliance on lagging safety performance data. 
 
For Contract personnel interviewed a similar picture was presented by 
interviewees; safety was a core value of their employing organisations and 
the importance of developing and maintaining a strong safety culture was 
recognised as a high priority and business critical activity. Personnel 
interviewed were not familiar with the concept of safety climate and its 
potential for use as a safety performance indicator. None of the interviewees 
could recollect any safety climate measurements being taken within their 
organisations and it was not recognised to be a scorecard element either at 
the corporate or contract level. Several interviewees recalled organisational 
culture questionnaires being applied during the past five years, but they were 
very much researching staff employee satisfaction levels; they were not 
applied to non-staff personnel working for or on behalf of the Contract 
organisation. Interviewees from one of the Contractor organisations stated 
that they had commenced safety culture measurements within their wider 
business organisation. On attempting to perform safety culture 
measurements on their personnel working offshore on one of the Operators 
assets, it was met with significant resistance by Operator senior leadership 
and the asset OIM’s. The interviewees confirmed that the Operator was 
concerned about a culture within a culture perception when, offshore, 
everything was controlled by the Operator and that meant safety culture too. 
Safety culture measurements had subsequently been suspended by the 
Contractor organisation with the process to be re-considered at a future date. 
All Sub-contract personnel interviewed stated that they were unaware of 
safety climate measurements being made within their own organisations and 
no scorecard inclusion should one exist. Also, none had been invited to 
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participate in any such measurement exercises at the Contractor or Operator 
level. When asked to consider the effect of working under the Contractor or 
Operator control of work arrangements on sub-contractor safety focus and 
safety performance the responses received were very consistent. On the 
Operators assets the clear expectation is for Sub-contractor leaders and 
followers to display the correct attitude to safety. Following the Operators 
control of work arrangements was stated by most interviewees to be 
imperative, as was participation in the safety conversation and observation 
initiatives, plus staying within the safety triangle. The message was stated to 
be clear on offshore assets that there would be [adverse] consequences in 
the event of someone (Operator, Contractor, or Sub-contractor) stepping out 
of the safety triangle. 
 
4.2 QUANTITATIVE DATA 
 
4.2.1 Offshore Workforce Safety Study 
 
Quantitative data was obtained from the research population during 2018 by 
means of three credible and recognised data collection instruments combined 
into a single Offshore Workforce Safety Study created specifically for the 
purpose of the original research.   
 
Firstly, the Authentic Leadership Questionnaire - ALQ (Avolio et al., 2007) 
both ‘Rater’ and ‘Self-Rater’ component scales were included for research 
purposes. The ALQ had previously undergone extensive validation activities 
to determine construct reliability and validity. Secondly, the Safety Climate 
Assessment tool (SCT) developed by the Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL). 
The scale was originally published by the Health and Safety Executive in 
December 1997 before being withdrawn during early 2007 and subsequently 
revised (Sugden et al., 2009) into the version utilised (V1.0) during the 
research. The third and final scale utilised was the Psychological Capital 
Questionnaire – PCQ (Luthans et al., 2007); the ‘Self-Rater’ version was 
utilised for the study. The PCQ had also previously undergone extensive 
validation activities to determine construct reliability and validity. All three 
data collection tools were unaltered for the purposes of the research 
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undertaken to ensure there was no detrimental impact upon assessed 
construct reliability and validity.  
 
4.2.2 Data Population and Study Response Rates 
 
Table 4.4 details the responses received to the Offshore Workforce Safety 
Study sent out to the seven individual offshore Assets, described in Chapter 
3. An overall response rate of 48.8% was considered positive for the 
organisational research undertaken. For example, Baruch and Holtom (2008) 
noted a response rate of 37.2% to be a positive indicator of research data 
validity. The returns from all assets except one (Asset A6) were either close 
to or in exceedance of the Baruch and Holtom (ibid) ‘good’ response rate. 
Assets A2 (54%), A4 (51.5%) and A5 (74.8%) were considered particularly 
strong returns. However, there was no assignable or discernible cause for 
Asset A6’s weak return percentage (9.6%); the timing, instructions and 
application of the Study were identical with all other assets. Overall, the 
strong response rate was important to the research given that lower returns 
may have resulted in the introduction of nonresponse bias, potentially 
generating misleading information about the safety science issues being 
researched through the specifically constructed Study (Shih and Fan, 2009). 
 
 
Table 4.4 Offshore Workforce Safety Study Responses by Asset 
 
A total of 36 from the 488 Study questionnaires returned were discarded prior 
to analysis. The reason for discarding returns included missing information 
from the “Points About Yourself” section, key for comparative analysis. There 
were also returns where part or whole sections had not been completed. 
 
The applied Study questionnaires invited respondents to provide additional 
comments about leadership, safety climate and/or safety performance on the 
Asset 
Identifier
Type Operating Phase Issued Returned Return % Used Discard 
A1 Production Platform Decommissioning 100 46 46 46 0
A2 Production Platform Decommissioning 100 54 54 48 6
A3 Production Platform Production with Asset Life Extension 100 44 44 41 3
A4 Production Platform Production with Asset Life Extension 200 103 51.5 95 8
A5 Production Platform Production with Asset Life Extension 250 187 74.8 168 19
A6 Drilling Rig Well Plug & Abandonment Operations 125 12 9.6 12 0
A7 Drilling Rig Well Exploration and Development 125 42 33.6 42 0
1000 488 48.80% 452 36
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asset they were working on. Of the 452 responses analysed there were only 
9 containing comments. These comments are shown in Appendix 5 to the 
thesis; there were too few to enable trends in commentary to be identified. 
It may have been by administering the Study during the onboard weekly 
Safety Meetings (time-bound but ultimately voluntary) the offshore crews 
considered that a sufficiency of their time had been sacrificed to the exercise 
answering the Study questions and opted not to give additional time to 
further commentary. Two of the Study respondents who did provide 
additional information resoundingly expressed their reservations about the 
safety science research. Respondent A5-25 provided the statement “I don’t 
think most of these questions were anything to do with safety” while 
respondent A5-68 summed the Study up as “Another box ticking exercise”. 
This, regrettably, was interpreted by the Researcher to reflect an 
understanding of safety as simply being the absence of accidents, reflected 
through lagging accident and incident metrics data. 
 
The population of surveyed offshore workforce respondents was profiled to 
illustrate the value chain make-up between staff, contractor and sub-
contractor split and is illustrated in Figure 4.2 below: 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Value Chain Population Breakdown 
 
Figure 4.3 provides a profile of respondent make up considering the 
contribution status of respondents (individual contributor versus leader of two 
or more people) between staff, contractor, and sub-contractor. From the data 
population it was observed that for Staff, Leaders represented 29.17% of 




Value Chain Population Breakdown
Staff Contractor Subcontractor
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Across all seven assets and in all cases, Individual Contributors comprised 
the respondent majority, with Leaders of 2 or more people making up a range 
of 17.89% to 41.67% of respondents.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Individual Contributor vs. Leader Breakdown by Work Group 
 
Upon completion of each Study questionnaire, the respondents were 
requested to indicate their thoughts on the ease or difficulty of completion for 
the data collection. The purpose was to confirm “face validity” (Saunders et 
al., 2009: 394); if the questionnaire had not made sense to the respondents 
then retrieved data viability may have been undermined, possibly unreliable. 
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Completion
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The raw data was concluded to confirm face validity with 44% of respondents 
considering the administered questionnaire to be ‘Quite Easy’ or ‘Easy’; a 
further 49% or respondents were ‘Neutral’ in their consideration of ease or 
difficulty of completion. Only 7% of respondents considered completion of the 
questionnaire to be ‘Quite Difficult’ or ‘Difficult’.  
 
Figure 4.5 displays the ease of completion by work group type, i.e. operator 
company staff, contractor, or subcontractor while Figure 4.6 depicts the ease 
of completion by contribution status. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Offshore Workforce Safety Study Ease of Completion by Work Group Status 
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Overall, the visible skew from a ‘Neutral’ to ‘Easy’ response is clear for the 
overall value chain, by work group, and by contribution status. Face validity 
was therefore considered to have been achieved by the applied Offshore 
Workforce Safety Study instrument and its incorporated measurement scales. 
It was not possible to determine from the discarded questionnaires if difficulty 
was experienced with understanding the concepts being examined and 
questioned; whether difficulty was experienced with face validity of the 
Survey document and therefore an assignable cause for incomplete or 
inadequate questionnaire completion. However, neither could the possibility 
be explicitly excluded although the final discard percentage was only 7.38% 
of Survey documents returned. Although, during piloting of the Offshore 
Workforce Safety Study face validity as a substantially intuitive process was 
both considered and confirmed by the pilot group. 
 
4.2.3 Data Reliability 
 
The data collection instruments [selected and] utilised possessed previously 
demonstrated validity during their construct. However, there was a need 
during research to demonstrate that the data collection activity was free from 
random error. Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) is one of the most widely 
used tests for demonstrating the internal reliability of data, determining 
whether the indicators that make up the data gathering scale are consistent; 
whether respondent scores on any one indicator tend to be affiliated with 
their scores on other indicators. The statistic provides an indication of the 
average correlation among all the items that make up the scale. Cronbach’s 
alpha values range between 0.00 and 1.00.  The closer Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient is to 1.00 the greater the internal consistency of the items in the 
scale. When there are reduced items in the scale, typically fewer than 10, 
Cronbach alpha values can be small and closer to 0.00. In such a situation, 
Pallant (2016) considers calculation and reporting of the mean inter-item 
correlation to be preferable. Optimal mean inter-item correlation values range 
from 0.2 to 0.4. Reliability statistics for the data collected during the Offshore 
Workforce Safety Study are summarised in Table 4.5, with the mean inter-
item correlation reported for measures with fewer than ten scale items. With 
one exception the Cronbach’s Alpha values obtained, supplemented by the 
inter-item correlation values as appropriate, demonstrate the internal 
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reliability of data gathered through the Offshore Workforce Safety Study. The 
values obtained confirm that respondents’ scores on any one indicator 
strongly indicate relativity to their scores for other indicators, thus confirming 
consistency of measurement across the concepts being measured: Authentic 
Leadership; Safety Climate; and Psychological Capital. 
 
Data Reliability Summary Table 









Total Instrument 452 16 .941 NR 
Transparency 452 5 1.00 1.00 
Moral/Ethical 452 4 .863 .611 
Balanced Processing 452 3 .746 .496 
Self-Awareness 452 4 .874 .637 
Authentic Leadership Questionnaire – Self-Rater 
Total Instrument 102 16 .909 NR 
Transparency 102 5 1.00 1.00 
Moral/Ethical 102 4 .774 .470 
Balanced Processing 102 3 .539 .305 
Self-Awareness 102 4 .744 .424 
Safety Climate Tool 
Total Instrument 452 40 .919 NR 
Factor 1: Organisational commitment 452 6 .723 .306 
Factor 2: H&S oriented behaviours 452 6 .868 .515 
Factor 3: H&S trust 452 7 .844 .446 
Factor 4: Usability of procedures 452 5 .884 .601 
Factor 5: Engagement in H&S 452 4 .858 .604 
Factor 6: Peer group attitude 452 4 .511 .355 
Factor 7: Resources for H&S 452 5 -.435 -.056 
Factor 8: Accidents and near miss reporting 452 3 .836 .634 
Psychological Capital Questionnaire 
Total Instrument 452 24 .872 NR 
Efficacy/Confidence 452 6 .857 .512 
Hope 452 6 .790 .396 
Resiliency 452 6 .746 .350 
Optimism 452 6 .517 .217 
Table 4.5 Data Reliability Summary 
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The optimum Cronbach’s Alpha value of 1.00 was obtained for the 
transparency scale within the Authentic Leadership Questionnaire, both Rater 
and Self Rater instruments. This indicates that across the data population 
there was total agreement on each item across the transparency semantic 
scale. While seeming to be unlikely, the coding for both instruments was 
checked and no errors, transcription or otherwise, were noted. According to 
SPSS statistical output the Cronbach’s Alpha and inter-item mean correlation 
value negative values for SCT Factor 7 (Resources for Health & Safety) was 
due to a negative average covariance among items, thereby violating the 
reliability model assumptions. The coding for the SCT scale was checked with 
no transcription errors noted. However, a dichotomous trend was noted with 
responses to the three scale items in Factor 7 which may have presented as 
incorrect coding through the SPSS analysis. Despite this outcome for one of 
the eight SCT scales, the overall instrument achieved an overall Cronbach’s 
Alpha value of .919, indicating strong internal reliability. 
 
Further and more granular analysis was conducted on the individual data 
collection instruments, commencing with the Authentic Leadership 
Questionnaire (ALQ) which comprised the first two components of the 
Offshore Workforce Safety Study. The instrument contains scales addressing 
the distinguishing features of authentic leadership (Walumba et al., 2008) 
namely relational transparency, internalised moral and ethical perspective, 
balanced processing, and self-awareness.  
 
4.2.4 Authentic Leadership Questionnaire Analysis 
 
The first section of the Study to be completed was the ALQ Rater version 
where respondents were requested to identify their leader’s style as they 
perceived it to be, rating it against a Likert Scale from 0 to 4 representing: 
Not at all; Once in a while; Sometimes; Fairly often; and Frequently, if not 
always. The scale, utilised in accordance with conditions of the Academic 
Licence, contained a total of 16 items. For example, My Leader: 
 
• says exactly what he or she means 
• analyses relevant data before coming to a decision 
• seeks feedback to improve interactions with others 
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Obtaining a score for the total ALQ scale, also for each of the four components 
individually, involved calculation of the average for each item as per the 
instrument instruction. The overall result output is shown in Table 4.6 with a 
prominent feature being that the initial analysis demonstrates the ALQ scores 
is higher for leaders of 2 or more people than for individual contributors. This 
trend is consistent across the total research population plus all work group 
categories: Staff; Contractor and Sub-contractor. 
 
Conducting further data analysis of the ALQ distinguishing features utilising 
the Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test there was a statistically 
significant difference for the overall ALQ score between individual contributors 
and leaders of more than 2 people, the latter with the higher average score 
(3.20 versus 2.96). It was therefore concluded that leaders of 2 or more 
people perceive stronger authentic leader attributes in their own leaders than 
do personnel who are individual contributors with no leadership accountability 
and responsibility for others. Considering the individual feature scales and 
utilising the same technique for comparing groups it was noted that there 
was no statistically significant difference between individual contributors and 
leaders of more than 2 people for the transparency feature of authentic 
leadership despite individual contributors recording a lower feature score than 
leaders (3.21 versus 3.42). For this feature, the Null Hypothesis considering 
the distribution of transparency to be the same across both categories of 
contribution was retained. A statistically significant difference was noted for 
the remaining ALQ features of internalised moral/ethical, balanced processing 
and self-awareness reflected through the individual calculated scale scores, 
with the Null Hypothesis being rejected. In all cases the instrument scale 
scores for leaders of 2 or more people were higher than those for individual 
contributors (3.31 versus 2.96, 3.01 versus 2.83 and 2.97 versus 2.73 
respectively). Overall, this further analysis discloses the basis for the earlier 
conclusion that leaders of 2 or more people perceive stronger authentic leader 
attributes in their own leaders than do personnel who are individual 
contributors. Further statistical analysis reviewing authentic leadership 
perceived differences based on work group contribution was conducted: 
Staff; Contractor; and Sub-contractor. 
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For Staff leaders of more than 2 people (N = 28) and individual contributors 
(N = 68) the Null Hypothesis that the total ALQ score would be the same 
across both categories of contribution was retained. 
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18 3.43 3.40 3.53 3.37 3.43 
Table 4.6 ALQ Rater Version Results 
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However, a statistically significant difference was recorded for the 
transparency feature of ALQ with the Null Hypothesis being rejected; leaders 
had a higher transparency score compared to individual contributors (3.57 
versus 3.06). The Null Hypothesis was retained for the Internalised 
Moral/Ethical, Balanced Processing, and Self Awareness features of the ALQ 
(3.23 versus 2.86, 2.79 versus 2.71 and 2.77 versus 2.48 respectively). 
 
Similar to the results for Staff personnel, the Null Hypothesis that the total 
ALQ score would be the same across both categories of contribution was 
retained for Contractor leaders of 2 or more people (N = 56) and individual 
contributors (N = 238). At an ALQ feature level the Null Hypothesis was 
retained for transparency, balanced processing, and self-awareness with 
leaders of 2 or more people presenting higher feature scores than individual 
contributors (3.36 versus 3.26, 3.01 versus 2.84 and 2.93 versus 2.75 
respectively). The Null Hypothesis was rejected for the Internalised 
Moral/Ethical feature demonstrating a statistically significant difference 
between the two independent contributing groups; here again the leader 
score was higher than the individual contributor score, 3.28 versus 2.98. 
 
For Staff and Contractor personnel the total ALQ score was greater for leaders 
in both working groups and the Null Hypothesis was retained. The Mann-
Whitney U Test for total ALQ score for Sub-contractors resulted in rejection 
of the Null Hypothesis for the leader and individual contributor independent 
samples. A statistically significant difference in perceived levels of authentic 
leadership was calculated between leaders of 2 or more people (N = 18) and 
individual contributors (N = 44); leaders presented an ALQ score of 3.43 
versus 3.06 for individual contributors. On this basis it was concluded that 
the gap in perceived authentic leadership levels is greater between leaders of 
2 or more people and individual contributors within Sub-contractor personnel 
than Staff or Contractor personnel working on the offshore assets. This 
conclusion was supported through further granular analysis which 
demonstrated retention of the Null Hypothesis that the ALQ score would be 
the same across both categories of contribution for only the transparency 
feature (leaders 3.40 versus 3.20). The remaining features of Internalised 
moral/ethical, balanced processing, and self-awareness had the Null 
Hypothesis rejected. In all cases the leader scores were higher than those for 
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the individual contributors (3.53 versus 3.06, 3.37 versus 2.95 and 3.43 
versus 2.95 respectively). 
 
Table 4.7 details a summary of the ALQ outcomes, Null Hypothesis retained 
or rejected, by work group status considering the independent groups of 
leaders of 2 or more people and individual contributors. 
 




Staff  RETAINED REJECTED RETAINED RETAINED RETAINED 
Contractor RETAINED RETAINED REJECTED RETAINED RETAINED 
Subcontractor REJECTED RETAINED REJECTED REJECTED REJECTED 
Table 4.7 ALQ Rater Version Outcomes 
 
In all cases, whether-or-not the Null Hypotheses were retained, the ALQ 
scores recorded by leaders of 2 or more people were higher than for those 
recorded by individual contributors.  
 
The second instrument in the Offshore Workforce Safety Study was the 
Authentic Leadership Questionnaire Self-Rater version. In the same manner 
as the ALQ Rater version, respondents were requested to identify their own 
leadership style as they perceived it, judging, and rating it against a Likert 
Scale from 0 to 4 representing: Not at all; Once in a while; Sometimes; Fairly 
often; and Frequently, if not always. As per the Rater version, the scale 
contained the same 16 items but expressed in personal tense. For example, 
As a Leader I: 
 
• say exactly what I mean 
• analyse relevant data before coming to a decision 
• seek feedback to improve interactions with others 
 
The total and four component ALQ scales required calculation of the average 
for each item as per the instrument instruction. The overall result output is 
shown in Table 4.8. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis Test (sometimes referred to as the Kruskal-Wallis H Test) 
was utilised to compare ALQ scores on the same continuous variable for the 
three groups of leaders: Staff; Contractor; and Sub-contractor. The Null 
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Hypothesis of the ALQ total score being the same across all categories of 
leaders was retained. More granular analysis was conducted at the ALQ 
feature level with Null Hypothesis of the feature score being the same across 
all categories of leader was retained for transparency, internalised 
moral/ethical and balanced processing. The Null Hypothesis was rejected for 
Self-Awareness, Staff leaders presenting with the lowest feature score and 
Sub-contractor leaders with the highest. Overall, the highest level of 
perceived authentic leadership traits, as a total and at an individual feature 
level, came from Sub-contractor leaders of more than 2 people. 
 






































18 3.50 3.61 3.61 3.43 3.32 
Table 4.8 ALQ Self-Rater Version Outcomes 
 
Table 4.9 summarises the results comparison ALQ scoring between how 
leaders of 2 or more people perceive themselves as authentic leaders versus 
how individual contributors perceive their own workplace leaders’ Authentic 
Leadership traits to be. To ensure non-parametric testing assumptions were 
not breached the independence of observations included in the statistical 
analysis was maintained by excluding data provided by leaders of more than 
2 people reflecting how they perceived their own workplace leaders’ authentic 
leadership traits to be. In this way, each respondent appeared only in one 
category. 
 
For the data population as a whole and considering the total ALQ scores of 
both independent groups (3.33 for leaders versus 2.96 for individual 
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contributors), the Mann-Whitney U Test highlighted a statistically significant 
difference between the self-rated perception of authentic leadership traits by 
leaders of 2 or more people and those perceived by individual contributors.  
 



























350 2.96 3.21 2.96 2.83 2.73 
Staff 
Leaders 




68 2.80 3.06 2.86 2.71 2.48 
Contractor 
Leaders 













44 3.06 3.20 3.06 2.95 2.95 
Table 4.9 ALQ Leader vs. Contributor Outcomes 
 
The Null Hypothesis that the distribution of ALQ total scores would be the 
same across both independent groups was rejected. With more granular 
analysis by ALQ feature, the null hypothesis was deduced to be retained for 
transparency indicating no statistically significant difference in ALQ traits as 
self-perceived by leaders and as rated by individual contributors. The Null 
Hypothesis was rejected for internalised moral/ethical, balanced processing 
and self-awareness, indicating statistically significant differences between the 
two independent groups, and therefore supporting the Null Hypothesis 
rejection for the total ALQ score. Further analysis was conducted at the each 
of the work group levels: Staff, Contractor and Sub-contractor, again utilising 
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the Mann-Whitney U Test to test for difference between the two independent 
groups (self-rater and individual-rater) on the continuous ALQ measure. 
Table 4.10 illustrates the results obtained, identifying where the Null 
Hypothesis of the same distribution of the ALQ score across both independent 


















Staff  REJECTED RETAINED REJECTED REJECTED REJECTED 
Contractor REJECTED RETAINED REJECTED REJECTED REJECTED 
Subcontractor REJECTED REJECTED REJECTED REJECTED REJECTED 
Table 4.10 ALQ Leader vs Individual ALQ Perception Outcomes 
 
The Null Hypothesis was rejected in all cases except for the transparency 
feature for the Staff and Contractor leadership groups. For all work groups 
the ALQ scores obtained, whether total or at the feature level were greater 
when self-perceived by leaders of 2 or more people than when rated by 
individual contributors. It was concluded from the analysis that the leaders 
perceived themselves to be better authentic leaders than their followers 
perceive them to be. This statistically significant difference represented 
potential improvement opportunity for both leaders and followers.  
 
To complete the analysis, a Kruskal-Wallis Test (outcome illustrated in Table 
4.11) was conducted to compare the Total ALQ scores from leaders from the 
three work groups of Staff, Contractor and Sub-contractor. The Null 
Hypothesis that the distribution of Total ALQ score would be the same across 
each leadership group was retained; no statistically significant difference was 
detected between the three categories of leadership grouping. 
 
 
Table 4.11 ALQ Leader Self-Rater Scores Staff, Contractor, Sub-contractor 
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Consistently across each of the three work groups, leaders of two or more 
people considered themselves to be more authentic in leadership 
characteristics than their followers perceived (and rated them) to be.  
 
4.2.5 Safety Climate Tool Analysis 
 
The second data collection instrument in the Offshore Workforce Safety Study 
questionnaire was the Safety Climate Tool (SCT). Figure 4.7 displays a radar 
plot of the asset SCT scores, depicting an apparent near parity between the 
seven assets.  
 
Following more granular analysis, Table 4.12 exhibits total SCT scores by 
asset. An independent-Samples Kruskal Wallis test was conducted with a Null 
Hypothesis stating that the distribution of total SCT scores obtained from the 
full instrument would be the same across each of the seven assets at the 0.05 
significance level.  
 
 
Figure 4.7 Safety Climate Factor Scores by Asset 
 
The Null Hypothesis was retained therefore no statistically significant 
difference was noted between the total SCT scores recorded for each asset. 
This may be considered as potential confirmation of the consistent application 
of the Operating company’s safety message ‘Nothing is so urgent or important 
















Accidents & near miss
reporting
Safety Climate Factor Scoring
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7
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expectations of ‘Always Professional, Always in Control, every work site, 










A1 46 30.42 76.05% 20.79 37.03 
A2 48 31.12 77.80% 22.40 40.01 
A3 41 30.79 76.98% 23.38 37.36 
A4 95 29.58 73.95% 19.47 37.53 
A5 168 29.72 74.30% 18.46 37.63 
A6 12 31.77 79.42% 27.43 36.09 
A7 42 29.82 74.55% 17.85 37.58 
Table 4.12 SCT Scores by Asset 
 
Utilising the Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) performance groupings, as 
developers of the SCT (Healey et al., 2012), provides for Poor (<35%), 
Average (≥35% to <65%), Good (≥65% to <90%), and Excellent (≥90%) 
groupings for the SCT scoring for the seven assets. From the research 
population it was determined that in addition to there being no statistically 
significant difference between asset SCT scores, all assets existed in the 
‘Good’ category. Improvement opportunities were highlighted by the analysis 
through future actions aimed at raising the scores from the ‘Good’ to 
‘Excellent’ though the asset portfolio. This would represent a key leading 
metric for inclusion in a safety strategy balanced scorecard. 
 
Focusing in the eight individual features of the SCT, Table 4.13 illustrates the 
tabulated scores for each asset, indicating where the Null Hypothesis of same 
distribution of the SCT scores is the same across each asset was retained or 
rejected through the Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis test at the 0.50 
significance level. From the non-parametric statistical analysis conducted, the 
Null Hypothesis was retained for Safety Climate Factor 1, Organisational 
commitment, demonstrating no significant statistical difference between the 
seven assets for this SCT feature.  All results for this feature scored in the 
HSL’s ‘Good’ grouping. For Safety Climate Factor 2, Health and safety 
oriented behaviours the Null Hypothesis was rejected demonstrating a 
statistically significant difference between the seven assets. 
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4.02 4.11 4.09 3.91 3.97 4.38 4.06 Retain 
H&S oriented 
behaviours 
4.01 4.23 4.21 3.87 3.83 4.07 3.82 Reject 
H&S trust 3.70 3.90 3.86 3.61 3.69 3.98 3.71 Retain 
Usability of 
procedures 
3.54 3.40 3.47 3.29 3.36 3.58 3.00 Reject 
Engagement 
in H&S 
3.97 3.90 3.73 3.75 3.86 4.21 3.90 Retain 
Peer group 
attitude 
4.03 4.26 4.14 4.02 3.97 4.06 3.83 Retain 
Resources for 
H&S 




3.87 3.94 3.96 3.82 3.74 4.17 4.07 Reject 
Total SCT 
Score 
30.42 31.12 30.79 29.58 29.72 31.77 29.82 
  
% 76.05 77.80 76.98 73.95 74.30 79.42 74.55  
Table 4.13 SCT Scores by Asset and SCT Feature 
 
All SCT feature scores were in the ‘Good’ grouping, the lowest feature scores 
obtained from asset A7 (3.82 – 76.40%), A5 (3.83 – 76.60%) and A4 (3.87 
– 77.40%). The Null Hypothesis was retained for Safety Climate Factor 3, 
Health and safety trust with all feature scores achieving ‘Good’ grouping 
status. Safety Climate Factor 4, Usability of procedures had the Null 
Hypothesis rejected with the lowest scores coming from asset A7 (3.00 – 
60.00%), asset A4 (3.29 – 65.80%), and asset A5 (3.36 – 67.20%). The 
result achieved for Usability of procedures on asset A7 was in the ‘Average’ 
grouping as per the HSL categorisation and therefore identified as an 
improvement opportunity. Considering Engagement in health and safety, 
Safety Climate Factor 5, the Null Hypothesis was retained as it was for Safety 
Climate Factor 6, Peer group attitude and Safety Climate Factor 7, Resources 
for health and safety. For these three features, the scoring attained at each 
asset was in the ‘Good’ categorisation. For the final Safety Climate Factor 
feature, Accidents and near miss reporting, The Null Hypothesis was rejected 
with the lowest scores coming from asset A5 (3.74 – 74.80%), Asset A4 (3.82 
– 76.40%) and Asset A1 (3.87 – 77.40%). Despite the Null Hypothesis 
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rejection for the eighth feature of the SCT, all asset scores achieved were in 
the ‘Good’ grouping. 
 
Analysing the SCT results by workforce grouping was also completed utilising 
the Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis test at the 0.50 significance level 
and Table 4.14 displays the results outcome. The complete set of SCT feature 
scores recorded across the three groups (Operator personnel, Contractor 
personnel, and Sub-contractor personnel) were in the ‘Good’ grouping 
according to the HSL classification. The Null Hypothesis for the Null same 
distribution of the SCT feature scores being the same across each Work Group 
at the 0.50 significance level was retained for six of the SCT features. 
However, it was rejected for two SCT features, Peer group attitude and 
Accident & near miss reporting. For Peer group attitude the lowest score came 
from Sub-contractor personnel (3.97 – 79.40%), an overall ‘Good’ rating. For 
Accident & near miss reporting the lowest score also came from Sub-
contractor personnel (3.78 – 75.60%), also a ‘Good’ rating. 
 







3.97 4.00 4.10 Retain 
H&S oriented 
behaviours 
4.00 3.95 4.02 Retain 
H&S trust 3.79 3.71 3.66 Retain 
Usability of 
procedures 
3.24 3.35 3.36 Retain 
Engagement 
in H&S 
3.83 3.84 3.86 Retain 
Peer group 
attitude 
4.08 4.05 3.97 Reject 
Resources for 
H&S 




4.10 3.84 3.78 Reject 
Total SCT 
Score 
30.28 30.08 30.03 
 
% 75.70 75.20 75.08  
Table 4.14 SCT Feature Scores by Work Group 
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The SCT feature scores recorded by work role, leader of 2 or more people 
versus individual contributors were similarly analysed utilising the 
Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test at the 0.50 significance level. 
Table 4.15 presents the analysis outcome. From the analysis it was 
determined that all SCT scores attained were in the ‘Good’ grouping according 
to the HSL classification. At the SCT feature level the Null Hypothesis for the 
distribution of SCT scores being the same across both categories of 
contribution was accepted for seven of the eight features, only rejected for 
Organisational commitment where a lower score was obtained from individual 
contributors (3.96 – 79.20%) versus leaders of 2 or more people (4.14 – 
82.80%). 
 





4.14 3.96 Reject 
H&S oriented 
behaviours 
4.04 3.95 Retain 
H&S trust 3.82 3.69 Retain 
Usability of 
procedures 
3.40 3.31 Retain 
Engagement 
in H&S 
3.94 3.81 Retain 
Peer group 
attitude 
4.13 4.02 Retain 
Resources for 
H&S 









% 76.82 73.30  
Table 4.15 SCT Feature Scores by Leader or Individual Contributor Role 
 
The final SCT analysis conducted considered SCT feature scoring by Offshore 
Oil & Gas Industry experience. Table 4.16 displays the results achieved 









1 - 3 
years 
3 - 5 
years 








4.36 4.02 3.82 4.04 3.99 Reject 
H&S oriented 
behaviours 
4.24 3.84 3.84 4.01 3.96 Retain 
H&S trust 4.01 3.60 3.52 3.75 3.72 Retain 
Usability of 
procedures 
3.66 3.29 3.23 3.29 3.34 Retain 
Engagement 
in H&S 
4.33 3.77 3.74 3.82 3.83 Reject 
Peer group 
attitude 
4.25 3.83 3.71 4.16 4.03 Retain 
Resources for 
H&S 




3.95 3.83 3.71 3.82 3.94 Retain 
Total SCT 
Score 
32.28 29.52 28.85 30.19 30.13 
 
% 80.70% 73.80% 72.13% 75.48% 75.33%  
Table 4.16 SCT Feature Scores by UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry Experience 
 
At the SCT feature level the Null Hypothesis for the distribution of SCT scores 
being the same across all categories of UK Oil & Gas Industry experience was 
accepted for six of the eight features but rejected for Organisational 
commitment and Engagement in health and safety where a statistically 
significant difference was calculated between the five experience length 
groupings in both SCT features. Despite the Null Hypothesis rejection for 
those two features, all SCT scores attained met the HSL ‘Good’ categorisation 
of ≥65% to <90%. 
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From the entire SCT statistical analysis there was only one feature, Usability 
of procedures at asset A7 during the SCT Scores by Asset analysis, where the 
Null Hypothesis was rejected, and the asset score obtained was 3.00 (60%) 
and therefore in the HSL classification ‘Average’ range. All other scores 
obtained from the data collection instrument were in the ‘Good’ 
categorisation.  
 
Overall, the consistent ‘Good’ SCT score attainment may be considered as 
confirmation for the effective understanding and implementation of the 
Operating company’s consistently communicated safety message ‘Nothing is 
so urgent or important that we cannot take the time to do it safely’ plus the 
similarly communicated safety expectation of ‘Always Professional, Always in 
Control, every work site, every task, every day’. From the granular analysis 
conducted there were a total of 32 opportunities for Null Hypothesis of same 
distribution across the groupings at the 0.05 significance level to be rejected. 
However, Table 4.16 demonstrates that in 75% of cases (24 out of 32), the 
Null Hypothesis was retained. 
 











Engagement in H&S 3 1 
Peer group attitude 3 1 
Resources for H&S 4 0 
Accidents & near 
miss reporting 
2 2 
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4.2.6 Psychological Capital Questionnaire Analysis 
 
The final instrument Offshore Workforce Safety Study questionnaire was the 
Psychological Capital Questionnaire, regarded to be the standard 
measurement scale to assess psychological capital (PsyCap) within an 
organisational context (Lorenz et al., 2016).  
 

































350 107.76 28.02 27.05 27.18 25.51 
 
Leader of 2 
or more 
 








68 107.16 27.88 26.76 26.82 25.69 
Staff 
Leaders 









238 108.16 28.12 27.13 27.33 25.57 
Contractor 
Leaders 














18 106.67 28.22 26.11 26.56 25.78 
Table 4.18 Psychological Capital Questionnaire Scoring Results 
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Table 4.17 presents the PsyCap scoring attained across the data population, 
considering work group (Operator, Contractor, or Sub-contractor) and role as 
either a leader of 2 or more people or an individual contributor. Undertaking 
a statistical analysis of the total Psychological Capital Questionnaire (PCQ) 
using the Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test, it was determined that 
there was no statistical difference between the three workforce groupings of 
Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor. The Null Hypothesis that the 
distribution of the PCQ Total would be the same across all three workforce 
groupings at the .050 significance level was retained.  
 
Repeating the analysis at the PQC feature level (Efficacy, Hope, Resiliency 
and Optimism) similarly concluded that there was no statistically significant 
difference, with the Null Hypothesis of the distribution being the same for 
each feature across the three workforce groupings at the .050 significance 
level being accepted in all cases. 
 
Turning to each of the individual work groups, the Mann-Whitney U Test was 
utilised to examine for possible statistically significant differences between 
leaders of 2 or more people and individual contributors at both the total PCQ 
score and individual feature levels. For Operator personnel, the Null 
Hypothesis of the same distribution of PCQ scores across the leaders and 
individual contributor were unanimously retained; no statistically significant 
difference in psychological capital levels between the two groups. For 
Contractor personnel the Mann-Whitney U Test was repeated. A statistically 
significant difference was noted for the total PCQ score between the leaders 
of 2 or more people and individual contributors with the Null Hypothesis of 
the distribution of PCQ total scores being the same across both work groups 
at the .050 significance level being rejected. The average score was higher 
for leaders of 2 or more people (111.88) than for individual contributors 
(108.16). Further granular analysis was conducted at the PQC feature level 
where the Null Hypothesis of same distribution of PCQ scores was rejected 
for the Efficacy and Optimism, but retained for Hope, Resiliency. For both 
features where the Null Hypothesis was rejected leaders of 2 or more people 
had higher PCQ feature scores than individual contributors; Efficacy (29.91 
versus 28.12) and Optimism (26.82 versus 25.57). Repeating the Mann-
Whitney U Test for the two Sub-contractor groups revealed retention of the 
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Null Hypothesis of same distribution across both work groups at the .050 
significance level for the PCQ total score and therefore no statistically 
significant difference. Likewise, at the PCQ feature level, all Null Hypothesis 
were retained and demonstrated that there was no statistically significant 
difference between leaders of 2 or more people and individual contributors 
within the data population. 
 
Considering psychological capital by length of Oil & Gas Industry experience. 
Table 4.18 outlines the results obtained from the Workforce Safety Study 
sample population. 
 

































20 112.65 28.85 28.45 27.95 27.40 
 
1 to 3 years 
 
21 111.67 29.52 28.10 27.81 26.24 
 
3 to 5 years 
 
33 106.48 27.27 26.85 26.48 25.88 
5 – 10 
years 




266 107.30 28.11 26.85 26.78 25.54 
Table 4.19 Psychological Capital Questionnaire Scoring Results by industry Experience 
 
Utilising the Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test to test for statistically 
significant difference across the different experience groups for total PCQ 
score and at the feature level, the Null Hypothesis for the distribution of PCQ 
scores to be the same across all experience categories at the .050 significance 
level was retained in all cases. There was therefore no statistically significant 
difference in PsyCap levels based on duration of Offshore UK Oil & Gas 
Industry experience. 
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4.2.7 Correlation Analysis 
 
Data correlations utilising the Spearman Rank Order Correlation (rho) 
technique for non-parametric data were conducted across the data population 
for: SCT and ALQ-Rater scores; SCT and PCQ scores; and ALQ-Rater and PCQ 
scores. With regard to the strength of the relationship indicated by the 
correlation coefficient (either negative or positive) Pallant (2016) proposes 
the following guidelines: small (r = .10 to .29); medium (r = .30 to .49); or 
large (r = .50 to 1.0). Utilising these guidelines and following the analysis 
Table 4.19 displays the results obtained for each of the three cases.  
 
 
Table 4.20 Correlation Coefficients 
 
For SCT and ALQ-Rater scores the correlation was positive-medium, with a r 
value of .434 in both cases. The stronger the SCT the stronger the ALQ-Rater 
perception and vice versa. For SCT and PCQ scores the correlation was also 
positive-medium, with a calculated r value of .433 in both cases. The stronger 
the SCT the stronger the PCQ assessment value and vice versa. Similarly, the 
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correlation between PCQ and ALQ was calculated to be positive-medium 
reflecting the higher the ALQ-Rater perception the higher the PCQ assessment 
value and vice versa. For the latter correlation, the r value was calculated to 
be .355 indicating that although positive, the correlation was weaker between 
ALQ-Rater and PCQ than between SCT and ALQ-Rater (r = .434) plus between 
SCT and PCQ (r = .433). It was therefore concluded that both authentic 
leadership and psychological capital, individually, exert a stronger positive 
influence on safety climate across the Operators value chain than they were 
observed to exert upon each other. 
 
4.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter reviewed the primary research findings obtained through the 
methodological triangulation approach deployed and sought to place into 
context the outcomes delivered through the qualitative semi-structured 
interviews and subsequent content analysis, plus the quantitative Offshore 
Safety Survey instruments and consequential non-parametric statistical 
analysis. The following chapter will consider and present to the reader the 
research findings, analysis outcomes and conclusions within the context of 
the research aim, the established research questions, and research objectives 
by way of sense-making and corresponding research questions developed to 
fulfil the aim and objectives. 
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CHAPTER 5 




This chapter presents a discussion and evaluation of the research findings 
obtained from the adopted pragmatic research philosophy and the established 
triangulation methodology, sometimes known as mixed method research. For 
the readers benefit, the research findings will be considered in context with 
the key literature review features and emergent themes to deliver 
implications for Health and Safety practice plus original contribution to the 
body of safety science knowledge. Additionally, the findings will be considered 
with due regard as to how they substantiated, were analogous with, or 
differed from the critically reviewed literature conclusions and synthesis. 
Finally, limitations experienced with data and findings will be presented. 
 
Chapter One outlined that the UK Oil & Gas Piper 25 Conference held during 
June 2013 to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the piper Alpha disaster, 
presented a review of the Cullen Recommendations following the disaster 
enquiry, and questioned current relevance. The conclusion was that in the UK 
Offshore Oil & Gas Industry, accidents and incidents still occur for ‘old’ 
reasons. To meet these challenges, it was stressed by the UK Health and 
Safety Regulator as being essential for organisations working in the industry 
to develop and implement appropriate business strategies, supported by 
effective leadership. Consequently, the aim of the research was established 
to be:  
 
‘Explore the ways in which organisational typology, strategy, leadership, and 
psychological forces contribute to safety performance’. 
 
When the research was significantly underway, a Safety 30 industry 
conference held during June 2018 to commemorate the 30th anniversary of 
the Piper Alpha disaster. Lord Cullen presented an address containing a stern 
reminder of the dangers of complacency, particularly the dangers associated 
with not recognising or effectively acting upon warning signals. The examples 
highlighted included: Texas City Oil Refinery, 2005; Buncefield Oil Storage 
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Depot, 2005; and Deepwater Horizon, 2010. These disasters were multi-
faceted rather than purely engineering and technical in root cause, each 
giving rise to incident investigations, reports and academic studies illustrating 
[amongst other considerations] Human Factors (HF) plus social interactions 
as contributing factors. The Safety 30 conference served to reinforce the 
originality and continued relevance of the established research aim. The 
consideration of Safety 30 implied that the conclusions of Hackitt (2013) from 
the Piper 25 Conference had not been fully acted upon; there remained 
propensity for further UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry disasters. This 
propensity for disaster remains despite the industry’s improving safety 
performance trends over the past two decades as documented in section 
1.1.3: Fatal Injuries Offshore; Over-Seven-Day and Specified Injury Rate per 
100,00 Workers; and the Number of Process Hydrocarbon Releases Offshore. 
 
Recognising the paucity of research literature considering HF as an aligned 
and integral element of business and/or safety strategy and when taken with 
currently expressed concerns regarding ageing assets, and continued safety 
issues within the industry, there was genuine potential identified for topicality 
and originality of purpose in the research undertaking. Cognisant of the 
established research aim, the subsequently generated six general focus 
research questions were used to direct the literature review and provide the 
basis for research objective development, leading to greater specificity in the 
research to be undertaken. The research questions defined in section 7.0 of 
chapter 1 were: 
 
1. What are the organisational typologies displayed by value chain 
organisations ’Operator’, ‘Contractor’, and Sub-contractor’?  
 
2. To what extent is safety strategy, with HF content, included as an aligned 
element of organisational business strategy for the differing 
organisational typologies?  
 
3. What is the relationship between workforce psychological capital and 
organisational typology within value chain organisations?  
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4. What is the relationship between organisational typology and safety 
leadership style within value chain organisations?  
 
5. What is the relationship between organisational typology and perceived 
workforce safety climate at offshore assets involved in Exploration, 
Operations, Asset Life Extension and Decommissioning? 
 
6. What effect does the Operator company safety message(s) have in 
creating alignment between all involved parties, irrespective of typology, 
to deliver acceptable safety performance?  
 
The six established research questions were subsequently operationalised 
into five research objectives as defined in section 8.0 of chapter 1 to provide 
clear and specific statements identifying the intended accomplishments of the 
research undertaken:  
 
1. To determine the extent of the influence exerted by organisational 
typology on the construction of safety strategy as an aligned element of 
overall organisational strategy. (From research question 1). 
 
2. To establish whether the psychological forces component of Human 
Factors is embraced within constructed safety strategies, considering 
psychological capital as an antecedent of safety focused behaviour.  
(From research questions 2 and 3). 
 
3. To describe the organisational typology associations with specific styles 
of safety leadership at the operational level on offshore assets during the 
lifecycle phases. (From research question 4). 
 
4. Determine how the preceding three aspects of safety strategy 
implementation combine to produce individual asset safety climate 
profiles. (From research question 5) 
 
5. Determine whether safety performance as reflected through safety 
climate perception is driven by individual organisational typologies or by 
the Operator company overarching safety message. (From research 
question 6). 
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Upon completion of data collection and analysis, the research aim, questions, 
and objectives provided a framework for data outcome discussions and 
formulation of data-driven conclusions, plus guidance for the thesis write-up.  
 
The research methodology utilised for the study was mixed methods, where 
the findings from a study may be enhanced by using more than one way of 
measuring a concept. The first strand of data collection utilised the use of 
qualitative semi-structured interviews conducted with onshore managers to 
assess and identify: the onshore consideration of organisational typology 
across a typical Offshore Oil & Gas Industry value chain; formalisation of 
safety strategy; considerations of workforce psychological capital; safety 
leadership; and safety climate as a predictor of safety performance. Secondly, 
and in parallel, an Offshore Workforce Safety Study was deployed to gather 
quantitative data from the offshore workforce addressing key areas of focus 
derived from critical literature review: perceptions of authentic leadership 
traits; safety climate on the individually sampled offshore assets; and 
workforce psychological capital. Findings from the semi-structured interviews 
were subjected to manual content analysis; findings from the Offshore 
Workforce Safety Study were analysed utilising non-parametric statistical 
methods. 
 
5.1 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW CONTENT FINDINGS SUMMARY 
 
From Operator interviews, 76% of interviewees identified their organisation 
to be most closely aligned with a Defender-type organisation with the 
remainder falling between Defender and Prospector-type organisations. For 
Contractor personnel, 74% identified with a Prospector-type organisation 
with the remainder at the intersection of Prospector and Defender. For Sub-
contractors, the most diverse group in size and complexity, 58% identified as 
Analyzer-type organisations, 27% as Reactor-type, and the remainder at the 
intersection between Analyzer and Reactor. 
 
Considering Safety Strategy none of the Operator, Contractor or Sub-
contractor interviews could identify their organisations as having a 
documented safety strategy. The Operator and Contractor organisations 
demonstrated some similarity in having clearly established safety goals and 
objectives, implemented, and monitored through established management 
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system arrangements. Lagging performance measures were maintained on a 
business scorecard. In the case of the Operator, the goals and objectives 
were aligned with the global corporate organisation and the safety portion of 
the business scorecard contained both leading and lagging safety 
performance measures. Sub-contractor displayed less awareness around 
safety strategy, while frequently referring to independent third-party safety 
management certification (to BS OHSAS 18001:2007 or ISO 45001:2018). 
Sub-contractor personnel from micro-businesses and Limited Company Sub-
contractors confirmed that their organisations and no safety strategy 
established, document, or implemented; employed based on their personal 
competencies they were reliant on the Operator company for safety strategy 
and direction. Strategy was frequently referred to as being reflected in the 
Operators safety message ‘Nothing is so urgent or important that we cannot 
take the time to do it safely’. 
 
Focusing on workforce psychological capital, across all three grouping there 
was a consistent message that on offshore assets following the Operator 
control of work arrangements was an imperative; failure to do so may have 
adverse consequences for transgressors. While no specific psychological 
capital development or reinforcing activities were identified through the semi-
structured interview process, all groups referred to the importance of: staying 
within the Safety Triangle (Policies & procedures / Training & Competency / 
The Law); exercising the Stop Work Authority without fear of negative 
consequences; plus involvement in the Safety Observation and Conversation 
programs. All three elements established to prevent inadvertent and adverse 
consequences as manifest through workplace accidents. 
 
From a Leadership perspective both the Operator and Contractor interviewees 
confirmed the presence of leadership training programs. However, given that 
safety was said to be an organisational value, safety was integral to 
leadership training rather than being a stand-alone training programme itself. 
For the Operator company the described leadership competencies appeared 
to reflect elements of authentic leadership. Sub-contractor interviewees 
confirmed that they were primarily selected based on their competence levels 
as reflected through education, training, skills, and experience. Leadership 
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training was not [apparently] as well developed as for the Operator and 
Contractor organisations. 
 
The final focus area of the semi-structured interview process was Safety 
Climate. Both Operator and Contractor interviews referred to their own 
organisations’ history of strong and positive safety culture. When asked to 
describe safety culture there were a variety of answers presented, including 
management certification (to BS OHSAS 18001:2007 or ISO 45001:2018). 
Sub-contractor personnel from micro-businesses and Limited Company Sub-
contractors confirmed that their organisations and no safety strategy 
established, document, or implemented; employed based on their personal 
competencies they were reliant on the Operator company for safety strategy 
and direction. Strategy was frequently referred to as being reflected in the 
Operators safety message ‘Nothing is so urgent or important that we cannot 
take the time to do it safely’. 
 
Focusing on workforce psychological capital, across all three grouping there 
was a consistent message that on offshore assets following the Operator 
control of work arrangements was an imperative; failure to do so may have 
adverse consequences for transgressors. While no specific psychological 
capital development or reinforcing activities were identified through the semi-
structured interview process, all groups referred to the importance of: staying 
within the Safety Triangle (Policies & procedures / Training & Competency / 
The Law); exercising the Stop Work Authority without fear of negative 
consequences; plus involvement in the Safety Observation and Conversation 
programs. All three elements established to prevent inadvertent and adverse 
consequences as manifest through workplace accidents. 
 
From a Leadership perspective both the Operator and Contractor interviewees 
confirmed the presence of leadership training programs. However, given that 
safety was said to be an organisational value, safety was integral to 
leadership training rather than being a stand-alone training programme itself. 
For the Operator company the described leadership competencies appeared 
to reflect elements of Authentic Leadership. Sub-contractor interviewees 
confirmed that they were primarily selected based on their competence levels 
as reflected through education, training, skills, and experience. Leadership 
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training was not [apparently] as well developed as for the Operator and 
Contractor organisations. 
 
The final focus area of the semi-structured interview process was Safety 
Climate. Both Operator and Contractor interviews referred to their own 
organisations’ history of strong and positive safety culture. When asked to 
describe safety culture there were a variety of answers presented, including 
’it’s just the way the company has always done things, safely’. There was 
frequent reference by Operator personnel to the clearly communicated 
organisational safety message. Personnel expressed a lack of understanding 
of the difference between culture and climate, the latter not being part of the 
organisational vocabulary. No safety climate measures had been made in 
either the Operator or Contractor organisations whose personnel had 
participated in the semi-structured interview process. Sub-contractor 
personnel confirmed no awareness of safety climate measurements being 
taken in their own organisations. 
 
5.2 NON-PARAMETRIC STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF OFFSHORE 
WORKER SAFETY STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE FINDINGS SUMMARY 
 
Importantly for data reliability, the Cronbach’s Alpha calculations for all three 
data gathering instruments and incorporating twenty separate scales 
confirmed consistency of measurement across the concepts being measured: 
Authentic Leadership (ALQ); Safety Climate (SCT); and Psychological Capital 
(PsyCap). 
 
From the evaluation of Authentic Leadership characteristics, it was 
determined that obtained ALQ-Rater scores were higher for leaders of 2 or 
more people than for individual contributors. This was consistent across all 
work groups of Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor and demonstrated 
that leaders perceived stronger Authentic Leadership traits in their own 
leaders than followers do in theirs. Further, and from comparing leader self-
rated ALQ scores versus individual (follower) rated ALQ scores leaders 
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Non-parametric statistical analysis of Safety Climate Tool (SCT) data revealed 
that there was no statistically significant difference in the total SCT scores 
across the seven sample offshore assets A1 through A7. Utilising the Health 
and Safety Laboratory (HSL) performance groupings, as developers of the 
SCT (Healey et al., 2012), provides for Poor (<35%), Average (≥35% to 
<65%), Good (≥65% to <90%), and Excellent (≥90%) groupings for the SCT 
scoring for the seven assets. From the research population it was determined 
that in addition to there being no statistically significant difference between 
asset SCT scores, all assets existed in the ‘Good’ category. That was not 
concluded to be the perfect, rather it presents an improvement opportunity 
through the journey from Good to Excellent. Numerous and more granular 
analysis of SCT scores demonstrated 75% retention of the Null Hypothesis 
(distribution being the same across all groups in the comparison at the .050 
significance level); 24 out of 32 comparative analyses. This was concluded to 
be confirmation of the Operator organisation clear communication and 
effective implementation of its safety message ‘Nothing is so urgent or 
important that cannot take the time to do it safely.’ 
 
Undertaking non-parametric statistical analysis for the total Psychological 
Capital Questionnaire (PCQ) demonstrated that there was no statistical 
difference (at the .050 significance level) between Operator, Contractor or 
Sub-contractor personnel. An equivalent result was obtained when examining 
PCQ scores based on experience years in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry. 
However, a statistically significant difference (at the .050 significance level) 
was recorded between leaders of 2 or more people and individual contributors 
from the Contractor group, the former having higher total PCQ. 
 
The final non-parametric statistical analysis conducted on the Workforce 
Offshore Safety Study data involved correlation. Positive-medium correlation 
was found disclosed between SCT and ALQ-Rater scores (r = .434), SCT and 
PCQ scores (r = .433). ALQ and PCQ were disclosed to also have a medium-
positive correlation (r = .355). Both ALQ and PCQ were concluded, as 
antecedents, to exert a positive influence on SCT.  
 
One key conclusion drawn from the research data obtained, both qualitative 
and quantitative) was that while it was possible to identify the Operator, 
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Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations within a typical Oil & Gas 
industry value chain to Miles and Snow (1978) typologies (Defender, 
Prospector, Analyzer, and Reactor), the typology had little or no influence on 
measured safety climate offshore assets. The causal factor was identified to 
be Operator insistence that all control of work systems implemented at the 
asset level were in accordance with its own established safety management 
governance, established policies, procedures, and work instructions. This 
determined that in addition to there being no statistically significant 
difference between asset SCT scores, all assets existed in the ‘Good’ category. 
That was not concluded to be the perfect, rather it presents an improvement 
opportunity through the journey from Good to Excellent. Numerous and more 
granular analysis of SCT scores demonstrated 75% retention of the Null 
Hypothesis (distribution being the same across all groups in the comparison 
at the .050 significance level); 24 out of 32 comparative analyses. This was 
concluded to be confirmation of the Operator organisation clear 
communication and effective implementation of its safety message ‘Nothing 
is so urgent or important that cannot take the time to do it safely.’ 
 
Undertaking non-parametric statistical analysis for the total Psychological 
Capital Questionnaire (PCQ) demonstrated that there was no statistical 
difference (at the .050 significance level) between Operator, Contractor or 
Sub-contractor personnel. An equivalent result was obtained when examining 
PCQ scores based on experience years in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry. 
However, a statistically significant difference (at the .050 significance level) 
was recorded between leaders of 2 or more people and individual contributors 
from the Contractor group, the former having higher total PCQ. 
 
The final non-parametric statistical analysis conducted on the Workforce 
Offshore Safety Study data involved correlation. Positive-medium correlation 
was found disclosed between SCT and ALQ-Rater scores (r = .434), SCT and 
PCQ scores (r = .433). ALQ and PCQ were disclosed to also have a medium-
positive correlation (r = .355). Both ALQ and PCQ were concluded, as 
antecedents, to exert a positive influence on SCT.  
 
One key conclusion drawn from the research data obtained, both qualitative 
and quantitative) was that while it was possible to identify the Operator, 
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Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations within a typical Oil & Gas 
industry value chain to Miles and Snow (1978) typologies (Defender, 
Prospector, Analyzer, and Reactor), the typology had little or no influence on 
measured safety climate offshore assets. The causal factor was identified to 
be Operator insistence that all control of work systems implemented at the 
asset level were in accordance with its own established safety management 
governance, established policies, procedures, and work instructions. This 
appears to have been reinforced by a simple but clear safety message 
(‘Nothing is so urgent or important that we cannot take the time to do it 
safely’) accompanied by a further clearly communicated safety expectation 
(‘Always Professional, Always in Control, every work site, every task, every 
day’). 
 
5.3 ORGANISATIONAL TYPOLOGY, SAFETY STRATEGY, AND HUMAN 
FACTORS SENSE MAKING 
The focus areas of organisational typology and safety strategy, both safety 
performance outcome influencing, was collected through purposive semi-
structured interviews conducted onshore. In total, 39 individuals were 
interviewed from a target of 45 after theoretical saturation had been reached 
and the researcher considered that sufficient data had been obtained to 
deliver a reasonably rigorous claim of true representation (Glaser, 1992; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The outcome of the purposive sampling exercise 
was considered appropriately aligned with the conclusions of Ritchie et al. 
(2003: 84) who noted that qualitative samples are often under 50. The 
sample population comprised representatives from middle and senior 
management from Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations 
within the Operators value chain. All interviewees had personnel working on 
offshore assets for or on behalf of the Operator. They all had engineering or 
science backgrounds; none were professional economists or strategists. 
 
Utilising the typology definitions from Miles and Snow (1978) and from the 
Operator responses provided on the anonymous marking grid an 
organisational typology pattern emerged across the Operator value chain. 
76% of interviewees identified with a Defender-type organisation. According 
to Miles and Snow (ibid) Defenders are organisations that operate in an 
environment with narrow product-market domains; in the case of the 
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organisation being researched, oil and gas, with no diversification into other 
energy market domains such as renewables. Given the narrow focus, such an 
organisation infrequently requires major adjustment to technology, structure, 
or operational processes; the latter being centred around compliance with 
The Offshore Installations (Offshore Safety Directive) (Safety Case etc.) 
Regulations 2015. The primary attention of a Defender-type organisation is 
with improving efficiency of the existing operations given that the primary 
assets of an Exploration and Production (E&P) company are its economically 
viable hydrocarbon reserves (Howard and Harp, 2009), essential to 
sustaining market position. The remaining 24% identified as falling between 
Defender and Prospector-type organisations. Prospectors are defined by Miles 
and Snow (ibid) to be almost continually searching for market opportunities, 
regularly experimenting with potential responses to emerging environmental 
trends. Due to the strong concern for product and market innovation, 
Prospector organisations are usually not entirely efficient. It may have been 
the turbulence in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas industry, the regular re-
organisation and frequent change the Operator organisation experienced 
since the oil price downturn of 2015 (Figure 5.1) that resulted in the between 
Defender and Prospector selection from some interviewees.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Crude Oil Prices: Brent 2014-2019 (based upon Statista 2019) 
 
The oil price downturn was a significant environmental condition requiring 
response and adjustment to avoid extinction. 
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If the between Defender and Prospector selection was not oil price driven, it 
was an entirely plausible perception given that Miles and Snow (1978: 30) 
acknowledge that any one typology is unlikely to encompass every form of 
organisational behaviour given that that the world of organisations is “too 
changeable and complex to permit such a claim”. 
 
Operator interviewees declared no awareness of a single documented safety 
strategy however, it was unanimously confirmed that the Operator had clearly 
documented safety goals and performance targets that were confirmed, 
monitored, and regularly adjusted, and formally re-established on an annual 
basis. The apparent lack of a documented safety strategy, a ‘1-page Safety 
Plan’ was not considered to be problematic, rather it confirmed the position 
concluded in seminal strategy and strategic content research that in 
organisational settings there may not be one plan, ploy, search for position, 
pattern or perspective but many (formal and informal) among key influencers 
each presenting a variety of plans, positions, and perspectives (Mintzberg, 
1987; Hax, 1990; Moncrieff, 1999; Peattie, 1993). Safety measures, both 
leading and lagging were stated to be included in the Operators business 
scorecard, which in turn, was aligned with the corporate and global 
organisation. The business scorecard was central to the organisations (global) 
variable incentive bonus scheme with safety performance as a key component 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 1996; 2006). Safety performance metrics were 
said to be under continual review but there was a formal quarterly Safety 
Assurance Board process established for the UK President and Top 
Management to review performance and make strategic adjustments as 
required. Interviewees considered safety strategy to be effectively 
communicated through goals and objectives and executed through safety 
management governance documented in the Operating Management System. 
Key in the communication of safety strategy was stated to be two statements. 
Firstly, that ‘No job is so urgent or important that we can’t take time to do it 
safely’. Secondly, the need to be ‘Always Professional, Always in Control, 
every work site, every task, every day’. These messages were said to be 
consistent and highly visible both onshore and offshore. 
 
Vogt et al. (2010) considered that a balanced scorecard approach to Human 
Factors (HF) within safety strategy would provide a means of identifying 
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enablers of safety, plus a means of systematically allocating resources to 
them. From Operator interviewees it was confirmed that HF metrics were not 
included as either leading or lagging metrics within the safety element of the 
business scorecard. With this lack of formal inclusion in the business 
scorecard, entirely possible with the modified Business Scorecard (Kaplan and 
Norton, 2006), it was concluded that Operator’s capability for enhanced 
delivery of business benefit through increased efficiency and the prevention 
of accidents in the workplace would be reduced. HF inclusion within the 
documented Operating Management System, was said to be at a high rather 
than detailed level. HF was also recognised within the Operator accident 
investigation procedure regarding the identification of human causes of 
accidents and incidents. The procedure was said to require HF analysis as an 
important part of the investigation process, recognising that human 
behaviour should be considered alongside technical causal factors during an 
investigation. None of the interviewees recognised the dynamics of social 
interaction to be an element of HF with the ability to defeat safety barriers 
(Storseth et al., 2014) resulting in accident, incident and MAH. While 
behaviours were considered as part of accident investigation, psychological 
or social dynamic issues were stated not to be considered. 
 
Interviewees from Contractor organisations predominantly (74%) aligned 
with the Prospector-type organisation (Miles and Snow, 1978) with 13% 
identifying a between Prospector and Defender and 13% as Defender-type. 
As stated previously, Defenders are organisations that operate in an 
environment with narrow product-market domains while Prospectors are 
almost continually searching for market opportunities, regularly 
experimenting with potential responses to emerging environmental trends. 
Unlike the Operator organisation operating in a single product-market domain 
(hydrocarbons) all the Contractor organisations represented through semi-
structured interview worked across multiple industrial and service sectors 
such as: chemicals and refining; mining and minerals; civil engineering and 
infrastructure; power generation. In addition to holding diverse portfolios, 
several of the Contractor organisations worked on an international basis, 
more than rivalling the Operator organisation in terms of personnel employed 
and market capitalisation. The conclusion drawn was the diversity of product-
market domains influenced the typology identification by interviewees, 
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skewing the selection towards Prospector. Again, for those interviewees 
selecting an in between Prospector and Defender position Miles and Snow 
(1978) acknowledged that any one typology is unlikely to encompass every 
form of organisational behaviour. A similar perspective was provided from 
Contractor interviewees about safety strategy as had been presented by 
interviewees from the Operator organisation. Safety was clearly understood 
to be a strong organisational value in all cases but [like the Operator] none 
of the interviewees recalled seeing a stand-alone safety strategy document 
within their own organisations. Rather safety strategy was communicated 
through plans, goals, targets, and established safety management systems 
(Mintzberg, 1987; Hax, 1990; Peattie, 1993; and Moncrieff, 1999;). The 
existence of safety performance as part of a balanced scorecard for each of 
the organisation represented by interviewees was acknowledged. However, 
the safety measurements included within the scorecard (verified through 
review of Company Annual Reports) were lagging in nature. For example, 
Lost Time Injury (LTI), and Recordable Injury (RI) Frequency rates. In 
utilising a more traditional balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 
1996) with limited (and only lagging) safety performance metrics the 
strategic performance measurement system may be reduced in effectiveness 
as the organisations are confronted with unpredictable and unstable 
environmental conditions (Stacey, 1995; Combe and Botschen, 2001; 
Casertano, 2013; and Ermida 2014), typified by the recent turbulent oil prices 
as depicted in Figure 5.1. All interviewees confirmed that the Operator safety 
strategy messages of ‘No job is so urgent or important that we can’t take 
time to do it safely’. Secondly, the need to be ‘Always Professional, Always in 
Control, every work site, every task, every day’ resonated through the 
contractual engagement, both onshore and offshore. Specifically, it was noted 
that at the offshore asset level, the Operator control of work arrangements 
take primacy. 
 
All Contractor personnel interviewed confirmed that there was no specific 
mention of Human Factors within strategy or on the business scorecard. The 
Contractor organisations retained a similar perspective to HF within accident 
investigations as the Operator organisation. Similarly, the dynamics of social 
interaction and psychological forces were not recognised to be an element of 
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HF with the ability to defeat safety barriers resulting in accident, incident and 
MAH events. 
 
Considering organisational typology within the Sub-contractor group, 58% of 
interviewees identified with an Analyzer-type organisation, 27% a Reactor-
type and the remaining 15% falling between the Analyzer and Reactor 
typologies (Miles and Snow, 1978). The researcher considered the 
identification outcome to be reflective of organisational diversity and broad 
spectrum of organisational specialisms that included small and medium sized 
enterprises (SME) with fewer than 250-employees, micro-businesses with 
fewer than 9-employees, through to self-employed personnel working on a 
sub-contract basis through a Limited Company status. From Sub-contractor 
personnel interviewed there was less awareness around safety strategy. 
Interviewees from micro-business and Limited Company Sub-contractors 
confirmed that their organisations had no safety strategy established, 
documented, and communicated but all were stated to have safety 
performance goals and targets. These organisations were concluded to likely 
have reduced sustainable competitive advantage due to simpler or less 
developed strategic capabilities (Barney, 1991). All but the micro-businesses 
and Limited Company Sub-contractors had documented safety management 
systems to implement safety strategy, potentially reducing their sustainable 
competitive advantage further. Working entirely for Operator or Contract 
organisations they were engaged on the basis of their technical competencies 
and the most important thing was to follow the safety management 
governance and control of work arrangements provided by the organisation 
that they were working for. In a similar manner to Contractor personnel, 
interviewees presented with a strong awareness of Operator safety strategy 
messages of ‘No job is so urgent or important that we can’t take time to do 
it safely’. Secondly, the need to be ‘Always Professional, Always in Control, 
every work site, every task, every day’ resonated through the contractual 
engagement, both onshore and offshore. Again, it was noted that at the 
offshore asset level, the Operator control of work arrangements take primacy. 
 
Within the Sub-contractor interview group, the majority of interviewees 
confirmed that their awareness and knowledge of Human Factors had been 
gained from experiences working for the Operator organisation. None had 
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any HF content to business scorecards (in the event they had been 
established). The means of avoiding normalisation of warnings, consensus 
mode decision making, confirmation bias, and group think was confirmed by 
most interviewees to be achieved through following Operator control of work 
arrangements and staying inside the safety triangle. 
 
In conclusion for Organisational Typology and Safety Strategy, the Operator 
organisation interviewees strongly aligned (76%) alignment with the 
Defender typology. The interviewees presented a clear indication of safety 
strategy, not documented as a single item but rather presented as a series 
of plans, positions, and perspectives. A balanced scorecard was said to 
utilised within the UK organisation aligned the corporate entity, with safety 
performance metrics (both leading and lagging) as a key component of the 
construct along with ongoing Top Management review. Safety performance 
was seen to be considered as a key strategic driver with determined 
propensity for providing competitive advantage. For Contractor organisations 
there was a clear alignment with Prospector typology (74%). As per the 
Operator organisation there was a clear indication of safety strategy 
presented as a series of plans, positions, and perspectives. Although safety 
performance measures were said to be included in a balanced scorecard they 
were only lagging in nature. Thus, there was potential for reduced 
effectiveness in determining strategy implementation effectiveness during 
periods of unstable environmental conditions as typified by the sustained low 
market oil price. Finally, for Sub-contractor organisations it was concluded 
that strategy capabilities were divided predominantly between 58% of 
interviewees identified with an Analyzer-type organisation (58%) and 
Reactor-type (27%). From semi-structured interview responses, it was clear 
that as the progression was followed from SME Sub-contractors through to 
micro-business and self-employed persons the typology identification 
travelled from Analyzer to Reactor; strategy formalisation and establishment 
appeared to reduce accordingly along with, consequently, reduced 
sustainable strategic capabilities. Through lack of developed safety strategy, 
combined with a lack of identification of HF as a means of preventing accident 
and incident, the Sub-contractor organisations presented with reduced ability 
of delivering HF competitive advantage to the Operator value chain (Vogt et 
al., 2010). 
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The most significant conclusion from semi-structured interviews considering 
organisational typology and safety strategy was that for Contractor and Sub-
contractor organisations, their typology has little or no impact on safety 
management and safety performance on the Operator assets given 
confirmation that all control of work on the assets is under Operator control. 
Contractor and Sub-contractor personnel are expected to be 100% compliant 
with the Operator’s control of work requirements. Although Contractor and 
Sub-contractor organisations are typically subject to an evaluation and 
selection process (normally risk-based), HSE Auditor interviewed confirmed 
that audits conducted were: safety management system standard based, for 
example ISO 45001:2018; compliance orientated; strategy reviews were 
restricted to goals, objectives; targets; and plans to achieve them. Further, 
HF content was restricted to competence assessment based on education, 
training, skills, and experience; there was no HF consideration beyond a 
[biased] technical component. Industry established guidance does little to 
discourage such practices, for example the Tender Efficiency Framework 
(OGUK, 2017), and the NORSOK Standards S-WA-006 HSE-evaluation of 
contractors’ standard. 
 
5.4 PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL SENSE MAKING 
 
Results from semi-structured interviews led to the conclusion that the typical 
UK Offshore Oil & Gas Operator value chain relied heavily on the traditional 
sources of competitive advantage, namely financial, structural, and physical, 
plus technological capital (Luthans and Youssef, 2004). From an Operator, 
Contractor, or Sub-contractor perspective prevention of accidents and Major 
Accident Hazard (MAH) events is through effective control of work systems 
being deployed and complied with on offshore assets. The Operator 
organisation establishes control of work systems and everyone working on 
the assets must rigidly comply, whether Operator, Contractor or Sub-
contractor personnel. Reference was frequently made by all value chain group 
interviewees to the to follow the Safety Triangle and work within the Law, 
follow correct policies and procedures (the Operator control of work 
arrangements), and to work within their own level of competence and 
training. Some support is provided through OIM ‘Green Hat’ inductions talks 
to fist time arrivals onboard an asset; here the Operator organisation safety 
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message and expectations are delivered by senior management offshore. In 
the workplace the additional expectation is for the workforce to help 
themselves and others ‘stay safe’ by exerting the Stop Work Authority plus 
engage in Safety Conversation and Observation Card process. 
 
At best it was deduced from semi-structured interview that there was some 
element of Human Capital Management (Luthans and Youssef, 2004) taking 
place across the Defender, Prospector, and Analyzer organisation types 
typologies. The larger the organisational entity (Operator and Contractor) the 
more evidence was presented at interview. For example, Human Resource 
functions to coordinate selection processes, training and development, and 
tacit knowledge building through competence assurance activity. Towards the 
micro-business and self-employed individuals (predominantly identifying as 
Reactor-type organisations) there appeared to be little Human Capital 
Management with interviewees confirming they were selected for working 
assignments based on their competence levels reflected through education, 
training, skills, and experience. There was also some evidence of Social 
Capital Management particularly with Defender and Prospector-type 
organisations reflected through open communication channels and cross-
functional teams. On offshore assets, all persons onboard are encouraged to 
participate in Stop Work Authority without fear of adverse consequences; 
also, participation in the safety Conversation and Observation Card process. 
However, the work-life balance aspect of Social Capital Management (Luthans 
and Youssef, ibid) was not examined within the research undertaken. From 
critical literature review it was understood that it is possible to distinguish 
psychological capital (PsyCap) from other forms of people related capital 
(Lorenz et al., 2016). Human Capital as mentioned relates to a person’s stock 
holding of knowledge skills and experience that may be enhanced through 
experience plus investment in training; this investment was detected. Social 
Capital is represented in the aggregate of actual or potential resources 
connected to the holding of a sustainable network of relationships was also 
detected from interview. Psychological capital (Luthans and Youssef-Morgan, 
2017) with its component elements of efficacy, hope, self- resilience, and 
optimism did not appear to be subject to management by any of the 
typologies identified within the value chain, with one exception. Management 
of the PsyCap feature of Hope includes goal setting. All interviewees except 
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self-employed personnel operating as Sub-contractors confirmed 
participation in annual goal setting processes. The HSE Auditors in both 
Auditor and Contractor semi-structured interviews confirmed that when 
conducting audits internally, or externally on supply chain organisations, 
PsyCap, psychological forces (position, pressure, power) and the dynamics of 
social interaction had never been considered when auditing topics such 
hazard analysis, hazard identification, risk assessment and risk control. 
 
There is no established Low/Medium/High scoring mechanism established for 
the Psychological Capital Questionnaire as included in the Offshore Workforce 
Safety Study. As per the instructions received with the Academic Licence each 
feature (subscale: efficacy; hope; resilience; and optimism) is calculated by 
the mean of all the items in the subscale. The overall PsyCap score was to be 
calculated by taking the mean of all the items in the PCQ. Three groups of 
non-parametric statistical analysis were conducted to search for statistical 
difference in PCQ scores. Firstly, it was calculated that there was no 
statistically significant difference in total PCQ level between the three 
workforce groupings of Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor. The 
workforce grouping analysis was repeated to provide granularity at the 
feature level (efficacy; hope; resilience; and optimism) and, again, no 
statistically significant difference was calculated.  
 
Statistical analysis for differences between leaders of 2 or more people versus 
individual contributors within each of the work groups. No difference was 
recorded for personnel from the Operator organisation. For Contractor 
personnel a statistically significant difference was noted between the two 
groups with leaders of 2 or more people having a higher average PCQ score 
than individual contributors. No statistical difference was noted for this 
analysis when repeated for Sub-contract personnel. Finally, a non-parametric 
Independent-Samples test was conducted based upon experience length 
within the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry. There was no statistically 
significant difference noted between the five experience groupings ranging 
from less than 1-year to greater than 10-years. 
 
The relative consistency of PsyCap scores obtained from the Offshore 
Workforce Safety Study was concluded to be reflective of the lack of 
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psychological capital management across the value chain. The researcher had 
anticipated individuals with lesser industry experience to [perhaps] have a 
lower total PsyCap score than personnel with longer industry experience. Due 
to lack of PsyCap management it may be considered that once a certain level 
of PsyCap has been reached it becomes maintained through repeat work 
experiences rather than developed and increased through active 
management (Luthans and Yousseff, 2004). It was concluded that since there 
was no statistically significant difference between total PsyCap scores 
between Operator, Contractor, and Sub-contractor groupings, none at the 
experience level, the potential loss of competitive advantage through lack of 
Human Capital Management exists across the value chain and within each 
organisational typology (Miles and Snow, 1978). 
 
5.5 ORGANISATIONAL TYPOLOGY AND SAFETY LEADERSHIP SENSE 
MAKING 
 
Operator personnel who, as a group identified 76% as a Defender-type 
organisation, stated that the organisation desired to put leaders onto offshore 
assets who were aligned with the organisations ethics and values and who 
provided strong safety focus. This was confirmed not to result directly from 
inclusion in strategy or a metric on the scorecard. Rather, a safety strategy 
enabler to deliver positive safety outcomes and performance. The Operator 
had established [globally] a programme of well-defined leadership 
competencies but safety, as a core organisational value, was stated to be 
intrinsic to leadership training rather than a stand-alone programme. The 
researcher concluded that aspects of authentic leadership attributes 
(transparency, internalised moral/ethical perspective, balanced processing, 
and self-awareness) were visible from the identified leadership competency 
elements, but that safety leadership was driven through the organisational 
value position on safety. The annual performance appraisal system was 
confirmed to be the only means of assessing leadership effectiveness. Beyond 
appraisal, the assessment of safety leadership effectiveness appeared to be 
reliant on the outcomes from accident and incident investigations, whether 
failure in safety leadership had been a direct or contributory cause. 
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HSE Auditors interviewed from both Operator and Contractor organisations 
confirmed that leadership was a regular audit topic both internally and 
externally, but primarily from a standards compliance perspective given that 
published safety management standards contain requirements relating to 
Leadership, for example Section 5.1. of ISO 45001:2008 (Leadership and 
commitment). Auditors for the Operator organisation confirmed that no 
investigation of Operator Leadership Competencies was included within 
Operator internal HSE audits. Both Auditor interviewees confirmed that the 
audits conducted did not result in the identification of safety leadership types 
deployed by the auditee organisation, for example authentic, charismatic, 
transactional, or transformational. 
 
Personnel interviewed from Contractor organisations (74% Prospector-type) 
provided similar responses to those received from Operator interviewees. 
Safety as an organisational value was not a stand-alone training programme, 
rather safety was intrinsic to other leadership training activities. 
Improvement in lagging safety performance metrics was also identified to be 
a measure of safety leadership effectiveness. Associated with this, several 
interviewees confirmed that their employing organisations also evaluated 
safety leadership by measuring and monitoring leaders’ engagement [and 
visibility] in safety related activities, for example conducting asset and work 
site visits, participation in safety audits, safety inspections and verifications. 
Effective engagement was said to be assessed through individual 
performance appraisal. 
 
Due to the range of different organisations represented in the Sub-contractor 
grouping (58% Analyzer-type and 27% Reactor-type. Sub-contractors 
interviewed frequently commented that they were engaged based on their 
engineering and technical competencies, not their leadership skills. 
 
Quantitative data analysis of the Authentic Leadership Questionnaire (ALQ) 
was analysed by a variety of non-parametric Independent-Samples Tests. 
There were two versions of the ALQ, firstly where individuals were asked to 
rate their supervisor, and secondly where leaders of 2 or more people were 
asked to rate their own perceived leadership skills. A variety of test 
comparisons were performed considering total ALQ score plus scores obtained 
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at the feature level, with a number of statistically significant differences being 
observed, each of which may be considered as potential improvement 
opportunities for leader and follower ALQ improvement across the value 
chain.  
 
Most significantly and in terms of total ALQ scoring, a statistically significant 
difference was calculated between the two independent sample groups where 
leaders of 2 or more people perceived their leaders to possess more authentic 
leader traits than individual contributors perceived their own leaders to 
possess. In another analysis, stripping the leaders of 2 or more people out of 
the ALQ-rating data (to ensure they did not feature in both groups being 
analysed; a non-parametric data analysis rule) and conducting a comparison 
of rater versus self-rater there was again a statistically significant difference 
noted with self-rater holding a higher total ALQ score across all work groups, 
Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor. The conclusion drawn was that 
leaders consider themselves to be more authentic in leadership attributes 
than their followers perceive them to be. With Neilsen et al. (2011) 
considering the four elements of authentic leadership (transparency, 
internalised moral perspective, balanced processing, and self-awareness) 
contribute to worker hazard perception and risk perception, the reality for the 
assets in the sample population and manifest through the Operator, 
Contractor and Sub-contractor working population is that the contribution to 
key hazard and risk perception may be unknowingly diminished. Increased 
potential for accidents in the offshore workplaces may remain undetected 
until too late. This scenario typifies why the use of ALQ measurements as a 
leading indicator of safety may prevent future lagging statistics. Also, Eid et 
al. (2012) considered that authentic leadership may be positively related to 
PsyCap due to followers who perceive their leaders to be more authentic will 
in addition, experience emotional and motivational states corresponding to 
the PsyCap features of self-efficacy, hope, resilience, and optimism. This 
considered effect will be limited if leaders are less authentic than they believe 
themselves to be and Human Capital Management is under-developed, 
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5.6 OFFSHORE ASSET SAFETY CLIMATE SENSEMAKING 
 
The Safety Climate Tool (SCT) provided a rich data set for research analysis. 
Upon charting the eight SCT factors for all seven surveyed offshore assets, 
the radar plot displayed a picture of near parity. To gain an improved 
understanding of measured safety climate strength, the Health and Safety 
Laboratory (HSL) (developers of the SCT) performance groupings were 
utilised. The categories had been designated as Poor (<35%), Average 
(≥35% to <65%), Good (≥65% to <90%), and Excellent (≥90%). The range 
of total SCT scores across the asset group was 73.95% to 79.42% therefore 
all securely in the ‘Good’ range. Utilising a non-parametric Independent-
Samples comparative test it was deduced that there was no statistically 
significant difference between the seven assets’ SCT scores. 
 
A range of more granular Independent-Sample comparative tests were 
conducted to examine and detect variation at the SCT feature level: SCT 
features per asset; SCT features per Operator, Contractor, and Sub-
contractor; SCT features per leader of 2 or more people and individual 
contributor; and finally SCT features per UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry 
experience. Although there were a number of instances where the Null 
Hypothesis of the same distribution across the independent groupings (at the 
.050 significance level) was rejected, for the SCT analytical tests run the Null 
Hypothesis was retained on 75% occasions. This was considered to support 
the initial finding that there was no deduced statistically significant difference 
in the SCT scores across the assets included in the research activity. 
 
O’Connor et al. (2011) recognised the usefulness of safety climate 
questionnaires as an effective tool for measuring safety climate perception. 
Payne et al. (2009) considered safety climate assessments as being capable 
of highlighting where threats to safety lie in an organisation (not to be 
underestimated in a Major Accident Hazard environment) permitting the 
targeting of intervention resources. Mearns et al. (2001) consider safety 
climate to be an important element of organisational reliability. Zohar (2003 
and 2010) concludes that 30 years of research has validated the use of safety 
climate as a robust leading indicator of safety performance. These references, 
if not testimonials, speak to the importance of safety climate measurements 
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hence their inclusion in the research conducted. The Operator organisation 
whose typical UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry value chain was the subject of 
research may be pleased with the ‘Good’ safety climate measurement score 
achieved. However. ‘Good’ presents an opportunity for advancing to 
‘Excellent’ given the Moral, Legal and Financial basis of Health and Safety 
Management (think Piper Alpha). The catalyst for improvement was 
considered to lie in the authentic leadership and psychological capital 
discoveries made during the research undertaken 
 
Considering the quantitative and qualitative data obtained through research 
it was concluded that the ‘Good’ SCT scores obtained across the seven 
sampled assets was significantly due to the Operator organisations insistence 
on 100% compliance with their control of work arrangements plus the clearly 
communicated safety strategy message (a safety culture artefact) that ‘No 
job is so urgent or important that we can’t take time to do it safely’ combined 
with the clearly stated safety expectation of the need to be ‘Always 
Professional, Always in Control, every work site, every task, every day’. 
Intended to be authentic and inspirational, the messages are strangely 
transactional. Confirmed through semi-structured interview the messages at 
times were perceived to mean ‘comply or there will be adverse 
consequences.’ 
 
5.7 LEADERSHIP, PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL, AND SAFETY CLIMATE 
CORRELATIONS 
 
Zohar (2003 and 2010) concluded that 30 years of research has validated the 
use of safety climate as a robust leading indicator of safety performance. 
Factors that positively influence safety climate perception are likely to 
influence positive safety outcomes. To that end, non-parametric data 
correlation analysis was conducted for SCT and ALQ-Rater scores, 
determining for the sample population a positive medium correlation between 
the two constructs; a stronger ALQ will influence a stronger safety climate 
perception, with a positive safety climate leading to improvements in hazard 
recognition and improvements in risk perception (Pandit et al., 2019),  
potentially leading to accident and incident reduction plus increased 
organisational reliability (Mearns et al., 2001). From the research conducted 
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it may be reasonably concluded that improvements in ALQ scoring 
(development in transparency, moral perspective, balanced processing, and 
self-awareness) may in the future assist in raising the eight safety climate 
factors for the seven researched assets from the observed HSL ‘Good’ 
gradings to ‘Excellent’. 
 
Non-parametric analysis was also conducted on the SCT and PCQ scores. Like 
the SCT and ALQ correlation, a medium positive correlation was achieved for 
SCT and PCQ scores; a stronger PCQ will influence the generation of a 
stronger safety culture. Established from the research, it was evident that a 
lack of investment in Human Capital Management had a negative impact on 
PsyCap development (Lorenz et al., 2016). It may also therefore be 
reasonably concluded that resources applied to Human Capital Management, 
ergo PsyCap development will have a commensurate positive effect on safety 
climate perception. 
 
A final correlation was calculated for PCQ and ALQ and deduced to be 
medium-positive also. However, although positive, the correlation coefficient 
calculated determined that the relation between the two constructs was not 
as strong as it was each individually with the SCT. What could not be 
determined from the research conducted was does PsyCap mediate the 
relationship between ALQ and SCT or is ALQ the mediator between PsyCap 
and SCT. Also, it could not be determined whether ALQ was an antecedent of 
PsyCap or vice versa. Both cases present a possible future research 
opportunity. 
 
5.8 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The outcome of the research activities described in sections 5.1 to 5.5 were 
related to each of the established research objectives in turn. Saunders et al. 
(2009) considered that to deliver the necessary level of precision with 
research, the development of research objectives is required to stimulate a 
greater degree of rigorous thinking, derived through use of more formal 
language. The outcome of the research activities undertaken were related to 
each of the established research objectives in turn. 
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Objective 1: To determine the extent of the influence exerted by 
organisational typology on the construction of safety strategy as an aligned 
element of overall organisational strategy. 
 
From semi-structured interview, only Defender and Prospector organisation 
typologies (deduced as Operator and Contractor organisations) gave 
indication of safety strategy being aligned with overall organisational 
strategy. Interviewees confirmed that some form of balanced scorecards were 
in play linking safety strategy to organisational strategy. The Operator 
highest-level scorecard included both leading and lagging safety performance 
data. Contractor interviewees confirmed that their highest-level scorecards 
relied on lagging safety performance data only. In both cases, safety strategy 
as expressed through policies, plans and procedures (Andrews, 1971; Hofer 
and Schen-del, 1978; and James, 1984) containing both leading and lagging 
safety performance measures were very regularly reviewed through daily, 
weekly, and monthly meetings. 
 
For Sub-contractors, deduced Analyser and Reactor type organisations, the 
safety and organisational strategy picture was very diverse. SME organisation 
interviewees emphasised their employing organisations reliance on third 
party certification to safety management system standards, including setting 
and managing goals, targets, and objectives. Interviewee’s from micro-
businesses and self-employed persons confirmed an absence of safety 
strategy, engagement based on niche skills, plus total reliance on the 
Operator company management system requirements. 
 
Boswell et al. (2006) reasoned that effective strategic safety management 
and decision making, when combined with line of sight (LOS) considerations, 
would be effective in connecting functional level Human Factors activity with 
business and corporate level goals and objectives. From the research data 
collected and anlaysed this consideration is, at best, being achieved within 
the Defender and Prospector organisation types identified. The first research 
objective was considered satisfied through data collected and finding results. 
Objective 2: To establish whether the psychological forces component of 
Human Factors is embraced within constructed safety strategies, considering 
psychological capital as an antecedent of safety focused behaviour.  
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Considering safety strategy to be expressed through policies, plans and 
procedures (Andrews, 1971; Hofer and Schen-del, 1978; and James, 1984), 
semis-structured interviews determined HF was only present in the safety 
strategy of Defender and Prospector organisational typologies (Operator and 
Contractor).  It was confirmed that there was some HF inclusion within safety 
management system procedures for both groups within the value chain, for 
example within Operator Asset Safety cases, but it is typically very high level 
and aimed at positively influencing Hazard Identification only. Several of the 
interviewees stated that HF is acknowledged within their employing 
organisation’s incident investigation procedure with regard to identifying 
human causes of accidents and incidents where HF analysis is intended to 
form an important part of the investigation process, recognising that human 
behaviour should be considered alongside technical causal factors during an 
investigation. None of the interviewees gave recognition that the dynamics of 
social interaction plus psychological forces as an element of HF possess a 
recognised ability to defeat safety barriers (Storseth et al., 2014). 
 
Dul and Nuemann (2009) suggested that by connecting HF to organisational 
strategy, a positive motivation for the application of HF may be created. Such 
a perspective may promulgate improvements in overall business system 
performance as well as in safety performance. From the research conducted 
it was concluded that the knowledge of HF across the value chain was not 
mature. The lack of inclusion in safety strategy, linked to overall business 
strategy was likely to be a limiting factor with regard to both safety 
performance (Zohar, 2003 and 2010) and organisational competitiveness 
(Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2009; Marimuthu et al., 2009; Unger et al., 2011; 
Diaz-Fernandez et al., 2014; and Kottaridi et al., 2019;). Until HF becomes 
fully embraced within safety strategy aligned with organisational strategy, 
improving safety performance as measured by safety climate from ‘Good’ to 
‘Excellent’ may not be operationally possible. The second research objective 
was considered satisfied through data collected and finding results. 
 
Objective 3: To describe the organisational typology associations with 
specific styles of safety leadership at the operational level on offshore assets 
during the lifecycle phases. 
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From critical literature review, authentic leadership was selected to be a 
primary point of focus because, with regard to matters of safety, the 
leadership style directly affects safety outcomes through the promotion of 
positive safety climate perceptions (Nielsen et al., 2011; Eid et al., 2012). 
There were no typology associations noted with other specific styles of safety 
leadership at the offshore assets, such as transformational leadership (Barling 
et al., 2002; Mullen and Kelloway, 2009; and Conchie, et al., 2011). All assets 
clearly identified authentic leadership traits however there were no 
statistically significant difference calculated between the different typology 
work grouping identified for Operator, Contractor, or Sub-contractor. The 
measurement tool deployed under academic licence was the Authentic 
Leadership Questionnaire which specifically looked for authentic leadership 
traits (transparency, moral/ethical, balanced processing, and self-
awareness). These traits were clearly identified as being present. The 
measurement tool was not designed to assess whether the leadership style 
presenting was purely authentic, or some other form of positive leadership 
style as mentioned above. Again, the research objective was considered 
satisfied through data collected and finding results. 
 
Objective 4: Determine how the preceding three aspects of safety strategy 
implementation combine to produce individual asset safety climate profiles. 
 
From the research data analysed there was no evidence produced to 
demonstrate that organisational typology for Operator, Contractor, or Sub-
contractor organisations influenced individual asset safety climate profiles. 
Despite typology profiles being clearly identified across the Operator value 
chain (Operators and Contractors as Defender and Prospector plus Sub-
contractors as Analyzer and Reactor type organisations) it was concluded that 
the strength of the Operator safety message was the over-arching influencing 
factor and not individual organisational typology. 
 
Psychological capital was positively correlated to safety climate scores as was 
the perception of authentic leadership traits. However, that lack of 
statistically significance between [both types of] score whether by asset, 
workforce grouping or experience in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry led 
to the conclusion that the mediating effect [power] of the Operator safety 
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message and safety expectations was consistently considered greater than 
the influence of psychological capital and authentic leadership on safety 
climate perceptions. The data produced appeared to give rise to a capping 
effect leaving safety climate consistently ‘Good’ across all seven assets. Good 
may not be good enough to prevent accidents occurring for ‘old’ reasons with 
new people (Hackitt, 2013) and therefore wholehearted reliance on the 
Operator safety message may impede organisations operating in the UK Oil 
& Gas Industry from implementing appropriate business strategies, 
supported by effective leadership. Psychological capital and authentic 
leadership were calculated to be positively correlated to each other (medium 
strength) although weaker than both individual constructs positively related 
to safety climate scores. It was not determined which of the constructs was 
the antecedent of the other, therefore identifying a possible area for future 
research. Based on the findings produced, the research objective was 
considered to have been satisfied through the data collected and findings 
determined. 
 
Objective 5: Determine whether safety performance as reflected through 
safety climate perception is driven by individual organisational typologies or 
by the Operator company overarching safety message. 
 
The mediating effect [power] of the Operator safety message and safety 
expectations was consistently considered greater than the influence of value 
chain organisational typology on psychological capital, authentic leadership, 
and safety climate perceptions within the offshore workforce across all seven 
of the Operator company’s assets sampled. Although commendable, when 
operationalised and re-considered it may be possible that the strict imposition 
of compliance (with inferred negative consequences through breach as 
mentioned in some semi-structured interviews) may be an impediment to 
progressing safety performance levels from ‘Good’ to ‘Excellent’. The working 
relationship between Operators, Contractors and Sub-contractors can be 
extremely complicated. Contractors and Sub-contractors frequently possess 
specialised skills that only they can safely and effectively manage; enforced 
compliance to the Operators safety message, and control of work systems 
may be inefficient and bureaucratically demanding with an inherent 
propensity to encourage violation through shortcuts. Blind compliance may 
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generate consistently ‘Good’ safety climate but may stifle innovation, 
efficiency, productivity and ultimately competitiveness (Fernandez-Muniz et 
al., 2009; Marimuthu et al., 2009; Unger et al., 2011; Diaz-Fernandez et al., 
2014; and Kottaridi et al., 2019;). The final research objective was considered 
to have been satisfied through the data collected and findings output. 
 
5.9 DATA AND FINDINGS CHALLENGES 
 
Chapter 3, section 3.7 provided detail on limitations anticipated during design 
of the research methodology. Conducting both the qualitative and 
quantitative data collection identified some additional challenges that had not 
been anticipated during the methodology design stage. Firstly, during semi-
structured interviews where participants had been selected through a non-
probability purposive sampling procedure based on the judgement of the 
researcher (Saunders et al., 2009) a significant number of no-show and late 
call-off from interview was experienced. This necessitated additional 
managers and supervisors being brought in for interview to the Sub-
contractor pool, where there were eventually more individuals interviewed 
from micro-businesses and self-employed personnel than had been identified 
in the original purposive sample by the researcher. Many of these individuals 
stated they were employed by the Operator company primarily based on 
personal and niche competencies; they were highly dependent on Operator 
management system requirements in the absence of any (other than 
statutory required governance) within their own employing organisations. 
The result led to a likely inflated identification with Reactor-type organisations 
(measured at 27%) and lowering of the Analyzer-type identification 
(measured at 58%). The researcher did not consider the challenge to have 
ultimately impacted the overall pattern of typology identification across the 
value chain given that no Sub-contractor personnel identified with Defender 
and Prospector organisation types. The second challenge encountered related 
to the conduct of the Offshore Workforce Safety Study conducted across 
sample assets A1 to A7. The data delivered, as per the researchers’ 
expectations, was extremely rich as evidenced by the quantitative data 
analysis presented in chapter 4. However, research approval did not come 
with the ability to travel offshore to conduct any form of follow-up interview, 
for example structured, semi-structured, or focus group interviews (Saunders 
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et al., 2009; Bryman, 2012). The logistics and costs associated with [at least] 
seven offshore trips could not be supported [understandably] by the Operator 
organisation, not least because helicopter seats and asset bed space offshore 
are typically in high demand operationally. There was no other funding 
available to expense the offshore travel should flights and accommodation 
have been made available. Had offshore visits been possible, interviews 
conducted may have provided more granular data to inform why, for 
example: there was no statistical difference at the 0.50 significance level in 
psychological capital based on duration of Offshore UK Oil & Gas Industry 
experience; similarly, there was no statistically significant difference between 
psychological capital for the three workforce groupings of Operator, 
Contractor, and Sub-contractor; and why did Leaders of two or more people 
identify that they possessed greater authentic leadership characteristics in 
themselves than their followers perceived – a fact determined to be 
statistically significantly different at the 0.50 significance level. The 
researcher did not consider the lack of travel and interview permission to 
reduce the validity of the research undertaken, the deduced findings, and 
subsequent conclusion. However, with interview, the findings may have led 
to enhanced conclusions, possibly additional areas for future research, and 
some additional recommendations to stimulate improvement in safety 
performance at offshore assets. 
 
5.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter presented to the reader a discussion and evaluation of the 
research findings obtained from the adopted pragmatic research philosophy 
and the established triangulation methodology. The research findings were 
considered in context with the key literature review features and emergent 
content to deliver satisfaction of the research objectives. Finally, additional 
limitations experienced with data and findings were presented. The following 
chapter will present to the reader conclusions drawn from the research 
undertaken and identify the unique contribution of the research study to 
safety practice, safety science knowledge, and research methods. The final 
chapter will also make suggestions for possible future safety science research.  
 
*** *** *** 
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CHAPTER 6 




By way of conclusion and following the discussion and sense making 
documented in chapter five, this chapter will inform the reader of the research 
conclusions drawn to demonstrate satisfaction of the research aim: 
 
‘Explore the ways in which organisational typology, strategy, leadership, and 
psychological forces contribute to safety performance’. 
 
Additionally, the chapter will outline the unique contribution the research has 
made to professional practice, safety science knowledge, plus research 
methodology. The chapter will also proffer some recommendations for safety 
management practice and suggest areas for future safety science research.  
 
6.1  RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
 
Following generation of the original research idea and establishment of the 
aim, the research process commenced with the generation of six general 
focus research questions. These were subsequently utilised to provide the 
basis for research objective development, creating greater specificity in the 
research undertaken (Saunders et al., 2009; and Bryman, 2012) and to direct 
the literature review. By utilising a data triangulation approach, the 
Researcher took the opportunity to make an original and unique contribution 
to safety science by examining the research aim through different means 
(both quantitative and qualitative) as part of a mixed methods study. This 
has been demonstrably achieved through the data collected and analysed 
(chapter 4) with the findings subsequently discussed and evaluated (chapter 
5). From research, four clear conclusions were drawn. 
 
Firstly, utilising the Miles and Snow (1978) seminal model of organisational 
typology it was possible to determine the organisational typology makeup for 
a typical UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry value chain, comprising Operator, 
Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations. This determination has not 
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been conducted previously. Knowing the characteristics (advantages and 
disadvantages) of the four typologies may provide opportunities for supply 
chain management across the value chain leading to safety improvement at 
offshore assets. For example, comprehensive understanding of organisational 
typologies making up an Operator company’s value chain, the propensity for 
improving horizontal collaboration relationships (in this case around safety 
performance) is likely to increase. Determining meaningful understanding of 
the typology characteristics of companies that make up the value chain, the 
advantages, disadvantages, and likely behaviour patterns associated with 
each type (Defender, Prospector, Analyzer, and Reactor) provides greater 
likelihood of achieving improved safety strategy alignment; ultimately leading 
to improved safety performance on offshore assets. 
 
Secondly, organisational typology does not influence safety performance on 
offshore assets as measured through safety climate perception scores. There 
was no statistically significant difference calculated between the three work 
groups of Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations comprising 
the four Miles and Snow (1978) typologies. Except for Operator company 
personnel, who are used to following the governance because it is their 
operating management system, the typology held by an individual’s 
employing organisation becomes essentially irrelevant. Once offshore, the 
controlling influence becomes the Operating company’s control of work 
arrangements that must be complied with. 
 
The third conclusion considered both authentic leadership and psychological 
capital to be positively correlated with safety performance as measured by 
safety climate perception scores. However, their potential (individually and 
collectively) was not being maximised across the value chain. From semi-
structured interview it was confirmed that neither construct was a clear 
feature of established safety strategy, nor was data collected in the form of 
leading indicators contributing to safety performance as an aligned element 
of organisational strategy. From qualitative data it was evident that both 
constructs were positively correlated to safety climate perceptions. However, 
in the absence of clear strategic drive, the researcher concluded that the 
potential for both constructs to generate further improvements in safety 
performance appeared restrained, with the progress from ‘Good’ to ‘Excellent’ 
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safety climate scores likely to occur at a slower pace than may actually be 
possible given the positive correlation between both constructs and safety 
climate strength. 
 
Finally, the Operator safety message and safety expectations were identified 
as the mediating variable in the relationships between the independent 
(predictor) variables analysed (typology, authentic leadership, and 
psychological capital) and the dependent (criterion) variable safety 
performance as measured through safety climate perception scores. The 
safety message and expectations communicated are extremely compliance 
orientated and while sufficient to achieve consistently ‘Good’ safety climate 
scores across the seven assets studied, rationally mechanistic compliance 
may be a contributing impediment to achieving ‘Excellent’ safety climate 
scores in the future. 
 
6.2 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
 
The UK Offshore Oil & Gas industry continues to present a highly hazardous 
working environment for personnel travelling offshore, irrespective of their 
intended activity: exploration, operations, asset life extension or 
decommissioning. There is genuine concern the potential remains for 
accidents to occur for ‘old’ reasons. At a conference event held to mark the 
30th anniversary of the Piper Alpha disaster (Safety 30, 2018) Lord Cullen, 
who conducted the official disaster investigation, presented an address 
containing a stern reminder of the dangers of complacency, particularly the 
dangers associated with not recognising or effectively acting upon warning 
signals. Lord Cullen’s Piper Alpha investigation and report are generally 
credited with raising safety standards within the UK Offshore Oil & Gas 
Industry. Oil & Gas UK’s annually published Health & Safety Report (OGUK, 
2018a) documents this overall improvement; section 3.1 of chapter 1 
provides examples for fatal injuries offshore, over-seven-day specified 
injuries, and process hydrocarbon releases. However, in addition to 
demonstrating improvement in safety performance, the Oil & Gas UK Report 
(ibid) indicates there remains clear potential for further improvement. This 
was endorsed by the 2019 report (OGUK, 2019b) that reported: a 12% 
increase in reportable process safety incidents during 2018; four major 
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hydrocarbon release incidents; and an upward trend in safety critical 
maintenance backlog. Positively, there were no fatalities reported during 
2018 but the over-seven-day injury rate increased by 12% during 2018 and 
the UKCS lost-time injury frequency (0.72 per million hours worked) is higher 
than the all-European average (0.7 per million hours worked). 
 
Henry Ford is frequently quoted as having said “If You Always Do What You’ve 
Always Done, You’ll Always Get What You’ve Always Got”. The originality of 
the conducted research was to depart from the norm of investigating safety 
performance from an operational and technical perspective. Instead, the 
research examined safety performance through a strategic lens with 
consideration for the psychological forces dynamic within Human Factors, 
acknowledging that the dynamics of social interaction have the potential to 
defeat established safety barriers resulting in accidents (Storseth et al., 
2014) with potentially catastrophic outcomes for UK Offshore Oil & Gas 
Industry operating assets. No application of the Miles and Snow (1978) 
organisational typology (Defenders, Prospectors, Analyzers, and Reactors) 
within strategic safety studies of the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry had been 
identified through literature search. Noting the typology approach to have 
been consistently and widely adopted in strategic research Desarbo et al., 
2005; Lin et al., 2013; Helmig et al., 2014; and Hung et al., 2017) since its 
1978 inception it was subsequently placed at the heart of the research 
methodology constructed.  
 
A Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) is considered equivalent to a PhD 
but more applied in nature (RGU, 2018). The academic qualification is 
purposely structured in a manner to generate knowledge and understanding 
within a research field that will contribute to enhancing policies and practices 
in a modern management environment. From that perspective, and given the 
conclusions reached, the unique contribution of the research was identified at 
three levels: Safety Practice; Knowledge; and Methodology. 
 
6.2.1 Contribution to Safety Practice 
 
For UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry stakeholders working across the value 
chain plus safety practitioners, the research conclusions provided a clear 
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illustration of the safety performance improvements to be realised by moving 
beyond the rationally mechanistic focus of compliance to policy, process, and 
procedure with a strong engineering and technical bias. Having a safety 
strategy that aligns with organisational strategy is seen from research as 
essential to drive safety performance and organisational competitiveness. 
Safety strategy would be further meaningfully enhanced if it included a 
psychological capital dynamic of HF plus authentic leadership constructs. Both 
can be objectively measured in a manner that provides leading safety 
performance indicators to strengthen the business balanced scorecard, in 
addition to the more traditional lagging performance indicators. In this way, 
Operator, Contractor, and Sub-contractor organisations would be organised 
to achieve, and demonstrate, a level of safety performance that is more than 
just the absence of accidents. 
 
The Operator safety message and safety expectations deliver strengths to 
safety performance through compliance with control of work arrangements. 
However, it was evident from the research findings that this singular focus 
on compliance limits the potential benefits to be obtained through authentic 
leadership practices plus investment in psychological capital. The safety 
message and expectations communicated are sufficient to achieve 
consistently ‘Good’ safety climate scores across the seven assets studied. The 
stringent focus on compliance combined with the knowledge of penalty for 
non-compliance may result in a more transactional leader-follower type 
relationship where, on offshore assets, there is no clear incentive or reward 
for proactive and improvement-directed behaviour. Kahn (1990, 2010) 
considered improvement in work-place performance may be achieved when 
personnel consider themselves to be actively engaged, and subsequently 
more able to employ themselves without fear of negative consequences; 
individuals were considered more likely to engage themselves when they 
perceive there is a low risk of doing so. Following Kahn’s determination, the 
researcher concluded that when offshore personnel (Operator, Contractor, 
and Sub-contractor) are highly compliance driven, they will be most likely to 
focus on compliance with control of work arrangements and be less likely to 
raise suggestions for improvement. As a result, the rationally mechanistic 
focus compliance acts as a continual impediment to the achievement of 
‘Excellent’ safety climate scores in the future. The research highlights that 
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the disclosed mediating effect of Operator safety message and expectation 
requires to be better and further understood for its potential to be maximised, 
and the impediment effect on safety performance improvement to be 
minimised. 
 
Awareness of organisational typology within the value chain has the potential 
to increase effectiveness of supply chain safety management, not least 
through improved horizontal collaboration relationships, a greater likelihood 
of improved safety strategy alignment, plus more enhanced audit, and 
assessment activity. 
 
6.2.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
The research incorporated an organisational typology approach to safety 
strategy and its influence on offshore asset safety performance, something 
which has not been done before in the context of safety science. Although 
typology was ultimately proven not to influence safety performance at 
offshore assets due to the mediating effect of the Operator safety message 
and expectations, the typology determination offers potential for improved 
supply chain safety management across the value chain. 
 
The research demonstrated it was possible to bring together objective data 
(qualitative and quantitative) collected from two separate research 
populations across a single value chain for sense-making purposes. The two 
data populations although separate, one onshore and one offshore, had a 
common purpose to safely produce hydrocarbons in the form of oil and gas. 
The onshore population supported the offshore population activities, provided 
much of the safety performance governance along with the engineering, 
planning, and technical expertise input. The offshore population enacted the 
governance, engineering, and technical inputs in a highly complex and 
hazardous working environment. The research study constructed enabled 
sense to be made from the onshore perception of how safety performance 
was intended to be achieved and the offshore reality of how safety was 
achieved on a practical and daily basis.  
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Typically, on UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry assets, a majority of personnel 
working are from Contractor or Sub-contractor organisations. This was 
reflected in the research undertaken where the significant percentage of 
respondents were Contractors and Subcontractors (65% and 14% 
respectively). These individuals were from organisations with different 
typologies and safety strategies from those held by Operator company. From 
these differing strategy choices and organisation types, deliberate choices will 
have been made by Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations regarding 
their technology, structure, and processes plus the necessary and integral 
human capital required for them to be competitive and organisationally 
successful.  The safety strategy alignment and typology aspects of Contractor 
or Subcontractor companies are given zero consideration at the offshore asset 
level by the Operator company, where the focus is managing safety to deliver 
safe and efficient production of hydrocarbons. In blindly demanding 
compliance with safety governance and control of work arrangements it may 
be contended that the Operator company was attempting to manage safety 
culture at the asset level. As Martin (1985) noted, culture [hence safety 
culture] is complex in nature; it emerges from members rather than 
becoming created by leaders. The Operator company researched did not 
describe its organisational [safety] culture as simplistically compliance-based, 
it was intended to be the product of members internalising and observing 
clearly stated organisational values where safety was integral to all aspects 
of organisational activity. By being highly compliance driven a significant 
number of offshore personnel (79% in the research) will most likely be 
focused on staying within the Safety Triangle (compliance with control of work 
arrangements) and be less likely to raise suggestions for improvement or 
becoming immersed in the Operator safety culture. Compliance with 
governance and control arrangements through alignment may be sufficient 
to consistently achieve “Good” SCT scores. However, alignment through 
compliance will not deliver immersion in the desired safety culture nor the 
antecedents of improvement focused behaviours. Maintaining the process 
employed at the time of research was concluded unlikely to deliver “Excellent” 
safety climate scores in the future as a robust leading indicator of safety 
performance. This knowledge had not been identified from any previous 
safety science research included within the critical literature review. 
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Boal (2004) considered that strategy and leadership provides a vision and 
road map to permit organisations to evolve and innovate. The study 
confirmed Boal’s considerations for leadership contribution, with authentic 
leadership being positively correlated to safety performance through 
measured safety climate scores (’Good’) at each asset. Across the value 
chain, however, strategic alignment varied across the differing typologies; 
from semi-structured interview it was observed to be absent with the Reactor 
typology. Unknown before the research was conducted, it was concluded that 
typology and strategy associations for Contractor and Sub-contractor 
organisations did not influence safety performance as measured by safety 
climate scores, due to the mediating effect of the Operator’s control of work 
governance compliance requirements. Boswell et al. (2006) concluded a 
consistent HF definition when aligned with strategy and effective leadership 
may lead to increased safety performance. The findings of this study 
demonstrated that safety performance measured through safety climate was 
‘Good’ across all seven assets studied despite an observed lack of HF 
understanding maturity and a lack of strategic alignment across the 
Operator’s value chain. The claim being made from the research is that a 
consistent HF definition when aligned with safety strategy [linked to 
organisational strategy], supported by authentic leadership and a 
psychologically capable workforce may propel an asset to ‘Excellent’ safety 
performance. 
 
Not previously reported in safety science research, the study confirmed the 
Operator safety message as an important mediating variable, capable of 
limiting the influence of differing organisational typologies, plus reducing the 
benefits to be gained through authentic leadership and psychological capital 
influence. The study was conducted on a typical value chain, representative 
of the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry and it is normal for Operator companies 
to have a concise safety message supported by a series of safety 
expectations. Knowledge gained from the research demonstrates the 
importance of understanding the mediating power of these safety culture 
artefacts. In this way the positive benefits leading to improved safety 
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6.2.3 Contribution to Method 
 
Given the more practical considerations of the DBA, the research confirmed 
the value of deploying (where possible) previously established and validated 
data collection tools within the techniques and procedures of the research 
being conducted. Doing so permitted a greater percentage of available 
research time to be allocated data analysis and sense-making of the findings 
rather than proving data collection method(s) validation. Using such an 
approach to method deployment also provides opportunity for novel 
application of data collection instruments in areas where they had not been 
previously used. Within the conducted research, the HSL Safety Climate Tool 
(SCT) was used for the first time in a data collection exercise along with the 
Authentic Leadership Questionnaire (ALQ) and Psychological Capital 
Questionnaire (PCQ) in a UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry application. The 
method deployed was also a re-validation of the SCT application in the Oil & 
Gas Industry; its first use came in previous research (Spence, 2013) as a 
stand-alone instrument. Using SCT combined in an Offshore Workforce Safety 
Study delivered reliable data, confirmed through use of Cronbach’s Alpha and 
Inter-Item Mean Correlation determinations. 
 
A final, practical, method contribution came directly from the second 
additional limitation described in chapter 5, section 5.7. The contribution is 
an identified emphasis [perhaps necessity] to have research permission that 
includes data gathering interviews, for example structured or semi-
structured, when conducting research on offshore installations. The research 
populations are remote on offshore assets and logistically constrained. It 
would be preferential to have interview permission granted and subsequently 
not used rather than attempting to obtain it later. Also, personnel change 
regularly on assets; in returning later to interview, a researcher may 
interview subjects that did not complete the original research questionnaires, 
a different population, thereby reducing the viability of data collected and 
outcome of research. This practical contribution is directed at researchers 
with little practical experience of the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry and the 
associated logistical challenges; flight and bed-space availability. 
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For the research conducted, interviews would have been explanatory in 
purpose, not least to further explore the mediating role of the Operator 
company safety message relationship between the independent (predictor) 
variables of typology, authentic leadership, and psychological capital and the 
dependent (criterion) variable of safety performance. The research approval 
was granted [and accepted] in the knowledge there was no provision for 
offshore interview to be conducted across the seven assets sampled. The lack 
of interview did not detract from obtained data validity and reliability however 
there was reduced ability to obtain insight into the ‘why’ behind the ‘what’ 
during data analysis and sense-making research activities.  
 
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
 
Given the DBA’s focus on generating knowledge and understanding within a 
research field that will contribute to enhancing policies and practices in a 
modern management environment (RGU, 2018), chapter 1 section 10.0 
highlighted anticipated research recommendations likely to be of interest to 
a wide range of stakeholders in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry, including 
safety practitioners and managers. Intended to provide for improved safety 
performance, the recommendations were anticipated to address: improved 
safety strategy alignment with organisational strategy; development of safety 
leadership skills; enhanced psychological strength of the offshore workforce; 
and improvements to Contractor and Sub-contractor evaluation and control 
within the value chain. Following the research conducted, findings discussed, 
and conclusions drawn, four recommendations subsequently created with an 
intent to assist with development and implementation of appropriate business 
strategies, supported by effective leadership, to ensure that accidents no 
longer occur for ‘old’ [Piper Alpha-era] reasons. 
 
Recommendation 1 addressed safety strategy. From the research findings it 
was confirmed that none of the Operator, Contractor or Sub-contractor 
organisations had safety strategy plans established as stand-alone 
documents. For Operator and Contractor organisations, safety strategies 
were present but documented across governance documentation supported 
by goals, objectives, and targets. Scorecards including safety performance 
measures were confirmed for Operator and Contractor organisations. For the 
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former, performance measures were confirmed to be leading and lagging in 
nature; for the latter, the performance indicators were lagging. It is 
recommended safety strategy safety becomes clearly aligned with 
organisational strategy to deliver not only continually improving safety 
performance improvement but increased competitiveness, innovation, and 
economic success while at the same time minimising the deterioration of 
human capital. Moreover, monitoring of safety performance through both 
leading and lagging indicators is critical to driving safety performance 
improvement and organisational competitiveness. The closed-loop 
management system model (Business Scorecard) linking strategy and 
operations provides a suitable model for achievement. Safety Climate 
perceptions have been validated as a robust leading indicator of safety 
performance. Given the research findings demonstrated both authentic 
leadership and psychological capital were positively correlated with safety 
performance the SCT, ALQ, and PCT measurement instruments are 
recommended to be used as leading safety performance indicators for input 
to a Balanced Scorecard aligning safety strategy with overall organisational 
strategy. 
 
Recommendation 2 addresses development programmes to enhance the 
psychological capital (Efficacy, Hope, Resiliency, and Optimism) of the 
offshore workforce. The research identified a positive-medium correlation 
between the obtained PCQ scores and the perceived safety climate scores. 
Therefore, as the PCQ scores increase indicating strengthening psychological 
capital (PsyCap), the identified correlation indicates that the safety climate 
scores (as a robust leading indicator of safety performance) would also 
increase. This outcome identifies psychological capital as an antecedent of 
safety climate. Further, given there was no statistical difference determined 
between the three workforce groupings of Operator, Contractor and Sub-
contractor the recommendation for PsyCap development is equally applicable 
to Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations. The anticipated 
outcome of such a development programme would be that offshore workers 
would be more psychologically capable, independently robust, and self-
confident, such that they may be less susceptible to adverse dynamics of 
social interaction such as persuasion, pressure, and power. Also, more likely 
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to avoid pitfalls such as confirmation bias, normalisation of deviation, and 
groupthink.  
 
Similarly, recommendations 3 concerns development programmes to 
enhance authentic leadership (transparency, moral/ethical, balanced 
processing, and self-awareness) practice and perception within offshore 
workforce. The research identified a positive-medium correlation between the 
obtained ALQ scores and the perceived safety climate scores. Therefore, as 
the ALQ scores increase indicating strengthening authentic leadership traits, 
the identified correlation indicates that the safety climate scores (as a robust 
leading indicator of safety performance) would also increase. This research 
outcome identifies authentic leadership as an antecedent of safety climate. 
Further, given there was no statistical difference determined between the 
three workforce groupings of Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor the 
recommendation for authentic leadership development is equally applicable 
to Operator, Contractor and Sub-contractor organisations. Development of 
authentic leadership traits and improved understanding within the leader-
follower relationship may eliminate the perception observed through the 
research where leaders consider themselves to be more authentic than their 
followers perceive them to be. 
 
Finally, recommendation 4 encourages a step change in approach by moving 
beyond traditional rationally mechanistic and compliance based HSE audits 
and to include topics such as: safety strategy and strategic alignment; 
leadership competency and styles; plus, psychosocial risks. This proactive 
style of audit can be considered as leading in nature and offers up further 
potential for inclusion in a Balanced Scorecard approach, such as the closed 
loop management system with the opportunity to ensure alignment between 
safety and organisational strategy. By persisting with a rationally mechanistic 
and compliance-based approach to HSE auditing, both internally and across 
the supply chain, Operator and Contractor organisations are highly likely to 
be missing an opportunity to create safety performance improvements with 
the resultant shift in asset safety climate scores from ‘Good’ to ‘Excellent’. 
Such audits are not assisting organisations to validate and verify that they 
have developed and implemented appropriate business strategies, supported 
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by effective leadership to ensure they reduce the likelihood of having 
accidents and incidents for ‘old’ reasons.  
 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
Chapter 1 section 10.0 also highlighted anticipated research outcomes as new 
areas and topics for safety science research. Considering the data, findings, 
discussion, conclusion the following four areas for future research are 
outlined.  
 
Firstly, and in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry setting of offshore assets. 
authentic leadership and psychological capital, which is the antecedent? From 
the research conducted both constructs were seen to have a medium positive 
correlation to safety performance as measured by safety climate perceptions. 
However, there was a weaker, but still positive relationship between the two 
constructs. Research to determine which is the antecedent would have 
practical implications for human capital development leading to improved 
safety performance on offshore assets. 
 
Secondly, and persisting with the positive psychology theme, an area 
identified for future research was to determine the antecedents and 
consequences of positive organisational behaviour on offshore assets, 
considering the role of psychological capital for promoting wellbeing among 
the offshore workforce during turbulent economic times in an industry with 
an increasingly less favourable public perception. 
 
Thirdly, from the data collected and analysed, asset safety climate scores 
were consistently rated as ‘Good’ against the HSL established performance 
groupings. The Operator safety message and safety expectations were 
identified as the mediating variable in the relationships between the 
independent (predictor) variables analysed (authentic leadership, and 
psychological capital) and the dependent (criterion) safety performance as 
measured through safety climate perception scores. There may be value in 
researching the strength of the mediating variable to understand the degree 
of impediment to improving safety climate scores from ‘Good’ to ‘Excellent’; 
possibly determining more effective means of harnessing the mediating 
power and leading to safety performance improvement. 
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Finally, a recommendation for conducting research to determine the 
psychosocial risks likely to be found on offshore oil and gas assets, to facilitate 
improved hazard analysis, risk assessment and risk control processes. Given 
that international safety management standards (e.g. ISO 45001:2018) do 
not deal explicitly with psychosocial risks, such research would also provide 
a robust basis for improved psychosocial risk auditing, including the 
identification of additional auditor competence and training requirements. 
 
6.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The chapter concluded the thesis by presenting to the reader research 
conclusions to demonstrate how the findings deduced addressed the 
established research aim of: 
 
‘Analyse the relationship between organisational typology, safety strategy 
(both its construct and implementation), leadership and safety climate’. 
 
In a study of this nature, previously not undertaken, the research identified 
organisational typology patterns across the value chain. Operator and 
Contractor organisations were determined to typically identify as Defenders 
and Prospectors; Sub-contractors as Analyzers and Reactors. Considering 
safety performance at the offshore assets as measured by safety climate 
perception it was concluded that organisational typology had no influence. 
psychological capital and authentic leadership were both found to positively 
correlate to safety climate scores, with each asset measuring as ‘Good’ on a 
validated scoring system. However, for all three constructs, the mediating 
effect of the Operator company safety message was strong through its 
insistence on compliance with the Operating company control of work 
arrangements. 
 
Contributions to practice, knowledge and method were identified. Four 
recommendations were made for practice plus four for future safety science 
research.  
 
*** *** *** 
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APPENDIX 1 
Semi-structured Interview Schedule 
 
Interview Subject Background: 
 
Q1 Please describe your employing organisation and the services provided to the Operator 
Company. 
 
Q2 What is your discipline background (e.g. engineering, science, business etc.)? 
 
Q3 How long have you been in your current role? 
 
Q4 What was your previous role? 
 
Q5 How long have you been working in the UK Oil & Gas Industry 
 
Research Objective 1 (Organisational Typology): 
 
Q6 For the value chain in question would your organisation be considered an ‘Operator’, 
‘Contractor’ or ‘Sub-contractor’? 
 
Q7 In an attempt to determine the organisational typologies that make-up the Operator 
Value Chain. Can you highlight where your organisation fits into the various descriptions 
put in front of you? If there is no exact fit, it is OK to identify a between position. 
 
Research Objective 2 (Safety Strategy): 
 
Q8 Does your organisation have a defined Safety Strategy? 
 
Q9 Is it documented? 
 
Q10 How is it communicated? 
 
Q11 Is it an integral element of overall business strategy, part of e.g. the business scorecard? 
 
Q12 If part of the business scorecard, what safety measures are included (e.g. leading or 
lagging indicators)? 
 
Q13 Does the Safety Strategy include Human Factors aspects? If “yes” what aspects? 
 
Q14 Does the Safety Strategy feature elements to (1) positively influence Hazard 
Identification (2) prevent the normalisation of warnings (3) avoid consensus mode 
decision making (4) avoid confirmation bias and (5) avoid group think? 
 
Research Objective 2 (Workforce Psychological Capital): 
 
Q15 In an attempt to ensure your offshore workforce does not succumb to production versus 
safety pressures, what activities does your organisation engage in to support and 
encourage both workers and leaders to avoid this pitfall? 
 
Q16 Do these efforts extend to staff and sub-contractor staff? 
 
Q17 How would you describe your offshore workforce? 
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Q18 Are these steps taken as a direct result of the established Safety Strategy and included 
on the Scorecard? 
 
Q19 Does your organisation engage in any assessment of the Psychological Capital levels 
within the offshore workforce? 
 
Q20 If there is no measurement, how does the organisation know if it is being effective and 
achieving its aims? 
 
Research Objective 3 (Safety Leadership): 
 
Q21 Please describe the type of safety leaders your organisation aims to put into the 
offshore workforce? 
 
Q22 Are these steps taken as a direct result of the established Safety Strategy and included 
on the Scorecard? 
 
Q23 Does your organisation conduct any type of safety leadership assessment and/or 
measurement? 
 
Q24 If there is no measurement, how does the organisation know if it is being effective and 
achieving its safety leadership aims and objectives? 
 
Research Objectives 4 & 5 (Safety Climate): 
 
Q25 Does you organisation conduct any safety culture or climate surveys as a predictor of 
safe performance within your offshore workforce? 
 
Q26 If “yes”, is this as a direct result of the established Safety Strategy and included on the 
Scorecard? 
 
Q27 If “yes”, what validated Safety Culture or Climate measurement tool is used? 
 
Q28 How are the results of Safety Culture or Climate surveys used to improve safety 
performance in your organisation? 
 
Q29 If you are not the Operator and do conduct Safety Culture or Climate surveys, how are 
the results feedback to the Operator organisation for their subsequent use? 
 
Q30 In the event your organisation is a contractor or sub-contractor to the Operating 
organisation then your workforce will be subject to Operator company Control of Work 
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APPENDIX 2 
Research Information Sheet 
 
UK OIL & GAS INDUSTRY - OFFSHORE WORKFORCE SAFETY RESEARCH 
 
Objective. This semi-structured interview has been designed in support of a 6-year 
part-time Doctoral research study that is evaluating the influence of organisational 
typology on safety strategy construction to address the psychological forces 
dynamic of Human Factors (HF) within: Operations, Asset Life Extension and 
Decommissioning.  
 
The aim of the research is to “Analyse the relationship between organisational 
typology, safety strategy (both its construct and implementation), leadership and 
individual safety performance capability.” The established research objectives are: 
 
1. To determine the extent of the influence exerted by organisational typology on the 
construction of safety strategy as an aligned element of overall organisational 
strategy. 
2. To establish whether the psychological forces component of Human Factors is 
embraced within constructed safety strategies, considering psychological capital 
as an antecedent of safety focused behaviour.  
3. To evaluate the organisational typology associations with Authentic Leadership at 
the operational level on offshore assets during the lifecycle phases. 
4. To determine how the preceding three aspects of safety strategy implementation 
combine to produce individual asset safety climate profiles across the value chain. 
 
The information obtained from your valuable interview will be analysed alongside 
data obtained from document and literature review, also from a four-part offshore 
workforce survey. 
 
Confidentiality. No asset, individual or organisation will be uniquely identified within 
the analysis or the subsequent thesis write-up. Raw data will be maintained 
confidentially by the Researcher and will subsequently not be shared with any 
additional party (individual or organisation). Data analysis will be completed 
exclusively by the Researcher: 
 
Phil Spence, UK Decommissioning HSE Manager 
[RGU Student ID 1011969 - p.a.spence@rgu.ac.uk] 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation with this original research project. 
 
I willingly agree to participate in the research interview. I give my consent 
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APPENDIX 3 
Organisational Typology Marking Grid 
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APPENDIX 4 









This survey document has been prepared in support of a 6-year part-time doctoral research 
study that is evaluating the influence of organisational typology on safety strategy construction 
to address the psychological forces dynamic of Human Factors (HF) within: Operations, Asset 
Life Extension and Decommissioning. The information obtained from this questionnaire will be 
analysed alongside data obtained from document and literature review, also from interviews 
conducted through a purposive sampling exercise. 
 
The aim of this questionnaire is to obtain your valuable views on various aspects of work and/or 
the work environment related to safety climate and safety performance. To ensure that your 
own thoughts and opinions are objectively represented, please take the time to complete the 
document frankly and spontaneously. The questionnaire will take approximately 15 to 20 




The questionnaire is designed to be completed anonymously and the feedback will be treated 
confidentially. No individual or asset will be uniquely identified within the written results or the 
subsequent thesis write-up. Please complete the survey in the time permitted during the Safety 
Meeting then give it back to your HSE Advisor. Data analysis will be completed by the 
Researcher: 
 
Phil Spence, UK Decommissioning HSE Manager 
[RGU Student ID 1011969 - p.a.spence@rgu.ac.uk] 
 
The questionnaire will be available from October 2018 until end-March 20199. Feedback on the 
research results will be provided to each surveyed asset during Q4 2019 once the analysis has 
been completed, evaluated and conclusions drawn. Thank you very much for your cooperation 
with this original research project. 
 
How to complete the questionnaire 
 
After indicating the name of the asset where you’re working plus some anonymous outline 
points about yourself and your employing company, the questionnaire itself contains four 
sections. Depending on your role you’ll be prompted to answer three or all four sections: 
 
1) Leadership Part A – to be completed by everyone. 
2) Leadership Part B – to be completed if you lead teams of 2 or more people 
3) Safety Climate – to be completed by everyone 
4) Psychological Capital – to be completed by everyone 
 




























What is the name of the asset (fixed platform, accommodation work vessel or drilling rig) that 
you are working on? 
 
Asset Name: 
……………………………………………………………………………………. [to be anonymised in reporting] 
 
 
Points About Yourself 
 
The following information will be used to make group comparisons only and your questionnaire 
will not be analysed on an individual basis. Please circle one response to each question. 
 
A. Which phase of offshore activity are you involved in? 
 
1. Drilling Well Operations 
2. Production Operations 
3. Asset Life Extension 
4. Decommissioning 
5. Plug & Abandon Well Operations 
 





C. If “No” to Question B above, what is your employing company’s relationship with the 
Operating Company? 
 
1. Contractor (i.e. contracts directly to the Operating Company) 
2. Sub-contractor (i.e. sub-contracts to a Contractor company) 
 
D. On this asset, how do you fit into the organisation structure? 
 
1. Individual contributor 
2. Leader of 2 or more people 
 
E. What is the length of your UKCS Offshore Oil & Gas Industry experience? 
 
1. Less than 1 year 
2. 1 to 3 years 
3. 3 to 5 years 
4. 5 to 10 years 
5. Greater than 10 years 
 











Section 1 - Leadership Part A 
(to be completed by everyone) 
 
The following survey items refer to your leader’s style, as you perceive it. Judge how 
frequently each statement fits his or her leadership style using the following scale and by 
putting an X in the corresponding box: 
 










0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
Section 2 - Leadership Part B 
(to be completed only if you lead teams of 2 or more people) 
 
The following survey items refer to your personal leadership style, as you perceive it. Judge 
how frequently each statement fits his or her leadership style using the following scale and by 
putting an X in the corresponding box. 
 










0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
Section 3 – Safety Climate 
(to be completed by everyone) 
 
Answer the following statements by placing an x in the box for the statement that most closely 










January is a much colder 
month than June. 
   x  
 
 
Section 4 – Psychological Capital 
(to be completed by everyone) 
 
 
Below are statements that describe how you may think about yourself right now. Use the 
following scale to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement and 
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Ease of Completion 
 
Please advise your thoughts on the ease/difficulty of completing this questionnaire by putting 









     
 
 
Finally, do you have any additional comments about leadership, safety climate and/or safety 
performance on your asset? Please use the Additional Comments box on the following page. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Offshore Workforce Safety Study – Comments 
 
A2-34: “Feel most safe on Asset A2 compared to other operated assets”. 
 
A2-43: “New safety initiatives often introduce new layers of paperwork, 
duplicating what we are already doing, but using vague and 
imprecise language. Formal permits and risk assessments are 
robust and well evolved to control work activities safely”. 
 
A5-25: “I don’t think most of these questions were anything to do with 
safety”. 
 
A5-44: “It’s easier for companies to go after easy things that the HSE 
legislation or provided guidance on. Anything that HSE doesn’t 
really touch, Companies see their responsibility to act as minimal 
+ something they don’t have to worry about too much”. 
 
A5-68: “Another box ticking exercise”. 
 
A6-06: “You might not agree with all the rules all the time or the referee’s 
decision every time but without them there would be no game at 
all. Just chaos”. 
 
A6-10: “Research Factor 4. Q27 – there are not too many procedures but 
to follow them there is often too much paperwork/checklists etc. 
which are repeated daily often for the same thing – this could be 
streamlined”. 
 
A7-10: “Management away from the decks/floor tend to jump on all small 
infringements but forget all those rules where it effects 
performance or down time. Double standards breed contempt for 
the rules. Either follow 100% or not!” 
 
A7-24: “Asset A7 team followed all standards. Good team work to set 
goals”. 
 





At the time of finalising thesis write-up, I am employed as a HSEQ Manager, 
Decommissioning & Major Projects for a major Exploration & Production (E&P) 
company working in the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry. Previously in my 30-
plus year career I have been a HSEQ Practitioner, a Management Systems 
Auditor, a Freelance HSEQ Consultant, and a Trainer.  
 
I would strongly contend that my Doctoral journey began on 17th March 2009 
when an employee of a UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry service company I 
was working for at the time, someone I did not know and had never met, had 
an accident in a works vehicle after an alleged substance abuse episode. 
Several weeks later I found myself in an involuntary job separation situation, 
no recourse to unfair dismissal procedures, an uncertain future, and the 
potential for a significantly lowered prestige level (Malo and Munoz-Bullon, 
2008). I was not ‘fired’, rather I departed with a Compromise Agreement 
along with an overwhelming sense of professional indignation. As the seven-
month incumbent HSE Manager I had paid the ultimate professional price, 
seemingly a ‘scapegoat’ for the serious accident and subsequent 
organisational fall-out. Someone had to be at fault and there was no energy 
apparent within the company for establishing contributing factors; whether 
they were personal in nature, related to the workplace or indeed the company 
itself. The company wanted to set a HSE example and what better a way to 
do it than change out the HSE Manager. I had been asked to demonstrate my 
qualifications for the job and after re-presenting my Under-Graduate degree, 
HSEQ IRCA Auditor accreditations and Charterships (Institute of Biology and 
Chartered Quality Institute) I was informed they were no longer sufficient. As 
a direct consequence, I created a 5-year strategy of continuing personal and 
professional development to ensure the risk of [again] being the ‘scapegoat’ 
was reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).  
 
A key component of this strategy was to pursue accredited and formal 
education in the Occupational Health and Safety subject matter area. I 
enrolled with the Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen during academic year 
2010/2011 to study for a Post Graduate Certificate in Health, Safety and Risk 
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Management. This was immediately followed by the Post Graduate Diploma; 
finally, successful completion of the Master of Science one year later. 
Participation in these Post Graduate studies added strength and substance to 
my ‘day job’ and, I firmly believe, increased value to my labour and delivery. 
The studies also served to fuel my interest in areas such as safety climate, 
culture, leadership. They propelled me to new subject matter areas that I had 
never considered before such as strategy, positive psychology, plus human 
and social capital. At the end of the MSc study, I was left with a key 
unanswered question, where do further opportunities exist for improved 
health and safety performance in the UK Offshore Oil and Gas Industry? My 
application to enrol in the DBA program was subsequently submitted and my 
strategy for personal and professional development extended out to a 10-
year plan. 
 
Throughout my career, Continuing Professional Development (CPD) has 
consistently been a fundamental and intrinsically rewarding element of my 
working life.  Naturally, I placed the DBA journey at the heart of CPD and 
management of my career path in Health and Safety (Hale and Booth, 2019) 
having made the deliberate choice of pursuing academic rigour over the 
National Examination Board in Occupational Safety & Health (NEBOSH) 
courses. Part way through the DBA journey I attained Graduate membership 
of the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (Grad IOSH); upon 
completion of my DBA I shall dedicate time to seek full Chartered Membership 
(CMIOSH) and at a future career stage, Chartered Fellow (CFIOSH). 
 
The collapse in crude oil prices during 2015 and subsequent persistent low-
price environment has transformed the UK Offshore Oil & Gas Industry into a 
turbulent and volatile employment market. My employing organisation 
throughout this period had almost annual rounds of redundancy, with the 
number of job losses each year amongst staff necessitating statutory 
consultation under Employment Law. The level of workforce cuts also affected 
the supply chain organisations and there were also significant reductions in 
Contractor and Sub-contractor personnel. Anxiety levels (including personal) 
were understandably high during this period which made research and study 
extremely difficult. However, I remain convinced that the personal and 
professional development received through participation in the DBA process 
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enabled me to demonstrate additional added value for the organisation, 
thereby increasing job security. Since commencing my Post-Graduate 
journey, particularly the DBA component, my organisational and managerial 
responsibilities have increased significantly. 
 
DBA studies have ensured that I approach my role through a strategic lens 
and I no longer occupy an HSE ‘bubble’. I see HSE activities as means to an 
end rather than as an end in themselves. Gaining insight to the subject of 
Psychological Capital and its core construct of Efficacy/Confidence, Hope, 
Resiliency and Optimism has made a significant difference to my personal and 
professional life. I will continue to use the measurement tool as a personal 
barometer and a basis for future development. In a similar vein, the Authentic 
Leadership construct (transparency, moral/ethical perspective, balanced 
processing, and self-awareness) has become invaluable to me and my 
managerial responsibilities as an HSEQ Professional. 
 
Possibly most importantly, the DBA process has resulted in my becoming 
more analytical and questioning than ever before during a 30-plus year career 
in Health and Safety, Environmental and Quality management. The research 
process exposed me to the stark realisation that, as a HSEQ Management 
Systems Auditor, I had been blinded by the rationally mechanistic nature of 
management system standards and therefore at best my deliverables 
provided for mediocrity rather than excellence in performance improvement 
outcomes. Such is the nature of the attitudinal adjustment that has occurred 
during my DBA journey, the analytical and questioning changes exist at a 
personal level too. 
 
Where the future is concerned, there are ways in which I intend to capitalise 
and take forward on the education and learning commenced during my DBA 
journey. Certainly, I will continue with exploratory reading to further advance 
my knowledge and understanding in factors contributing to safety 
performance: particular emphasis on safety critical organisational 
applications. Secondly, I fully intend to use the knowledge gained [and future 
knowledge yet to be obtained] to work with my employing organisation to 
assist in delivering safety performance improvements recognising the 
psychological forces dynamics of HF plus effective safety leadership rather 
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than just the persistent focus on engineering and technical aspects of safety. 
Having identified potential research opportunities, I would like to maintain a 
link with Robert Gordon University and participate in research activity, 
possibly to extend the findings of the safety science research outlined in this 
thesis. 
 
Thanks to Robert Gordon University for having faith in my potential, and for 
endorsing the original research proposal. 
 
*** *** *** 
 
